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ABSTRACT
Building upon the frontier policies and the handling of 
tribal affairs of previous dynasties, the Ming Court systematised 
the t’u-ssu chieftain institution as an instrument for 
controlling tribal administration in southwestern China. At the 
same time, t 'u-kuan prefectural governments in which the official 
status and administration were the same as those of the regular 
prefectural government were established. The headship of both 
was conferred upon chieftains, but the registrars and secretaries 
of the t ’ u-ssu government and the deputies and subordinates of 
the t’u-kuan government were mostly Han civil servants. After 
the abolition of a t’u-ssu, the Court had to consider whether the 
use of a fragmentation strategy or the application of kai-t’u 
kuei-liu was more advantageous. The former being a policy of 
establishing many small, weak territories ruled by new chieftains 
and Han officials was usually adopted for reasons of economy.
The kai-t'u kuei-liu policy which led to the change from tribal 
to regular government and the replacement of tribal chiefs with 
regular officials required considerable financial investment to 
be successful. In carrying out this transformation, the Court 
achieved its two greatest successes in the establishment of 
Kweichow province after the suppression of the t ’u-ssu 
governments of Ssu-chou and Ssu-nan in 1413 in the early Ming 
and in the creation of the two prefectures of Tsun-i and P 1ing- 
yüeh by the abolition of the Po-chou t 'u-ssu government in 1601 
in the late Ming.
The Yang family had ruled over Po-chou for seven and a 
quarter centuries since 876 A.D. By following an opportunistic
it
policy, the Yang family had maintained good feudal relations 
with a succession of dynastic houses. Having suffered official 
oppression and judicial trials from provincial authorities, the 
twenty-ninth ruler Yang Ying-lung revolted against the 
government. Displaying his antagonism towards five subordinate 
tribal chiefs and seven prominent local families, Yang Ying-lung 
confiscated their lands and property to provision his Miao troops 
in fighting against government forces and making raids over a 
wide area in northern Kweichow and southern Szechuan for several 
years. Thus the feudal relationship was broken and the social 
order severely disrupted. The local government forces failed to 
subjugate the uprising and the central government could not 
organise a new campaign because of the massive military 
commitment to keep Korea resist Japanese aggression. After the 
end of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) in Korea, a government- 
tribal united force of 240,000 was recruited to conduct a 
suppression campaign against Yang Ying-lung. Finally, in 1600, 
Ying-lung was defeated and committed suicide. Owing to the 
expense of the military campaigns and the request for political 
reforms, the Ming authorities implemented a kai-t’u kuei-liu 
policy. The rule by the Yang family was abolished and Po-chou 
was divided into two new prefectures under the jurisdiction of 
Szechuan and Kweichow respectively.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
Proper Names
The romanisation system employed in this thesis is the 
Wade-Giles for Chinese, including personal names, official 
titles, geographical names and special terms. Provinces and 
widely known places of the Ming and Mongol names are given 
according to their conventional English spellings. Chinese 
characters presented in the maps, the Chronology Used in the 
Text, the Ming Reign Periods and in Appendix Two (The Genealogy 
of the Yang Family in Po-chou) are not furnished in the 
Glossary. Special abbreviations are included at the beginning 
of Appendices One and Two as specific guides to the reader.
The Calendar and the Hour Period
Dates are calculated according to the western calendar. 
Time indicated in the original sources by Chinese hour (shih- 
oh’en) has been converted to Western time. (There are twelve 
Chinese hours in a day. The first Chinese hour period is from 
11 p.m. to 1 a.m.)
Weights and Measures
Standard units include the following, with approximate 
English equivalents:
<0^ mou = 1/6.6 acre
%  tan (measure of grain) = picul = 133.3 pounds 
oh 'ien = 1/10 tael of silver
ting (paper cash) = 5 kuan = 5,000 copper cash 
li = 1/3 English mile
V i 7. i
Civil Service Degrees
/v chü-jen = provincial graduate (second degree)
}ff. 1' chin-shih = metropolitan graduate (third and
highest degree )
CHRONOLOGY USED
Shang >1
Chou ftl
Warring States 'f\ (S
Ch' in
v- : %Former Han <11
Later Han
Shu Han ^ >1
Western Chin &
T ' ang h
Five Dynasties 5- k
Liao i t
Northern Sung J t '/fs
Southern Sung vf) t
L—Chin it
Yuan 70
\dÜMing . ♦
Ch 'ing
IN THE TEXT
c. 1766-1123 B.C 
1122- 249 B.C 
403- 221 B.C 
221- 207 B.C 
206 B.C.-A .D 
25- 220 
221- 264 
265- 317 
618- 906 
907- 960 
907-1125 
960-1126 
1127-1279 
1115-1234 
1279-1368 
1368-1644 
1644-1911
MING REIGN PERIODS
Hung-wu 1368-1398
Chicn-wcn t  V 1399-1402
Yung-lo 1403-1424
Hung-hsi
Hsüan-te
- i t  l i e  / . > . - ,
t  %
1425
1426-1435
Cheng-t ' ung jL 1436-1449
Ching-t ' ai ;.i b K  ' P 1450-1456
T ' ien-shun t  " I f 1457-1464
Ch ' eng-hua 1465-1487
Hung-chih 1488-1505
Cheng-te j l  f t 1506-1521
Chia-ching |  >i %<] 1522-1566
Lung-ch'ing 1567-1572
Wan-li 1573-1620
T ' ai-ch ' ang 1620
T ' ien-ch1i £  A t 1621-1627
Ch1ung-chen
j. >
- f  < 7 1628-1644
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITATIONS
CTWKP Chao-tai wu-kung-pien
DMB Dictionary of Ming Biography3 1368-1644
HMCSWP Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien
KC Kuo ch 'üeh
KCTH Kuo-ch 'ao tien-hui
MCHC Man-ssu ho-chih
MS Ming shih
MSCSPM Ming -shih chi-shih pen-mo
MSK Ming shih kao
PPCS P 'ing Po ch'ilan-shu
SL Ming shih-lu
TIFC Tsun-i fu-chih
TMHT Ta-Ming hui-tien
WLSTCK Wan-li san-ta-cheng k rao
YSCC Yang-shih chia-chuan
INTRODUCTION
China is a multi-ethnic country. Over fifty ethnic
minority nationalities make up about six per cent of the total
population, the rest being Han Chinese. V7hile comprising a
small percentage of the population, the ethnic minorities are
spread over 50-60 per cent of the territory of present-day
China. More than half of these have for many thousand years
made their homes in the mountainous areas of the southwestern
provinces of Yunnan, Szechuan and Kweichow, in western Hunan in
central south China, as well as in Kwangsi, Kwangtung and
Fukien in the south.^ During the Ming era (1368-1644) the
registered population of China was around 60,000,000 to over 
265,000,000. The population of ethnic minorities is unknown. 
Therefore the proportion of minorities to Han Chinese in Ming 
times cannot be accurately estimated.
Undoubtedly there were large groups of minority tribesmen 
in southwestern China, such as the Chuang in Kwangsi, the Miao 
in Kweichow and the Yi in Yunnan. Some ethnic groups 
established independent or semi-independent domains which 
survived for several centuries; some persisted for over one 
thousand years. The T 'ien clan of Ssu-chou in Kweichow, for 
example, was said to have lasted since the Former Han dynasty
People’s Hand Book (Peking, 1965), 115-116; China: A
Geographical Sketch (Peking, 1974), 6-7.
 ^Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of China3 1368-1953
(London, 1967), 9, 22.
23(206 B.C.-7 A .D.). The ancestor of the An clan of Shui-hsi in 
Kweichow had led his tribesmen to assist Prime Minister Chu-ko 
Liang (181-234 A.D.) of Shu Han (221-264 A.D.) in his southern 
expedition.^ The Tuan clan of Ta-li in Yunnan and the Yang 
clan of Po-chou in Kweichow (Szechuan in Ming times) had
5founded their domains in the T'ang period (618-906 A.D.).
As Han-Chinese political influence gradually penetrated 
south and southwestern China, the imperial Courts tried to 
institute direct rule by regular officials in the border 
regions or the sinicised tribal areas wherever possible. Han- 
Chinese administrators were appointed to tribal areas with 
responsibility for tribal affairs during the pre-T'ang period; 
later, the imperial Courts of the T'ang and Sung (960-1279) 
dynasties established chi-mi fu chou (military and civil 
prefecture under loose rein) in the frontier regions because 
they found it expedient to accept nominal overlordship over a 
tribe by reinstating its old chieftain or by appointing a Han 
leader with a military following in place of a defeated 
chieftain. With the establishment of this special institution, 
the chieftain of such a prefecture was conferred the title of 
Tu-tu (military governor) or Tz ’u-shih (governor) with rights
T'ien Ju-ch'eng, Yen-chiao chi-wen (Chang-sha, 1938. Reprint 
of the 1617 Chi-lu hui-pien edition.), 59:7a.
4 Chang T'ing-yu et al. , Ming shih (Peking, 1974. Hereafter 
abbreviated as MS), 27:3169.
5 MS, 27-8067; Sung Lien, Yang-shih chia-chuan [Sung-hsüeh-shih 
ch'ilan-chi edition, 1887, n.p. Hereafter abbreviated as YSCC) , 
10:31b.
3of hereditary succession for his family.6 During the Yiian 
(1260-1368) and Ming dynasties, the imperial Courts reformed 
the institution by setting up pacification offices known as the 
t 'u-ssu system. The Yiian Court appointed an equal-ranked 
Mongol darughachi (normally a tax collector) to form a dual 
rulership with the native chieftain to govern a tribal district; 
the Ming Court appointed lower-ranked Han-Chinese officials as 
registrars and clerks to participate in tribal administration. 
Such pacification offices or native prefectures under loose 
rein in Ming times constituted a frontier prefectural system in 
name but a frontier feudal system in reality. Therefore, the 
Ming Court started to adopt a policy known as kai-t'u kuei-liu 
to convert them into regular prefectures and districts directly 
under the control of the provincial governments. This approach 
to tribal affairs was later widely used by the imperial Court 
of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911).
This dissertation intends to assess the evolution of Court 
policy towards the minority groups from chi-mi to the t 'u-ssu 
institution to kai-t'u kuei-liu through a study of Po-chou in 
the Szechuan-Kweichow frontier region where the Yang family 
held hereditary rule for seven and a quarter centuries from 
876 A .D . to 1600 A.D.
Owing to the extreme difficulty and high cost of imposing 
direct administration upon the minority groups in the mountain
Herold J. Wiens, Han Chinese Expansion in South China (United 
States, 1967), 208-209; Lien-sheng Yang, "Historical notes on 
the Chinese World Order", in J.K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese 
World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge,
1968), 32-33.
4areas of south and southwestern China, the Ming Court adopted 
the earlier policy of the Mongol Yuan, codifying and 
systematising the t'u-ssu institution. The Court granted each 
tribal chief a title and the hereditary right to rule, and in 
return, the tribal chief submitted tribute and undertook other 
obligations. In the first chapter, this t'u-ssu system— the 
frontier policy and tribal administration of the Ming 
government— will be discussed in detail. In order to 
understand the character of the t ’ u-ssu institution as well as 
its long existence in history, the Yang family rule over Po- 
chou from the T'ang to the Ming and its relationship to those 
imperial Courts will be introduced in the second and third 
chapters.
The last three chapters will focus on the conflicts, 
negotiations and challenges between the Po-chou ruler Yang 
Ying-lung and the provincial governments as well as the central 
government. Through the underlying causes and the development 
of the Po-chou uprising, the contradictions between the Yang 
family and its subordinate chiefs as well as the inconsistent 
policies of the provincial and metropolitan authorities will be 
clearly exposed. Consequently, the policy of kai-t'u kuei-liu 
of absorbing Po-chou into the regular government and replacing 
its tribal chiefs with regular officials was adopted after the 
elimination of the autonomy of the Yang family through a 112 
days decisive suppression campaign in 1600.
CHAPTER ONE
The T'u-ssu System: Frontier Policy and
Tribal Administration of the Ming Government
A. Establishment of the Ming T'u-ssu System
The practice of nominating local chieftains as imperial 
officials can be traced back as early as the times of Emperors 
Ch'in Shih-huang (r. 246-210 B.C.) and Han Wu-ti (r. 140-87
B . C.). ^ Such appointments had been practised occasionally in
the eras of Shu Han (221-264 A.D.) and Western Chin (265-317
2A .D.) and during the reign of Sung T'ai-tsu (907-926 A.D.). 
Although the seeds of the t ’u-ssu system had been planted in 
the early dynasties, it became a firmly established institution 
with a definite hierarchy of titles and ranks only during the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The term "t'u-ssu" also originated 
in Ming times. Moreover, of the Twenty-five Standard 
Histories, Ming Shih is the first one which contains several 
chapters of "Biographies of T ’u-ssu" .
According to the t ’u-ssu system of the Ming dynasty, 
there were two types of tribal officials: t’u-kuan and t’u-ssu.
T ’u-kuan were the civilian tribal administrative officials, such 
as the magistrates of t’u-fu (native prefecture), t’u-chou 
(native sub-prefecture) and t’u-hsien (native county). Their 
titles were t’u ohih-fu (ranked 4a), t’u ohih-chou (5b) and t’u 
chih-hsien (7a). These were tribal officials appointed to
 ^Lien-sheng Yang, op.oit.; MS, 26:7981.
2 Mao Ch'i-ling, Man-ssu ho-chih (Mao Hsi-ho hsien-sheng ch’uan- 
chi edition, 1745. Hereafter abbreviated as MSHC), 1:1b; Wang 
Hung-hsii, Ming shih kao (Taipei, 1963. Reprint of 1723 edition. 
Hereafter abbreviated as MSK) , 7:75.
6administer regular administrative units with largely tribal 
populations.
T'u-ssu were the rulers of the tribes which had submitted 
to the Ming Court. These tribal chieftains were invested with 
their pre-existing rule and were conferred the titles of hsuan- 
wei-shih, hs'uan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t ’ ao-shih or chang- 
kuan depending upon their size and merit. Their offices or 
headquarters were called ssu, such as hsuan-wei-ssu or hsuan- 
wei-shih-ssu, hsuan-fu-ssu, an-fu-ssu, chao-t’ao-ssu and ohang- 
kuan-ssu. These t'u-ssu in general maintained their established 
territorial boundaries and retained considerable local autonomy. 
T'u-li were assistants in a tribal office, such as clerks,
3jail wardens and post-masters. They existed in the 
jurisdictions of both the t'u-kuan and t'u-ssu as the low- 
ranking underlings.
The character "t ’ u" has the cognate meanings of earth, 
local or indigenous —  in other words, pertaining to the non-Han
4tribespeople. The character "ssu" originally means an 
administrative department or an independent bureau. The term 
"yu ssu" in ancient Chinese or literary language means 
official(s). Therefore, some scholars have translated "t'u-
3 She I-tse, Chung-kuo t’u-ssu chih-tu (Shanghai, 1947), 1. 
a Herold J. Wiens, op.cit. , 214.
f This footnote has now been deleted.1
5
ssu" as a tribal chief;^ some have defined it as a border or
7tribal government, or as an aboriginal self-government unit or
ga pacification office.
These tribal governments were not treated as foreign 
countries but as a special kind of local government by the 
Ming Court. Their chiefs and deputies were, of course, granted 
titles and ranks according to the Court's hierarchical 
principle. The following table illustrates the organisation of 
the t'u-ssu government in Ming China.
The titles of the Pacification Offices and Pacification 
Commissioners listed in the table did not actually originate in 
Ming times. They had been used in preceding dynasties for 
different duties. The an-fu-ssu designation originated during 
the T'ang period (618-906) when its head, the an-fu-shih, was 
appointed to receive imperial mandates from the Court and to 
carry out missions to the local governments. In the Sung 
period (960-1279), however, it designated a military commander.
She I-tse, o p . c i t H.J. Wiens, op.oit.; William Frederick 
Mayers, The Chinese Government (Taipei, 1970. Reprinted 
edition) , 46; Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese-Eng'lish Dictionary 
(Taipei, 1972. Reprinted edition), 1496; Mathew's Chinese- 
English Dictionary (Harvard University Press, Revised edition, 
1963), 951; Liang Shih-chiu, A New Practical Chines e-English 
Dictionary (Taipei, 1971), 173; Lien-sheng Yang, "Ming Local 
Administration", in Charles 0. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government 
in Ming Times: Seven Studies (Columbia University Press, New 
York and London, 1969), 2.
7 Lin Yutang, op.cit., 173; Sun I-tu (Jen) ed., Ch'vng 
Administrative Terms (Harvard University Press, 1961), 131.
g Charles 0. Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming 
Dynasty", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 21:43 (1958) .
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9During the Yuan (1279-1368), it was applied to military 
commanders in frontier regions.
Being a temporary but very important position during the 
Sung dynasty, the hsüan-fu-ssu was usually occupied by a high 
official of the Privy Military Council who supervised military 
personnel from the Court. During the Yuan, the hsüan-fu-ssu 
was stationed in the southwestern frontier regions and his 
duties concerned mainly pacification activities.
The position of the chao-t 'ao-ssu originated in T'ang
times and was adopted by the Five Dynasties (907-960) with
responsibility for carrying out military expeditions under the
Marshal. The ruling houses of the Khitan Liao (907-1125) and
the Jurchen Chin (1115-1234) also appointed chao-t 'ao-shih to
conduct subjugation and suppression campaigns. During the
Sung, it was a temporary position with the same kind of duty as
it had in the periods of Liao and Chin. The Yuan officials of
this name, however, were stationed only in the garrisons near
9the border areas.
There were two kinds of chang-kuan-ssu in Mongol-ruled 
China. The one in northern China was applied to officials in 
charge of the households of artisans. The other in southwestern 
China entitled man-i chang-kuan-ssu whose head and deputy 
officials were mostly conferred on chieftains was concerned
Ma Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t'ung-kao (Shanghai, 1937. Wan-yu- 
wen-k'u edition), 1:564; Chi Huang et at., Hsü wen-hsien t’ung- 
krao (Shanghai, 1937. Wan-yu-wen-k ’ u edition), 1:3351-3353; 
Hsü t’ung-chih (Shanghai, 1937. Wan-yu-wen-k 'u
edition), 1:4069; 4080.
10
v;ith rule over their tribesmen.  ^ In Ming times, both chang-
kuan-ssu and man-i chang-kuan-ssu became the lowest-ranking
pacification offices and referred to offices dealing with the
management of tribal affairs. The difference between the two
was that the former ruled over four hundred or more households
and the latter ruled over less than four hundred households.^
The word "hsüan-wei" means to proclaim and pacify. It
first appeared in the Chin shu (History of the Chin Dynasty,
12265-317), a Standard History edited in the early T'ang. The 
official title "hsüan-wei-shih" was first used in the mid-T'ang 
when it referred to Confucius's seventy-third generation
13descendant K'ung Ch'ao-fu as the "Hsuan-wei-shih of VJei-po" .
It became an office within the provincial government during the 
Yuan dynasty and was entitled "hsuan-wei-shih-ssu". His duty 
was to assume full charge of all military and civil affairs 
within a circuit of a province. Since the provinces were so 
vast that the Yuan governors found it difficult to dominate the 
border areas far from the provincial capitals, the hsuan-wei- 
shih were appointed to share these duties with the provincial 
governments. Most of the staff in the hsuan-wei-shih-ssu were 
high-ranking officials, and usually three heads (ranked 2b)
Hsü wen-hsien t'unq-k'ao, 1:3353; Hsu t’unq-chih,
1:4067; 4070.
'*'1 Ming shih-lu (Taipei, 1962. Photolithographic edition. 
Hereafter abbreviated as SL), 18:1073-1074; MS, 6:1875-1876.
^  Fang Hsuan-ling, et al. , Chin-shu (Peking, 1974), 1:34.
^  Ou-yang Hsiu, et al. , Hsin T'ang-shu (Peking, 1975), 16:5007.
11
were simultaneously appointed at the headquarters to form a 
collective leadership. From the Mongol point of view, all 
nationalities including the majority Han were conquered 
subjects and should be impartially "pacified". Therefore, 
although the hsuan-wei-shih were not tribal heads but 
administrative officials of local government units in the Yuan 
period, they were appointed to carry out the pacification 
activities in the Han provinces of China in the early stage.
Only those who were appointed in the border provinces were 
concurrently in charge of a hsuan-wei-shih-ssu as well as a tu- 
yüan-shuai-fu or yuan-shuai-fu (Field-Marshal Headquarters) 
which concerned more military affairs. In order to rule over 
the tribesmen in the mountainous areas, "uncivilised" districts, 
remote places or frontier regions, the Yiian Court bestowed the 
titles of hsuan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t 1 ao-shih (all ranked 
3a), or the man-i-ohang-kuan (5b) in cooperation with a
14darughachi (3a) (usually a Mongol) to form a dual rulership.
The Ming Court, as a Han-Chinese dynasty, of course, 
adopted a different point of view on pacification from the 
Mongols. After the overthrow of the Yiian, the Ming founder 
withdrew all hsüan-wei-shih-ssu and chang-kuan-ssu from the 
provincial governments in China and combined them together with 
hsuan-fu-ssu, an-fu-ssu, chao-t rao-ssu and man-i-chang-kuan-ssu
Sung Lien, et al. , Y'üan-shih (Peking, 1976), 8:2308-2310;
Lung Wen-pin, Ming hui-yao (Peking, 1956), 2:769; Yen Keng- 
wang, "Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu", in Chung-kuo 
cheng-chih ssu-hsiang yu chih-tu-shih lun-chi (Taipei, 1955),16; 
Huang K'ai-hua, "Ming-tai t'u-ssu chih-tu she-shih yii hsi-nan 
k'ai-fa", in Ming-shih lun-ts'ung (Taipei, 1968), 5:34-41.
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in forming different ranks of tribal government ruled by 
chieftains. From the viewpoint of the ethnically Han Chinese 
imperial Court, these t 'u-ssu could be regarded as Pacification 
Offices dispatched from the Ming central government.
The Yiian t'u-ssu system was not tightly organised but was 
strongly supervised by the Mongol Court. The appointments of 
hsuan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih and chao-t 'ao-shih were not conferred 
solely on tribal chiefs but were all supervised by the equal- 
ranked imperial ruling agents davughachi. In Ming times, the 
institution of t’u-ssu was simplified but systematised. The 
appointments of hsuan-wei-shih, hsuan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, 
chao-t 'ao-shih and ohang-kuan were conferred solely upon the 
tribal chief who became the head of a tribal government; no 
darughachi or equal-ranked high officials were appointed. 
Instead, to maintain control, lower-ranked registrars who were 
in charge of official communications and documents in the
15tribal governments were mostly Han-Chinese civilian officials. 
Furthermore, some of the tribal units were converted into native 
fu, chou or hsien according to their size in Ming times. They 
had the same organisation as regular fu, chou and hsien local 
governments in China but their heads were mostly tribal chiefs 
governing with the assistance of Han-Chinese deputies or 
subordinates.^ This conversion which had been in practice 
since early Ming can be regarded as a kind of semi-kai-t’u 
kuei-liu policy.
Huang K'ai-hua, op.cit., 5:36-40; MS, 6:1376.
16 MS, 6:1876.
B. Military Control and Utility
The frontier policy in the early Ming period generally
reflected a hierarchical approach. The Ming Court was not
interested in those states far from China. It paid much more
attention to the tribes in the frontier area or border regions.
It is clear that the effort involved in bringing peoples of the
overseas and neighbouring countries under China's domination
would be too great. In 1371, the Ming founder (r. 1368-1398)
had clearly stated that China should never send punitive
] 7expeditions to East and Southeast Asia. He pointed out that
those nomadic cavalry people to the north who had for
generations posed a threat to China should be watched with
18close attention. The Khitan Liao and the Jurchert Chin had
taken over parts of China in the past, and the Mongols more
recently had succeeded in capturing all of China, control of
which the Ming Court had just regained. For the purpose of
defense, the Ming government successively founded 3 Regional
Military Commissions, 385 Guards, 41 Battalions and other minor
19military stations in north China. Later, nine or more so-
called Defense Areas (ohen) or Frontiers (pien) which stretched
across the northern land frontier were also created for
20resistance against any possible invasion.
Chu Yüan-chang, "Huang-Ming tsu-hsiin" , in Ming-ch'ao k'ai-kuo 
wen-hsien (Taipei, 1966), 3:1588-1591; Shen Shih-hsing, et al. , 
Ta-Ming hui-tien (Taipei, 1963. Reprint of 1587 edition. 
Hereafter abbreviated as TMHT), 3:1585.
1 R
SL, 3:1277-1278.
19 MS, 6:1876; 8:2222-2228.
20 Wei Huan, "Chiu-pien k'ao", Ming-shih lun-ts’ung (Taipei, 
1968), 6:100-101.
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While defending the border areas in the North in early
Ming, the government troops marched to the South and the
Southwest to confront the surviving Han rivals in Szechuan and
the remnants of the Mongol feudal forces as well as unsubdued
tribal clans in Yunnan. Southwestern China had been an ideal
environment for the development and expansion by Han migrants
since the Chin and Han periods. The Ming Court viewed the
region with a similar interest. Since the Ming founder had
successfully conducted subjugation campaigns in Szechuan in 1371
and Yunnan in 1382, the succeeding emperors adopted this
21suppression policy throughout the country. His usurping son 
Emperor Yung-lo (r. 1402-1424) even broke his specific imperial 
instructions by expanding further into An-nan (present-day
22Vietnam) with the dispatch of eight hundred thousand troops.
During the suppression campaigns of the early Ming, the
Ming founder in his instructions insisted on killing all
disloyal and unyielding tribal chiefs or tribal heads but
2 3forgiving their subordinates and followers. In 1434, Emperor 
Hsuan-te (r. 1426-1435) specified in the reward regulations 
dealing with the suppression of southern tribesmen that anyone 
who could kill either three tribesmen or a tribal head would be
MS, 1:26, 39; Chao I, Nien-erh-shih cha-chi (Peking, 1963), 
2:710.
22 Chao I, ibid.
23 SL, 5:1930; 6:2460, 2668-2669, 2717; 7:2787, 2933, 3029, 
3170-3171, 3179-3180; 8:3240-3241, 3278, 3469, 3473-3474, 3480, 
3520-3522, 3528, 3547-3548, 3604, 3630, 3713-3714.
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24promoted by one rank. During the Ch'eng-hua reign (1465-
1487), the number to be killed to gain the same promotion was 
25doubled. From the Cheng-te reign (1506-1521) onward, because
of the long distance from the capital which had been
transferred from Nanking in the south to Peking in the north,
the rewards for killing tribesmen in Szechuan and Kweichow were
to be defined according to the number of ears cut from the dead,
2 6rather than heads. Despite these strong suppression 
campaigns, however, tribal revolts did not cease throughout the 
Ming dynasty.
On the other hand, the Ming Court preserved its military 
control over the t’u-ssu through a tight organisational military 
hierarchy. The basic military administrative hierarchy 
culminated in a cluster of five Chief Military Commissions in 
the central government, paralleling the Censorate and the 
cluster of six Ministries. These Chief Military Commissions 
were concerned with specialised professional aspects of military 
administration, whereas the Ministry of War dealt with problems 
of personnel, supply etc. At the provincial level, there were 
twenty-one Regional Military Commissions or Branch Regional 
Military Commissions. At lower levels, the military 
bureaucracy basically consisted of Guards, Battalions and 
Companies, each designated by its geographical locality and
Hsu wen-hsien t'ung-k’ao, 2:3894. 
Ibid.
26 Ibid. , 2:3899.
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supervised by one of the Regional Military Commissions or
2 7Branch Regional Military Commissions. In this rigorously 
organised military structure, most of the t’u-ssu were 
supervised by the Guards or directly controlled by a Regional 
Military Commission. (See Appendix One: The Military Hierarchy
in Ming China.)
One of the successes of the Ming Court's policy towards 
the tribal peoples was that the Han-Chinese rulers could 
effectively utilise tribal forces to fight against foreign 
enemies, to suppress the disloyal tribes, to exterminate 
bandits, to guard the frontier regions, and to invade 
neighbouring countries. According to the historical sources, 
the first time tribesmen were used as a military force was in 
the late Shang dynasty (c. 1766-1123 B.C.). While marching to 
defeat the last Shang ruler, King Wu of the Chou dynasty (1122- 
249 B.C.) organised a united front in which at least eight
• 9 Qkinds of famous tribespeoples were enlisted.
During the last period of the Yuan dynasty, thousands of
tribesmen were organised into a strong military force by the
Mongol ruler to fight against rebels. For the same purpose,
the Han-Chinese rivals Chang Shih-ch'eng, Ch'en Yu-liang and
Chu Yiian-chang who were contending for supremacy also utilised
2 9the tribesmen in their struggles.
27 Charles 0. Hucker, op.cit.
2 Q  X  C K ova. skw . i  t  l i  ilsbsj. y*** I ^ v (  ’L_ 1 , i  ^ l % 3 ;
MSr 26:7981; Cheng Chen et at., Tsun-z fu-chih (Taipei, 1968. 
Reprint of 1841 edition. Hereafter abbreviated as TIFC), 1:43.
29
SL, 1:36, 42, 67, 128-131, 220-222; MS, 26:7982; Frederick 
W. Mote, The Poet Kao Ch'i, 1336-1374 (Princeton, 1962), 24.
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During the Ming dynasty, the tribal forces obviously took
30part in the invasion of Vietnam. When military movements
occurred, the Han~t’u or government-tribal joint forces were
mostly recruited from the southern and southwestern provinces.
The highest estimate for such an army was the joint force of
1406 numbering eight hundred thousand, of which the number of
31tribesmen is unclear. The percentage of tribal troops was 
quite high in some suppression campaigns, as illustrated in the 
following table:
TABLE TWO: Quantity and Percentage
of Government-Tribal United Troops
Year Province Joint Force Han-Chinese •! Tribesmen %
1395 Kwangsi 58,900 20,000 34 38,900 66
1465 Kwangsi 190,000 30,000 15.8 160,000 84.2
1476 Kweichow 22,821 5,710 25 17,111 inr-
1600 Szechuan 240,000 72,000 30 168,000 70
1606 Kweichow 10,000 5,000 50 5,000 50
Sources: MSCSPM, 1:400-401; MS, 26:8048, 27:8196, 8269.
So vast an empire as Ming China undoubtedly needed a 
substantial military force to guard its extensive borders. The 
wei-so garrison system took main responsibility for such heavy 
defense requirements. Those located along the north and
Ch'iu Chün, P ’ing-ting Chiao-nan-iu (Lung-wei mi-shu edition. 
Taipei, 1968. Reprint of 1794), 2:1192; Ku Yin-t'ai, Ming-shih 
chi-shih pen-mo (Taipei, 1969. Hereafter abbreviated as 
MSCSPM), 1:245-247, 250, 252, 255, 260; MS, 17:5241.
31 MS, 14:4220; Chao I, op.cit., 2:710.
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northeastern border regions were called chi-mi wei-so%, those
in the west and northwestern border regions, fan-i wei-so. The
commanders of both kinds were largely recruited from the tribal
chiefs who had the same feudal character as those t'u-ssu in
southwestern China. Those garrison troops of northern borders
32were mostly organised by tribesmen. In 1388, the Ming
founder ordered the selection of tribesmen from the t'u-ssu in
Szechuan for guarding the border securely and controlling
Tibet. This was an instance of the Emperor using a tribal
33force for the national defense of southwestern China.
Throughout the Ming dynasty, the government-tribal joint force
made great contributions to safeguarding against the
34encroachment of China's border by alien forces.
Bandits in Ming times were classified into two categories: 
Han and tribal. They usually went into hiding in mountain 
areas after raiding cities or villages. In order to exterminate 
these entrenched bandits, the Ming Court found it most 
convenient and successful to conscript those loyal tribesmen 
experienced in fighting in bush and mountain areas. The 
suppression of Han bandits in Hukuang and tribal bandits in 
Kwangsi during the Ch'eng-hua reign are the most prominent 
examples of this kind of successful employment of non-Han
MS, 3:2222; Hsu wen-hsien t’ung-k'ao, 1:3353.
^  Hsu wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, 2:3942; SL, 7:2824-2828.
^  SL, 8:3620-3627; MS, 17:5241, 27:3185; Ch'iu Chun, op.cit., 
1189, 1192-1193.
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35forces. In the last two decades of the Ming dynasty, banditry
3 6was prevalent throughout China. The famous female t’u-ssu
Ch'in Liang-yu of Shih-chu hsüan-fu-ssu in southeastern Szechuan
bravely assisted the government troops in suppressing bandits
37in the southwest. Even though the strong bandit leader Chang
Hsien-chung was vastly superior to government forces at the
time, he still feared Ch'in's fighting capacity and warned his
3 8followers not to enter into the Shih--chu area.
The chief threats to the Ming borders were the Mongol
cavalry and the Wo-k'ou pirates. The former came from the
northern steppe and the latter came from the sea. To resist
the Mongols, the defense burden fell largely on Han troops as
well as on northern tribesmen of the chi-mi wei-so. To suppress
the Wo-k’ou, the Han troops were unsuccessful in the first stage
during the mid-sixteenth century when the plundering suffered
by the southeastern coastal provinces reached its height. An
army of eight thousand tribesmen enlisted from Yung-shun hsüan-
wei-ssu and Pao-ching hsüan-wei-ssu of Hukuang, however, won a
39famous victory in 1555. In addition to these small wars along 
the coast, the Chinese troops had fought with the Japanese
MS, 16:4730; MSCSPM, 1:393-408.
3 6 Li Wen-chih, "Preface", Wan Ming min-pien (Hong Kong, 1966. 
Reprint of the 1943 edition), 1.
37 MS, 23:6944-6948.
3 8 Li Wen-chih, op.cit., 91-92.
39 MSCSPM, 2:584-607; MSK, 2:345-347; MS, 26:7993-7994; Chu 
Kuo-chen, Yung-chuang hsiao-p’in (Shanghai, 1935. Reprint of 
1621 edition), 3.
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regular army in Korea between 1592 and 1598.40 In order to aid
Korea in resisting Japanese aggression, the Ming Court ordered
that recruits from all military forces including the tribesmen
be thrown into the battle. The tribal troops from Szechuan,
Kweichow and Kwangtung took part in this Sino-Japanese War in 
41Korea. Despite the long distance, the tribesmen of
southwestern China again contributed their fighting power in
the Sino-Manchu War in northeastern China in the last two
decades of the Ming dynasty. The two most successful were the
hsuan-fu-ssu of Yu-yang and Shih-chu, both from Szechuan.42
I-i fa-i, i-i kung-i or i-man kung-man, literally "using
barbarians to attack barbarians" was a traditional imperial
policy which had been frequently employed by Chinese 
4 3strategists.‘ In order to strengthen its domination over 
southwestern China, the Ming Court adopted this policy of 
utilising the military forces of the strong ethnic minority 
groups to suppress disloyal tribesmen. Such utilisation could 
save many Han soldiers' lives and a lot of military provisions. 
From the geographical point of view, the tribesmen were more 
experienced in operating in the mountains which the disloyal 
tribesmen tended to occupy as their natural defensible
Mao Jui-cheng, Wan-li san-ta-cheng k 'ao (Taipei, 1968. 
Reproduction of 1621 edition. Hereafter abbreviated as 
WLSTCK) , 33-66; MSCSPM, 2:670-683.
41 MSCSPM, 2:680; Lo Jung-pang, "Liu T'ing", in L.C. Goodrich,
et al. , Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1 36 8-1644 (New York and
London, 1976. Hereafter abbreviated as DMB), 1:965.
42 MS, 23:6944; 26:8058.
4 3 Lien-sheng Yang, "Historical notes on the Chinese World 
Order", in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's
Foreign Relations, 33.
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strongholds. Once the rebellious Yao tribesmen of Kwangsi
proudly said, "The government has ten thousand troops but we
have ten thousand mountains. We leave if they come; we return 
44if they go". A tribal chief of Yunnan said in a similar vein,
"As the Court has its strong military force of ten thousand
troops, we also have our natural defensible strongholds of ten
4 5thousand mountains. How can they annihilate us at all?"" In
addition, the climate of the mountain regions did not agree
with the Han soldiers, who suffered considerably in these harsh
conditions. The tribal troops were more accustomed to the
climate than were the Han troops.
For other reasons, the tribal troops were willing to fight
for the Ming Court. First of all, they could obtain at least
a part of their military supplies and provisions from the
government if they were engaged in the suppression campaign.
Secondly, they might seize the opportunity to loot after
suppressing the disloyal groups. Thirdly, they had the chance
4 6to pillage the local inhabitants while on route home. At
times, in a special case, the Court might promise to cede a
piece of land to a strong tribe in exchange for their military 
4 7assistance. Therefore, a large number of tribal troops 
usually joined with the government troops in the subjugation 
campaigns.
Hu Ch'ien, et al., Kuang-hsi t'ung-chih (1800 edition), 21: 
8b-9 .
45 MS, 27:8084.
4 6 Chu Kuo-chen, op.ait., 12:3b; SL, 10:460-461; Hsu wen-hsien 
t’ung-kao, 2:3943; Lo Hsiang-lin, "Lang-t'ien lang-ping k'ao", 
Kuang-ohou hsüeh-pao, 1.2:342-346 (April 1937).
47 MS, 27:8172-8173.
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Besides the above reasons for the use of tribal military
forces by the Ming Court, the main situational factor was that
the Court lacked effective combat troops. The government troops
were no longer strong enough to fight against the strong and
cunning enemies after the decline of the wei-so garrison system
in the mid-sixteenth century. Thereafter, government regular
troops were supplemented by militiamen organised for home-guard
duty by local authorities. During the late Ming period, the
frontier forces were augmented and finally almost superseded by
4 8mercenaries lured or coerced into service for pay. In the 
eyes of Han authorities, the "never-say-die" tribesmen were 
ideal brave and cheap soldiers for supplementing the regular 
troops. Therefore, the military utility of tribal forces was 
essential and was an important aspect of the t'u-ssu 
obligations in Ming times.
C. Political Supervision and Conversion
After the Ming Court had codified and systematised the 
t’u-ssu system, the regulations governing the t’u-ssu became 
very strict. Since the system appeared to yield effective 
results, it became a firmly fixed institution. First of all, 
a hierarchy of rank was established both in military and 
civilian titles and ranks.
A series of special titles, such as hsüan-wei-shih, hsuan- 
fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t ’ao-shzh and chang-kuan, were only
4 8 Wu Han, "Ming-tai ti chün-ping", Tu-shih oha-chi (Peking, 
1957), 92-141; Charles 0. Hucker, op.oit., 57.
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to be conferred upon the t'u-ssu (tribal chieftains) with the 
ranks from 3b to 7a. (See Table One: The Organisation of the
T'u-ssu Government in Ming China.) They were originally all 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel but in 1397 
came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. In 
addition, a Registry was set up in each of the first two 
classes of the t'u-ssu government, i.e. hsüan-wei-ssu and 
hsüan-fu-ssu. All registrars and most of the secretaries and 
clerks were Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. Thus, each 
t 'u-ssu government was supervised by Han-Chinese authorities 
from above by the Ministry of War and from below by the 
Registry.
Some of the tribes had been changed into the t ' u-kuan 
governments since the early Ming, such as the native prefectures 
(t'u-fu), native sub-prefectures (t'u-ohou) or native counties 
(t'u-hsien), their native magistrates (t'u-kuan) were codified 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel. The 
authority over-these native fu, chou and hsien with the ranks 
from 4b to 7a were mostly conferred upon tribal chiefs, but 
most of their deputies and subordinates were Han-Chinese regular 
civilian officials. Their official status and administration 
were to be the same as that of the regular prefectural system 
in the Han provinces of China.
Furthermore, in 1530, the t'u-kuan was re-codified under 
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Honour (in the Ministry of 
Personnel) in the central government and directly governed by 
the Provincial Administration Office in the provincial 
government, and the t'u-ssu was re-codified under the
24
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Personnel (in the Ministry of
War) in the central government and directly governed by the
4 9Regional Military Commission in the provincial government.
Thus, the tribal chiefs of the t’u-kuan were fully absorbed
into the administrative structure of the Empire with the sole
exception of retaining their hereditary right. The tribal
chiefs of the t'u-ssu, however, remained strong within their
semi-independent domains because they still had full power over
tribal administration, tax collection and judicial proceedings.
Although tribal chiefs of both the t'u-kuan and t'u-ssu
were confirmed in their hereditary right of succession, many
regulations were issued by the Ming Court limiting this
formerly absolute right. In 1393, the succession of the tribal
chiefs of both systems was required to be fully investigated
regarding the details of the heir and the genealogy of his clan,
and written bonds from the local authorities and the officials
concerned were required by the Ministry of Personnel of the
50central government. After 1397, the t'u-kuan remained under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel, but the t ’u-ssu
51was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War.
Most of the regulations on succession for both, however,
continued to be the same. New successors had to go to the
52capital to be formally installed at Court. This was to
MS, 6:1875-1876; 26:7982; She I-tse, op.cit., 21-22.
50 TMHT, 1:123.
51 TMHT, 1:123; 3:1706.
52 MS, 26:7982; TMHT, 1:123.
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demonstrate the willingness of the chieftain to accept Han 
suzerainty and to impress upon him the majesty and splendor of 
the Emperor as well as the wealth and civilisation of China.
More important, this was to confirm his position through a 
formal political recognition and make him more ready to continue 
his submission.
Usually the son inherited his father's title and rank. If
there were no son, the dead chieftain's brother, wife, nephew,
or even son-in-law who was regarded with esteem by the
tribesmen might inherit the office and title. In order to get
rid of the struggles among potential claimants to succession,
the chieftain was required to present the details and names of
heirs at an early stage. An heir up to the age of five was to
be registered. Copies of the registration were to be sent to
the Regional Military Commission, Provincial Administration
Office, Provincial Surveillance Office, and the Ministry of
Personnel or the Ministry of War. The heir took office on
reaching fifteen years of age after the former chieftain had
vacated his rule through death, retirement or other causes.
Prior to this date, a regent was to be appointed to carry on
temporarily. The prospective heir or successor had to study Han
53rules of conduct for three months. Although these regulations 
might not be carried out completely by all chieftains especially 
after the mid-Ming period, they could be used as a means of 
political supervision. In addition, according to the T'u-kuan 
ti-pu, the pre-Cheng-te reign (1506-1521) documents of 363'
53 TMHT, 1:123-124; 3:1743-1745; Herold J. Wiens, op.cit., 217.
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chieftains of Yunnan (151), Kv/angsi (167), Szechuan (24),
Kweichow (15), Kukuang (5) and Kwangtung (1), the Court-issued
certificates frequently used expressions such as "the request
[for succession] is hereby temporarily approved", "to replace
him when he is not law-biding", or "this succession is approved
54but not hereditary". Although dismissal rarely occurred, it 
was regarded as an art of political manoeuvring played by the 
Ming Court.
On the other hand, besides requiring that the installation
take place in the capital, Court tribute presented by the
chieftain or his representative was also a compulsory
obligation. There were definite regulations pertaining to the
frequency of tribute, the number of persons in the delegations,
and the type of tribute presented. In return for tribute, the
Court bestowed valuable awards which usually exceeded the
tribute in order to show the graciousness of the Ming 
55Emperor. The tribute senders always took the opportunity to 
conduct private business in the capital by transporting other 
goods or special products from their own place. In such Court 
tribute, the political design outweighed the financial aim and 
was used primarily to maintain communication between the Court 
and the tribal governments.
It was mentioned above that a considerable number of Han 
regular civilian officials were employed in the Registry of the
"T'i yao" (Summary), T ’u-kuan ti-pu (Reprint of the Ssu-k'u 
ch'uan-shu edition. Taipei, n.d.), 1-2; passim.
55 TMHT, 3:1615-1619; 1661-1663.
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t’u-ssu government. Some of them were even appointed as
deputies or subordinates of the magistrate in the native t ru-
kuan prefectural governments. On occasion, two magistrates,
one the native chief and one a Han civilian official, were
appointed simultaneously to the same office with different 
56duties. This policy called "I-Han ts’an-yung" (employment of
both tribesmen and Han-Chinese) or "liu-t'u kung-chih" (joint
rule by Han-Chinese regular civilian officials and tribal
chieftains) could be regarded as a kind of transition from dual
political administration to full Han-Chinese civil
57administration. Furthermore, the extermination of the rule 
by tribal chieftains over their semi-autonomous kingdoms and 
the abolition of the t ’u-ssu tribal governments was the final 
step in the political integration of former tribal territory 
into the structure of the Chinese empire. This policy was 
known as "kai-t’u kuei-liu", i.e., to replace tribal chiefs 
with Han-Chinese regular officials or to change from tribal to 
regular government. Such a policy had been adopted since the 
early Ming. The most successful and largest scale example was 
the conversion of Ssu-nan hsuan-wei-ssu and Ssu-chou hsuan-wei- 
ssu into six prefectures, together with other prefectures, sub­
prefectures, counties, guards and some tribal governments to
In 1522, a Han-Chinese magistrate and a native magistrate 
were appointed in Ning-chou, a sub-prefecture of Lin-an 
Prefecture in Yunnan Province. The Han-Chinese magistrate was 
in charge of the administration; the native magistrate was 
limited to the duties of patrol and inspection. See MS, 27:3070. 
Other examples, see Huang K'ai-hua, op.oit., 211-212.
57 Ling Shun-sheng, "Chung-kuo pien-cheng chih t'u-ssu chih-tu", 
Pien-chiang lun-wen chi (Taipei, 1964) , 2:747; Huang Fen-sheng,
Pien-chiang cheng-chiao chih yen-chiu (Shanghai, 1947), 98;
Herold J. VJiens, op.oit. r 219-220.
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5 8form the new province of Kweichow in 1413. Thereafter, the
Ming Court adopted the kai-t’u kuei-liu policy on various
pretexts, such as the annihilation or dismissal of a tribal
chief, the lack of a legitimate heir, incessant struggle among
potential claimants to succession, the incapacity or
disobedience of a tribal chief, or at the request of the local 
59tribesmen. In order to achieve the goal of kai-t’u kuei-liu, 
both political means and military moves were used. Of course, 
the latter could be extremely expensive. The suppression of 
the Po-chou hsuan-wei-shih-ssu which cost over two million 
taels of silver was the most expensive example where military 
force was used.
Owing to the practical limitations of its military and 
economic resources and recognising the diminishing returns, the 
Ming Court did not insist on kai-t’u kuei-liu. On occasion, 
the same rebel leader was restored in office when a revolt was 
suppressed. Even a chieftainship system was rehabilitated 
after kai-t’u kuei-liu when the Court found it ineffective to 
rule the tribe by regular officials. Aside from pacification 
and suppression, the Ming policy also included measures 
designed to fragment the tribes politically. Over seventy 
separate chang-kuan-ssu were established when Kv/eichow was 
first conquered in the early Ming. This disintegration policy
58 MSCSPM, 1:219-222; MS, 4:1197-1217; 27:8176-8178.
5 9 She I-tse, op.cit., 160-161; Huang K'ai-hua, op.ait., 213- 
215; Chiang Ying-liang, Ming-tai Yiin-nan ching-nei ti t’u-kuan 
yu t ’u-ssu (Kunming, 1957), 12-13.
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was also adopted in Szechuan and Kweichow after the suppression 
of the joint rebellion of She Ch'ung-ming and An Pang-yen in 
the late Ming. Summing up, the Ming Court did not maintain the
consistency on its frontier policy towards the tribal
, . 6 0organisations.
D. Economic Exploitation
Before the absorption into the t ’u-ssu system, the 
tribesmen suffered heavy economic exactions only from their 
tribal chiefs. After the establishment of the t'u-ssu system, 
the tribesmen suffered from the additional economic 
exploitation of the imperial government as well. The economic 
exploitation included tribute, tax levy and corvee. The Court 
tribute presented to the capital was undoubtedly in the name of 
the tribal chief who would be usually presented costly rewards 
in return. These valuable awards would never be shared with the 
tribesmen who might be the real contributors of the tribute.
Undoubtedly the tribal chief had levied tax and labour
corvee upon his tribesmen for his own benefit. Individual
chieftains levied poll tax, housing tax or silver surtax upon
their subjects.^ They had the right to do so because they were
6 2feudal lords and had never received a salary from the Court.
She I-tse, op.oit., 35-37; 158-160; MSCSPM, 2:772-784.
MS, 26:8016; PPCS, 4:328; Chiang Ying- liang, op.cit. , 19. 
MS, 6:1752; 26:8052.
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At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, in order to pacify the
tribal chiefs and show its goodwill, the Court refused to levy
taxes or to fix the quota of tax upon the newly submitted
tribes. Subsequently, taxes-in-kind were levied upon them. In
1384, seventeen years after the foundation of the Ming, the
native prefectures of Wu-meng, Tung-ch'uan and Mang-pu were
ordered to supply 8,000 tan of grain and 800 felt clothes
annually, and VJu-ch'e taxed at a rate of 20,000 tan of grain
6 3and 1,500 felt clothes per year. Shui-hsi hsuan-wei-ssu, the
strongest tribe in Kweichow, was assessed annual taxes of 30,000
64tan of grain from 1387 onwards. Most of the tribes in Yunnan 
were required to remit tax-in-silver cash or tax-in-gold cash. 
The total quota was 8,890.5 taels of which 110 taels were gold 
and the rest, silver. The tribesmen actually paid more than that 
quota because the tribal chiefs shifted the burden to their 
subjects and took the opportunity to collect more gold or silver 
from them for their personal benefit.
When the Ming Court asked the local governments including 
two metropolitan areas and thirteen provinces to compile the 
Register Book on taxation and corvee, the tribal governments 
which had submitted and were under control were also asked to 
compile a Register Book in the Han fashion or according to 
their own customs. The Kuei-chou hsuan-wei-ssu was allowed not
MSK, 7:86; MS, 26:8004.
MSK, 7:161; MS, 27:8169.
TMHT, 2:694; Chiang Ying-liang, op.cit., 18-19.
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to compile it in the Hung-wu reign (1368-1398) but was asked to
66do it in the Hung-chih reign (1488-1505). In 1391, a Register
Book was required to be compiled by the tribesmen neighbouring
on Po-chou who could speak Chinese; the tribespeople unfamiliar
with Chinese were not required to file data for this Register 
6 7Book. This indicates that in the early Ming the Court levied 
taxes only upon the Han people and on those tribesmen who had 
been sinicised.
After the change from tribal to regular government, the 
rule by chieftains was ended and his share of the economic 
exploitation was automatically cancelled. In this manner, the 
tribesmen would be emancipated from double exploitation. The 
new tax rate was usually much higher than before because in 
rearranging the tax system the new bureaucrats sought to recoup 
the high costs of expenditure on military suppression required 
to stop the exploitation by the defeated chieftain. The 
Po-chou case which will be discussed in the following chapters 
illustrates this point.
Corvee, including military corvee and labour corvee, may 
be regarded as a kind of indirect economic exploitation. The 
military corvee levied upon tribesmen was extremely heavy 
especially after the decline of the wei-so garrison system.
Due to their low cost and their fighting ability, the tribesmen
Wei Ch'ing-yuan, Ming-tai huang-ts'e ohih-tu (Peking, 1961), 
28-30.
Ch'en Jen-hsi, Huang-Ming shih-fa-lu (Taipei, 1964), 2:1114. 
Po-chou also had a Register Book which was cancelled by its last 
ruler, Yang Ying-lung (c. 1552-1600), when the revolt came to 
a height. But the initial compilation of the Register Book is 
unknown. See Ch'en Tzu-lung et at., Huang-Ming ching-shih wen- 
pien (Hong Kong, 1964? Reprint of the late Ming edition. 
Hereafter abbreviated as HMCSWP), 6:4550.
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were frequently recruited. The percentage of tribal troops
within the government-tribal united forces was higher than that
of Han troops. (See Table Two: Quantity and Percentage of
Tribal-Government United Troops.) The basic equipment and
provisions of the tribal forces were largely self-supplied,
being transported by themselves from their original tribe to
6 8 'the battlefield. The labour corvee, including the 
construction of tribal offices, bridges, fortifications and 
walls, service in post stations and offices, transport of 
taxes-in-kind and tribute, lumbering activities and the 
transportation of beam timbers and various other kinds of hard 
work, were mostly performed without compensation. After the 
change from tribal to regular government, the tribesmen only had 
to serve one ruling class. At the first stage the labour corvee 
might be still heavy because of the need to reconstruct the new 
prefecture. Thereafter, the labour corvee would be lighter 
than before.
E. Cultural Assimilation
The Court had paid attention to sinicising non-Han peoples
since the early Ming. Confucian Schools were built in most of
69the t'u-ssu regions. Heirs or sons of tribal chieftains were
[T'ang] Chia-hung, "Shih-lun Ming-Ch'ing feng-chien huang- 
ch'ao ti t'u-ssu-chih chi kai-t'u-kuei-liu", Ssu-oh'uan ta- 
hsueh hsueh-pao, 2 : 67 (1956); Li Hua-lung, P 'ing Po ch'üan-shu 
(Shanghai, 1937. Ts'ung-shu ohi-chreng edition. Reprint of the 
1601 edition. Hereafter abbreviated as PPCS) , 5:448; 470; 474; 
491; 542; MS, 23:6945-6946; 26:7994; 27:8074-8075; 8099.
69 MS, 6:1851-1852.
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70encouraged to enrol in the National University. They were
all treated with special kindness and unusual politeness. The
emperor always bestowed awards including paper cash, summer and
71winter clothes, shoes and socks, etc. Some of them were even 
allowed to be accompanied by a native servant who would be
72provisioned by the government during the stay in the capital.
Because of this excellent treatment, a large number of tribal
students went to the capital to study at the National
University. In 1384, an additional five hundred new dormitories
were built for several thousand new students from all provinces
73and tribal areas.
The Ming founder clearly expressed his idea that all sons
of chieftains should come to study at the National University,
so that they could return home to sinicise their tribesmen with
Han culture.^ He also regarded that the best way to pacify
the frontier regions was to establish Confucian Schools to
75teach the youth in tribal areas. These two ways of 
sinicisation seemed to be successful in the early Ming, 
particularly the first one requiring that the tribal heirs be
SL, 7:3025; MS, 26:8005-8017; 8032;8040.
71 SL, 7:2963, 3006, 3018, 3031, 3040, 3051, 3058, 3087, 3088, 
3107, 3143; 8:3314, 3365, 3421, 3567, 3591, 3712.
72 .Yang Ch'i-ch'iao, "Ming-ch'u jen-ts'ai p'ei-yang yu teng-
chin chih-tu chi ch' i yen-pien", Hsin-Ya hsiieh-pao, 6.2:348
(August 1964) .
73 SL, 6:2506-2507.
74 SL, 6:2365-2366.
75 SL, 8:3475-3476.
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educated in the capital. The purpose was the same as the Court
visits and Court tribute, impressing Han political and cultural
influence upon the potential successors and future chieftains.
This was especially important in view of the great distance
from the capital after it was moved from Nanking to Peking in
the early fifteenth century. On the other hand, the local
sinicisation was much less successful, and some of the
V 6Confucian Schools were closed down. Several supplementary
edicts were issued to restore Confucian Schools, but these were
mainly concerned with tribal heirs. In 1444, an imperial edict
announced that all heirs of tribal governments should be sent 
77to school. In 1481, an edict indicated that the eldest
legitimate sons of chieftains were allowed to study at the
Confucian Schools in the neighbouring local regular governments
because education was not well developed in some tribal areas
or high level education was only available in regular 
7 8governments. In 1492, an edict even ordered new tribal
chieftains to study Han rules of conduct before taking charge
79of tribal affairs. In order to encourage the tribal heirs to 
accept sinicisation, in 1499, the Court agreed that an heir who 
had studied at a local Confucian School since the time he was 
ten years old could succeed to office without the approval of
SL , 8:3277; 21:2577. 
SL, 27:2410-2411. 
TMHT, 3:1240.
79 TMHT, 3:1743.
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provincial authorities, requiring only a testimonial from the
8 0Director of Education of the school he attended. In 1503,
the Court agreed with the decision reached at the joint meeting
of the Ministry of War and the Censorate that an heir would not
be permitted to succeed to a hereditary post if he had not
81attended a Confucian School. These supplementary regulations 
illustrated that the Court was serious about enforcing 
sinicisation upon the tribal ruling class. As a matter of 
fact, the general Chinese education at the local level in 
tribal regions was still much less developed than that in the 
Han provinces of China. The spread of the Han Chinese 
education, however, would be more popular in the tribal area 
where the policy of kai-t'u kuei-liu was implemented.
F. Judicial Administration
Theoretically the chieftain was recognised as having 
jurisdiction in minor civil matters in the tribal government, 
such as in cases of household, marriage, land, etc. The 
arguments among tribal chiefs would be judged by their 
superior, such as the provincial government or the garrison 
town. Cases about military affairs or insurrection had to be 
reported to the Court. According to the traditional tribal 
custom, crime could usually be redeemed by payment in the form
SL, 57:2675-2676. 
81 MS, 26:7997.
82 SL, 20:1936.
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of cattle or rice. Sometimes this provision did not operate,
and the Han-Chinese authorities judged the case according to
Han-Chinese laws. In 1451, a deputy hsiian-fu-shih who had
murdered his brother was sentenced to death. His wife sent his
son to contribute horses in order to redeem his crime. The
Court refused to pardon him but paid paper cash of equal value
for the horses. In 1461, a tribal secretary was sentenced to
imprisonment. His mother presented horses as redemption, and
the emperor bestowed one hundred ting of paper cash upon this
8 3old woman but kept her son in prison.
In the early Ming, a hereditary chieftain could not be
arrested or judged without express imperial authority even if
he had committed a serious crime. The case had to be reported
to the Court first. The appointed chieftain would be treated
as if he were a regular civil official. He would be punished
84in the manner of regular civil officials of the same level. 
Owing to this special right, the Han authorities sometimes 
instigated insurrection by a chieftain in order to create a 
pretext for investigating him or even suppressing him.
Internal enemies who hoped to use the government military 
forces to suppress him also sometimes falsely accused him of 
the crime of insurrection, since the Court always pardoned 
minor crimes committed by hereditary chieftains. The case of 
the suppression of Miao tribesmen in Po-chou in 1476-1477, the
83 MS, 26:7987.
84 SL, 6:2559-2560.
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accusation of Yang Ai (1464-1517; r. 1474-1501) by his brother, 
the case of An Kuo-heng (r. 1562-1577; d. 1595) and the case of 
Yang Ying-lung (c. 1552-1600; r. 1571-1595) illustrate the use 
of Han-Chinese laws to control or threaten the authority of the 
tribal chieftains. (See Chapter Four and Appendices Four, Five 
and Six.)
CHAPTER TWO
The Yang Family: The Ruling Agent in Po-chou
A. A Geographical Survey of Ming Po-chou
Po-chou had been a semi-autonomous kingdom ruled by the
Yang lineage since 876 A.D.* 234- It was situated in the northeastern
part of Kweichow province. According to a scholar's description,
it was an area about the size of Switzerland. More accurately
speaking, its size and shape were more like Taiwan according to 
3my estimate. Both look like long ovals; but the direction in 
which they run is different: Taiwan from northeast to
southwest; Po-chou from northwest to southeast (See Map I.
Ming Po-chou in Modern Kweichow.) Before its abolition in 1600 
in the Ming dynasty, Po-chou generally belonged to neighbouring 
Szechuan province north of Kweichow. After the abolition, its 
territory was divided up to form two new administrative units: 
Tsun-i prefecture in Szechuan and P 'ing-yueh prefecture in 
Kweichow. After 1727, Tsun-i prefecture also became part of
4Kweichow. (See Map II. The Ming-Ch'ing Boundaries between 
Kweichow and Szechuan.)
In view of its position on the Kweichow Plateau, the 
climate in Po-chou is extremely humid, with abundant rainfall.
YSCC' 10:31.
2 Chaoying Fang, "Li Hua-lung", DMB, 1:823. According to Atlas 
de la Suisse (Wabern-Berne, 1966), 1A, the area of Switzerland 
is 41,287.9 square kilometres.
3 According to Hsieh Chiao-min's description in Atlas of China 
(USA, 1973), 148, Taiwan covers an area of 34,263 square 
kilometres, about the size of Massachusetts or Switzerland.
4 MSK, 1:387, 432; 7:106; MS, 4:1034, 1205; 26:8048-8049; TIFC, 
1:80-81; 2:910; Chaoying Fang, op.cit., 825; James B. Parsons, 
"Yang Ying-lung", DMB, 2:1556.
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As a result of water erosion, the geographical surface of Po- 
chou is rugged, with many mountains of greatly varying heights.
A mountain range about fifteen hundred kilometres high lying 
from northeast to southwest at the frontier region of present- 
day Szechuan and Kweichow called Ta-lou-shan constituted a 
natural barrier at the northern end of Po-chou. A medium-sized 
river, Wu-chiang, which flowed northeastward through the middle 
part of Po-chou into the Yangtze River drained numerous small 
basins scattered among the undulating mountains. Thus, even a 
small plain could rarely be found in this area. Furthermore, 
Po-chou was also bounded by the mountains of western Hukuang 
(including modern Hunan and Hupeh) to the east and the Yunnan- 
Kweichow Plateau to the west.“* In the vicinity of Po-chou, 
there were many other tribal units. Shui-hsi and Yung-ning were 
of about the size of Po-chou. (See Map III. Important T'u-ssu 
in Szechuan-Hukuang-Kweichow-Yunnan Area.)
The rule of the Yang House in Po-chou lasting for seven 
and a quarter centuries (876-1600) from the late T'ang, through 
the Five Dynasties, the two Sung periods, the Yuan, to the Ming, 
can be regarded as the result of an opportunistic policy of 
serving the big power. Therefore, it was never destroyed 
following the defeat of an imperial house. That its territories 
were not frequently ravaged by war until 1600 might be 
attributed to its special geographical situation. The best
See Ku Tsu-yu, Tu-shih fang-yu chi-yao (Peking, 1957), 1:3008; 
China - A Geographical Sketch, 29; Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho- 
kuo ti-t'u (Peking, 1972); Chung-kuo ti-t'u-ts’e (Shensi, 1973), 
Map 32.
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proof of this is the difficulty faced by the 240,000 tribal- 
government united force in marching into this area to attack 
Po-chou's strongholds during the extermination campaign.
B . The Occupation of Po-chou by the Yang Family
The name of Po-chou does not appear in official records 
until 639 A.D. in the early T 'ang dynasty.^ In the mid-eighth 
century, Po-chou was said to cover three districts, with a
7population of 2,168 composed of 490 households. But in 815, 
Po-chou was still described as a far-reaching remote placeg
suitable only for animals, not human beings. It had been 
invaded and occupied by the Nanchao tribal state in 859 but 
was soon restored by T'ang troops the following year.
9Unfortunately, it was again re-occupied by Nanchao in 873. 
Responding to an imperial appeal for recruits to suppress the
O  ic i 'a  <
Nanchao rebellion, Yang Tuan, a Han-Chinese from Shansi
JUo Hs 14. I\, y
province, led clans from his native region to the Po-chou
area in 876. With the aid of three local bullies, Yang Tuan
Chang Kuang-ssu et al., Kuei-ohou t'ung-chih (1741 edition), 
5:33-34; TIFC, 2:877.
 ^ Liu Hsu et al. , Chiu T ’ang-shu (Peking, 1975), 5:1625-1626; 
Hsin T ’ang-shu, 4:1075.g
Po-chou was a place for degraded officials in T'ang times.
By learning that poet Liu Yii-hsi was degraded to Po-chou in 
815, his good friend Liu Tsung-yüan, a famous writer of prose, 
suggested to replace him because Po-chou was not suitable for 
human beings and Yii-hsi had to look after his old mother.
Censor P'ei Tu also asked for the transfer of Yu-hsi because he 
could not go with his mother who was at the age of eighty to 
Po-chou where animals could be seen everywhere. See Chiu T ’ang- 
shu, 2:452; Esin T ’ang-shu, 16:5129, 5141-5142.
9 See note 6.
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and his men recovered Po-chou the same year.^ Three decades 
later, with the fall of the T'ang Empire, China entered into 
the "Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms" era, a half century long 
period of great disunity and frequent dynastic change.^ Yang 
Tuan and his descendants therefore independently settled in 
Po-chou. Thereafter, the Yang family established itself as the 
dominant force in the region and inaugurated the practice of 
transmitting power from generation within its own clan.
Po-chou was inhabited mainly by aborigines mostly of Miao
descent. Their contact with Han-Chinese can be traced back to
the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) when a general of the
Ch'u State led his troops westward. Contact increased after
the reign of Han Wu-ti (140-87 B.C.), who actively opened trade
12with the southwestern frontier-dwellers. The three Po-chou 
local bullies, surnamed Yu, Chiang and Huang, who had helped 
Yang Tuan to establish his authority in T'ang times might have 
been Chinese migrants long resident there. In addition to the 
troops of the nine clans (including his own clan) led by Yang 
Tuan from Shansi, a large number of other Han-Chinese 
undoubtedly became new residents in the Po-chou area.
clans were Yang. Ling-hu, Ch' eng, Chao, Yu,
Lou, Liang, Wei and Hsieh. Three local bullies in Po-chou were 
Yu, Chiang and Huang. See YSCC, 10:31; TIFC, 1:67, 71.
Wang Gungwu, The Structure of Power in North China during the 
Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), 1-2.
12 Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih-chi (Peking, 1972), 9:2993-2998, 3044- 
3049; TIFC, 1:46-50; Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han 
China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 111-117; Yu Chung, "Han- 
Chin shih-ch'i ti hsi-nan i", Li-shih yen-chiu, 12:13, 26 
(December 1957) .
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Therefore, in the early stages of occupation, the Yang family
had to preserve its dominant position against threats from
neighbouring tribesmen. Tuan's grandson Pu-she initially led
his troops in attacks on the Min tribe attached to the Nan-
chao. Unfortunately, Pu-she died in the fighting and his son
San Rung was captured. Half a year later, San Rung successfully
13escaped from the Min tribe.
We may conclude that the military power of the first four 
generations of the Yang family was not very strong and therefore 
its dominant position in this area had not yet been firmly 
established. The description by the Ming scholar Sung Lien in 
the Yang-shih ahia-chuan (The History of the Yang Family) that 
once in the mid-tenth century the aborigines prostrated 
themselves on the ground in front of San Rung and swore not to 
revolt but to send tribute to the Yang clan is a total 
exaggeration!
C. Disruption and Reunion in Sung Times
When emperor Sung T'ai-tsu unified China and ascended the 
throne in 960 A.D., San Rung's son Shih made preparations to 
head a mission to the capital. At the time, however, two 
barbarian tribes rose in revolt and Shih was forced to remain 
in Po-chou to suppress the rebellion. Unfortunately, he was 
mortally wounded by a stray arrow and died shortly thereafter.
YSCC, 10:32a.
14 YSCC, 10:32b.
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Shih left three sons: Chao, Hsien and I. The latter two
commanded powerful armed support and initiated a struggle for 
succession. Hsien held the eastern part of Po-chou and I 
occupied the southern part. I even united with their enemy Hin 
tribe to attack Hsien. Proclaiming his righteous indignation, 
Chao mobilised all military forces at his command to subjugate 
I and succeeded in re-occupying the southern part of Po-chou.
He was unable to conquer his other rival at the time because 
Hsien was too strong. — Subsequently, Chao's adopted son Kuei- 
ch'ien, the seventh ruler of Po-chou, was murdered by a bully 
bribed by Hsien. Thereafter, from about the last quarter of 
the tenth century to the first quarter of the thirteenth 
century, Po-chou was divided into two parts for over two 
hundred years. Chao held the greater part of Po-chou, called 
the "Upper Yang" or the "Great Po-chou". Hsien still kept the 
eastern part of Po-chou, called the "Lower Yang" or the "Small 
Po-chou". (See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang
Family in Po-chou.) Seven generations later, at the beginning 
of the thirteenth century, descendants of the two sides agreed 
to seek a reunification. Two decades later, Huan, the head of 
the "Lower Yang" broke the agreement and plundered the border 
region. Finally, he was murdered by Ts'an, the leader of the 
"Upper Yang" and thirteenth ruler of Po-chou. Thenceforth, 
under the rule of the brilliant Yang Ts'an, Po-chou achieved
real unity and its size was enlarged by the defeat of the Min
. 15tribe.
15 T'o T'o, et at. Sung-shih (Taipei, 1970. I-wen yin-shu-
kuan edition. Reprint of the 1747 edition), 36:5913; YSCC,
10:32b-37.
During the period of disunion, another division had
occurred within the "Great Po-chou" ("Upper Yang"). In order
to deprive his nephew of leadership, Yang Kuang-yung of the
eighth generation submitted to the Sung Court in 1108 with the
contribution of his lands. Yang Wen-kuei of the ninth
generation likewise donated the district he controlled to the
Court the same year. Moreover, Yang Kuang-yung had repeatedly
tried to poison his grand-nephew Wei-ts'ung, the tenth
legitimate successor of Po-chou, but ultimately killed himself
by mistakenly drinking the poisoned tea meant for his rival.^
According to the research of Herold J. Wiens, if a Han-
Chinese were appointed to rule a tribe in the isolation of the
tribal habitat, he would eventually succumb to the tribal ways,
lose his own culture and become a non-Han tribesman like his 
17 . . .subjects. However, it is difficult to measure accurately to
what extent the Yang family had succumbed to tribal ways and to
what degree it preserved Chinese practices. Members of the
Yang family retained use of their Chinese names through the
centuries. (See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang
Family in Po-chou.) The Mongolian names Sayin-Buqa of Han-ying
(the seventeenth ruler of Po-chou) and El-Buqa of Chia-chen (the
eighteenth ruler of Po-chou) were names conferred by the Mongol 
18rulers. This formal acceptance of Mongol names, however, did
Hsu Sung, ed., Sung-hui-yao chi-kao (Peking, 1957), 8:7784; 
TIFC, 2:682-683.
'^  Herold J. Wiens, op.cit., 208-209.
1 8 Yuan-Shih, 13:3884; YSCC, 10:41-42.
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not signify rejection of their original Chinese names which
were continued in the genealogy of the Yang family.
In 1081, in the aid of the Sung Court's efforts to suppress
disloyal tribes, Kuang-chen, the eighth ruler of Po-chou, was
described as "shu i" (civilised barbarian). In 1108, when they
donated their lands to the Sung Court, both Kuang-yung and Wen-
kuei were described as "t tsu", "i gen" (barbarian or tribesman)
or "tsu shuai", "fan shuai" (commander of a clan or of a tribe)
19who came to submit to the Han-Chinese emperor. Part of Po-
chou' s history was first recorded in the Standard History Sung-
20shih, mostly in Man-i-chuan (the "Biography of Barbarians").
This seems to indicate that the Yang family as well as other
Han-Chinese inhabitants of Po-chou were regarded as having
succumbed to tribal ways after two hundred years since 876 A.D.
The Sung dynasty is regarded as a period of literary and 
21artistic maturity, and the Yang family was also influenced by 
this literary atmosphere. After the fall of the Northern Sung, 
the imperial House withdrew southward accompanied by a large 
number of high officials and highly civilised Chinese scholars. 
At the beginning of the Southern Sung (the second quarter of 
the twelfth century), the eleventh ruler Hsüan employed famous 
teachers to coach his thirteen sons and supported a Szechuan
Sung-shih, 31:1097; 36:5918-5919, 5921; Li Yu, Sung-ch’ao 
shih-shih (Taipei, 1967), 774-775.
20 Sung-shih, 36:5918-5921.
21 Wang Gungwu, op.cit., 1.
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scholar in obtaining a chin-shih degree. Shih, the brother and 
the regent of the twelfth ruler, paid much more attention to 
arts and literature. He also provided accommodation and 
subscribed lands for the support of those Szechuan scholars who 
came to Po-chou. Thereafter the majority of barbarian children 
and youths became literate and accomplished, and local customs 
underwent a great change.
The thirteenth ruler Ts'an, who had ended the division of
Po-chou during the first quarter of the thirteenth century,
rebuilt a temple for the ancestors of the Yang family, founded
schools and supported scholars. He also wrote ten directives
based on Confucian ideals as the governing principles of the 
22Yang family. The civil examination system originated in T'ang 
times and developed during the two Sung periods but had not been 
introduced into the Po-chou area. At the earnest request by 
the fourteenth ruler Chieh (d. 1243), Po-chou was allocated a 
quota of three chin-shih degrees by the Court every year after 
1238 A .D. Though famous as a strategist and militarist, the 
fifteenth ruler Wen (d. 1265) also paid attention to civil
Ten directives were:
1. Fulfil one's official responsibilities to the utmost.
2. Emphasise one's filial duty to parents.
3. Carry on one's parents' enterprise.
4. Guard the borders.
5. Practise thrift and frugality.
6. Distinguish the good man and the bad.
7. Exercise fairness and reciprocity.
8. Act in accordance with the popular opinion.
9. Do away with extravagance.
10. Be scrupulous in administering punishment.
See Ch'eng Chü-fu, Chung-lieh miao-pei {Ch 'eng-hsüeh-lou wen- 
chi edition. Taipei, 1970. Facsimile reproduction of 1395 
edition), 628-631; YSCC, 10:35b-37b.
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administration and promoting literary studies. He built a
Temple for Confucius to encourage the tribesmen to become
. . .  ,23smicised.
Following the efforts of the above five rulers to foster
education and sinicisation, the cultural relationship with the
Han-Chinese imperial government was greatly improved. This was
largely because the political and cultural centre had shifted
from northern China to the South during the Southern Sung
period. On the other hand, relation between the Yang family and
the Sung Court was mutually beneficial. The Court could obtain
military assistance and tax collection from the Yang family.
The chieftains of Po-chou were awarded imperial rank and
honorific titles from the Court in return. Under such
circumstances, the ruling class of Po-chou willingly accepted
cultural assimilation. As far as we know, during the period
from 1238 to 1274, eight Po-chou scholars obtained the chin-shih
degree and two others were appointed magistrate and deputy
24magistrate in 1244 A.D.
After the reunification of Po-chou, its size increased and 
its military power was stronger than ever. Due to its loyalty 
and strength, it became more and more highly regarded by the 
Sung Court. In 1239 A.D., when the Po-chou tribal troops went 
to the aid of the Szechuan governor against the Mongols at 
River Min, the fifteenth ruler Wen was appointed an-fu-shih, an
YSCC, 10:38-39b.
24 TIFC, 2:710-711, 885.
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important military commander in the Sung official hierarchy.
It was the first time a Po-chou ruler obtained a high position
25from the central government. Thereafter Wen commanded his
troops in assisting the Sung Court against the aggression of
the Mongol cavalry another six times. He won many victories in
the battlefield and many honourable titles were conferred upon 
2 6him. Unfortunately, the Mongols were too strong and all he 
could do was to delay their success.
D. Submission to the Mongol Yuan Dynasty
Since most tribal leaders were aware that they were not 
strong enough to resist a unified Chinese Empire, the best 
policy to adopt was to submit to the superior power in order 
to preserve their own position of local power. After the fall 
of the T'ang empire, Po-chou could still keep its independence 
because China was suffering internal troubles during the period 
of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. When the Sung came to 
power and established a unified empire, Po-chou submitted to 
the Court immediately. During the later years of the Southern 
Sung, when the Mongols had occupied Yunnan and were ready to 
march eastward via the tribal areas to invade China, Po-chou, 
owing to its military obligation to the Sung Court and in order 
to defend itself, mobilised all its power to fight against the 
Mongol cavalry. However, when the Sung army was defeated, Po- 
chou did not persevere in its loyalty to the Sung Court.
25 TIFC, 1:77; 2:885.
2 6 Kuei-chou-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Tsun-i Kao-p1ing 'Po-chou t'u- 
ssu' Yang-wen teng ssu-tso mu-tsang fa-chueh-chi", Wen-wu, 
1:67-70 (January 1974) .
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Following the fall of the Sung empire in 1277 and despite
the continuing resistance of some Han-Chinese loyalist remnants,
Pang-hsien (c. 1239-1282), the sixteenth successor of Po-chou,
immediately yielded to the Mongol conqueror. In exchange, he
was promised that the titles he had held before would be
maintained. Seven months later, he asked for an imperial letter
2 7from the Mongol Yuan Court for confirmation of his position.
In order to comply with the terms of tribute laid down by Emperor
Khubilai Khan (r. 1260-1249), he went to the Court to seek an
audience personally in 1278. Next year, he was urged to send
his son to the Court as hostage. From 1281 onwards, he was
asked to pay tribute every year. While the Court was sending
troops to suppress a local uprising via Po-chou, he supplied
them with provisions and provided fighters to assist the
29government forces. He thereby fulfilled most of the
obligations laid down by the Mongol ruler. Therefore, after
his death in 1282, he was conferred a posthumous title "Hui Min"
( Kind and YCdtfy ) and honoured with the highest degree of
30nobility as "Po-Kuo Rung" (Duke of the Po-chou State).
Yüan-shih, 1:171, 192-193; Kuei-chou t'ung-chih, 7:1; TIFC, 
2:686, 887-888.
2 8 In 1267, Khubilai Khan laid down what he really meant by the 
terms of tribute:
1. The ruler to seek audience personally.
2. Sons to be sent as hostages.
3. A census of population to be made.
4. The people to provide military corvee.
5. Taxes to be paid.
6. A Mongol governor to be in charge.
See Yüan-shih, 1:116. Translation adopted from Wang Gungwu's 
"Early Ming relations with southeast Asia: a background essay",
in J.K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 1968), 48.
29 Yüan-shih, 1:210; YSCC, 10:40b; TIFC, 2:686.
30 YSCC, 10:41.
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31Pang-hsien left a few young sons. Of them Han-ying
(c. 1277-1317), his successor, was only five years of age.
Four years later, Han-ying was accompanied by his mother nee
32T'ien (d. 1287) on a Court visit in 1286. The main reason 
might have been because they wanted to show their loyalty and 
ask for official recognition of their ruling position in 
Po-chou. Khubilai Khan received them personally.
He touched Han-ying's head and, after studying him for a long
time, spoke to the ministers, saying, "This boy will be an
33outstanding hero of the nation". He was also greatly 
impressed with the visit by a widow and an orphan who had come 
to the Court despite the long distance they had to travel from 
their home.^  During this successful Court visit, Han-ying was 
conferred a Mongolian name "Sayin-Buqa", an honourable title 
"General of Lung-fu-wei with Golden Tiger Tally", the hsüan-wei- 
shih of Shao-ch'ing, Chen-chou and Nan-p'ing, and the an-fu-shih 
of Po-chou. In addition to the former honourable title "Lady
In Yang-shih ehia chuan (The History of the Yang Family) , 
only Pang-hsien's son and successor Han-ying had been mentioned. 
(See YSCC, 10:41). The recently unearthed discovery in China 
in 1972 shows that the other three sons of Pang-hsien, Ju-tsu, 
Hsiao-tsu and Szu-tsu, were also written into an epitaph of nee 
T'ien (1230-1290). (See Wen-wu, 1974, 1:72.) Of the three, 
Ju-tsu's son Chia-chen (El-Buqa) was later adopted by Han-ying 
and became the eighteenth ruler of Po-chou.
32 Yüan-shih, 13:3884; YSCC, 10:41.
33 YSCC, 10:41.
34 Yuan-shih, 13:3885.
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Chaste and Obedient” (Chen-shun fu-jen), nee T'ien was also 
conferred the title "Lady of Lasting Peace County” (Yung-an- 
ehün fu-jen) and appointed regent to administer the affairs in 
Po-chou. 33
Unfortunately, a year after the Court visit, nee T'ien was
killed in the power struggles within the Yang clan in 1287.
This case was reported to the Court by Han-ying and the Court
commanded the local government to help in the arrest of the
3 6murderers who tried to escape to Szechuan. Next year, Han-
ying, at the age of twelve, was accompanied on a second Court
visit, probably in order that he might thank the emperor
personally for his help in avenging the death of his mother as
well as to request the re-confirmation of his own ruling
position. Again Khubilai Khan was pleased by his loyalty. In
addition, following one of the ministers' reports that the Yang
family had gained military merit in the suppression of the
rebellion in the frontier regions, Po-chou was raised from an-
fu-ssu to hsüan-fu-ssu and Han-ying was simultaneously appointed 
37hsuan-fu-shih. Han-ying was too young to actually command
the army and too inexperienced to handle civil affairs. There
must have been a class of talented men from the Yang clan to
assist him in fulfilling his ruling position.
As his economic obligation to the Court, Han-ying
3 8presented one thousand raincoats in 1290. When an imperial
35 TIFC, 2:686.
36 YSCC, 10:41.
3"^ Yüan-shih, 13:38 85 .
33 Yüan-shih, 2:334.
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appeal was issued asking for taxes from all local governments
and tribal units, unlike Po-chou's neighbouring tribes which
refused to respond, Han-ying immediately collected taxes and
made a census of households to the Court. For this show of
loyalty to the Court, he was given the additional title of
39"Commander of Ten Thousand Troops".
As military corvee, one thousand tribal troops of Po-chou
4 0were recruited to attack Burma. At the end of 1293, eight
thousand former Sung soldiers, possibly including a large
number of tribesmen, were enlisted from Po-chou and three other
tribal units in Szechuan to attack An-nan.^ Although Han-ying
was said to have made three Court visits during Emperor Ch’eng-
tsung's reign (1295-1307), he did not gain any change in his 
4 2position. On the contrary, his burden of military corvee and
supplies was increased because of the internal suppression
4 3campaigns waged by the Court. After his death, he was
conferred the same honourable degree of nobility as his father:
44
Po-Kuo Rung (Duke of the Po-chou State).
Chia-chen (r. 1318-1352), a nephew of Han-ying, became the 
eighteenth ruler of Po-chou. He was conferred a Mongolian name
TIFC, 2:686-687.
40 Ibid., 2:889.
4  ^Yuan-shih, 2:375.
4 2 YSCC, 10:41b. According to the "Biography of Yang Sayin- 
Buqa" in Yüan-shih (13:3884-3885), Han-ying had only two Court 
visits in the reign of Emperor Ch'eng-tsung.
43 TIFC, 2:687.
44 YSCC, 10:42b.
During the4 5"El-Buqa" when he paid a Court visit in 1322.
late Yuan, Mongol rule was not very strong. A Mongol governor
of Szechuan revolted in 1329. In order to march eastward to
Hukuang a key province of China, this rebellious Mongol
governor succeeded in taking over a pass in Po-chou. Being
confronted with the disloyal high official of the Yüan
government at this crucial moment, rather than trying to resist
a sudden attack, Chia-chen opened the gate to let the treasonous 
. 46troops m.
Chia-chen probably was unable to wait for government relief
troops because the rebel soldiers had already occupied Po-chou's
strategic base. Po-chou would be less ruined if he let the
rebel troops quietly enter into Po-chou. Furthermore, the Yang
clan was not as strong as previously because it had not been
fully successful in pacifying the rebels led by Hsieh Wu-ch'iung
4 7before this occurred. From the tribal point of view, no
matter who controlled the empire or what struggles took place,
the tribal heads should sit on the fence and at length submit
to the final conqueror. Therefore, undertaking an opportunistic
policy, Chia-chen and his brothers came to surrender to the
Court when a large number of government troops were marching
toward Po-chou from various directions. Not long afterwards,
4 8the governor who had revolted also yielded to the Court.
Ibid.
4 6 YUan-shih, 3:728-730.
47 TIFC, 2:688, 891.
4 8 A few months later, the rebellious governor was sentenced to 
death because he reproached the royal carriage. See Yüan-shih, 
3:730-731; TIFC, 2:891.
CHAPTER THREE
Po-chou in Ming Times
Yang Chien, a nephew of Chia-chen, succeeded Chia-chen's
grandson Yuan-ting, becoming the twenty-first ruler of Po-chou.
(See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang Family.)
Adopting the traditional opportunistic policy, Chien remained
neutral with regard to the military struggles among the Han-
Chinese rivals for the throne during the last years of the
Yuan. Of those rivals, Ming Yü-chen had swept the Mongols from
Szechuan in 1358. He then established a state called "Ta Hsia"
and crowned himself emperor in 1362.^ There is no record of
whether Chien was forced to adhere to the Ta Hsia State as a
petty dependency because of geographical proximity or whether
he simply submitted to the power which had founded this new
state. The historical sources show that a governor was sent to
2Po-chou by Ming Yu-chen in 1365. When the Ming founder 
Emperor Hung-wu (r. 1368-1398) had unified most of China in 1368, 
Po-chou was still under the control of the Szechuan ruler.
After the elimination of the Ta Hsia State in mid-1371 and 
other successful subjugation campaigns in the rest of Szechuan 
several months later, an imperial emissary was sent to gain the 
adherence of Po-chou by an attractive promise by which the 
status of Po-chou would be raised from that of hsiian- fu-s su to 
hsuan-wei-ssu. In the first lunar month of the following year,
1 SL, 1:266-267.
2 SL, 1:269.
Chien went with other tribal chiefs to acknowledge his
submission to the Court and delivered all golden tallies,
silver seals and bronze medals bestowed by the former Mongol
3rulers to the new Ming emperor. The positions of Chien and 
other tribal chiefs in Po-chou area were confirmed and their 
titles were formally recognised. Subsequently, two an-fu-ssu 
(Ts'ao-t'ang and Huang-p'ing) and six chang-kuan-ssu (Po-chou, 
Yli-ch'ing, Pai-li, Yung-shan, Chen-chou and Chung-an) were 
established under the jurisdiction of the Po-chou hsüan-wei- 
shih-ssu.^
A. Feudal Relationship between the Yang Family and the 
Ming Court
The "feudal system" (feng-chien) and the "prefectural 
system" (chün-hsien) are two contrasting types of political 
systems in Chinese history. In Chinese usage, the "feudal 
system" normally refers to the monarch's establishment or 
recognition of feudal states in which the position of the state 
ruler is hereditary. In contrast, the "prefectural system" 
refers to the division of the empire into prefectures and 
districts, to which the central government appoints prefects 
and district magistrates as administrators for a limited period
3 SL, 3:1318-1319; MSK, 7:102; MS, 1:26; 12:3706; TIFC, 2:892- 
893.
 ^ The years of the establishment of these an-fu-ssu and ohang- 
kuan-ssu were: Po-chou, 1372; Huang-p'ing, 1374; Chung-an,
1375; Ts'ao-t'ang, Chen-chou, Yii-ch'ing and Pai-ni, 1384 ; Yung- 
shan, 1384-98(7). See TMHT, 1:290; MSK, 7:102; MS, 4:1034, 
1205-1207; 26 : 8039 ; TIFC, 1: 79-80 ; 2 : 893; Li Hsien et al. , Ta- 
Ming i-t'ung-ohih (n.p. 1559. Reprint of 1461 edition), 72:35; 
Map I, Ming Po-chou in Modern Kweichow.
of time. The two systems, however, were combined in a mixed
system which was tried as early as the second century B.C. when
the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) established both
5"commandaries" and "principalities" simultaneously. The Ming 
founder Hung-wu adopted this mixed system by maintaining 
prefectures on the one hand and, on the other, setting up 
several of his sons and generals with hereditary titles and 
privileges to govern their enfeoffed lands.^
Similarly the institution of t'u-ssu in line with the 
feudal system and that of t’u-fu as part of the prefectural 
system were simultaneously established as early as the 
beginning of the Ming dynasty. In the t’u-fu (native 
prefecture), the magistrates were mostly appointed from among 
the tribal chiefs, but most of their deputies and subordinates 
were Han civil officials. The administration of these t’u-fu 
and its official status were considered the same as those within
7the regular prefectural system in China. The chieftains of 
t’u-ssu, however, retained considerable power and authority 
within their semi-independent domains. Their hereditary right 
of succession as well as their full power over tribal 
administration, tax collection and judicial proceedings 
reflected their feudal character. Moreover, the feudal
Lien-sheng Yang, "Ming Local Administration", op.ait., 1. 
 ^Li Chieh, Ming Shih (Hong Kong, 1972), 40-41.
7 See Chapter One, Section C. Political Supervision and 
Conversion.
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relationship between the chieftains and the emperor, or the 
tribal units and the Court, remained strong, and audiences at 
Court and tribute to the emperor were important aspects of this 
feudal connection. The economic and military contributions 
were the burdens imposed by these feudal obligations.
Before the abolition of Po-chou, the feudal relationship 
between the Yang family and the Ming Court was firm. Yang 
Chien, the first Po-chou ruler in Ming times, had been asked
gin 1389 to send seasonal reports to the Court. Owing to the
long distance between Po-chou and Nanking, regular reporting to
the Court was difficult. After the capital was removed from
gNanking to Peking in 1421, the seasonal reports would have 
been even more difficult to submit due to the longer distance.
It is not known whether or not this duty was carried out, but 
the Court visits made by Chien and his sub-tribal chiefs 
outnumbered those of any other tribes. During his reign, 
nineteen court visits were made in the three decades after the 
submission of 1372, nine by Chien personally. During the 
Ming dynasty, the Po-chou rulers made a total of one hundred 
and fourteen court visits in two hundred and twenty-eight
years— the highest number of Court visits of all the t ’u-ssu--
with an average of one visit every two years.^ Obviously the 
Yang family was peaceful and obedient to the Ming Court.
8 SL, 7:2930.
9 MS, 6:1739.
10 SL, 3:1318-1319; 4:1624, 1693, 1798; 5:1956, 2007; 6:2508, 
2571; 7:2787, 2872, 3027, 3159, 3169, 3205; 8:3273, 3355-3356, 
3369, 3472, 3568-3569.
^  The second highest number of Court visits conducted by Shui- 
hsi hsilan-wei-ssu of Kweichow is 113. See Huang K'ai-hua, 
op.ait., 120, 163.
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B . Economic Burdens
Tax payment was one of the important feudal obligations.
In 1374, there was a government proposal for the levy of taxes-
in-kind on Po-chou at the rate of 2,500 tan of grain per annum
from 1371 onwards. Emperor Hung-wu immediately rejected this
suggestion deciding against a fixed levy in favour of voluntary
12tribute from the tribal chiefs. The reason given was that
the Po-chou chieftains submitted to the Ming Court upon his
assumption of imperial rule. This is an unconvincing
superficial explanation since Po-chou was not among the first
to come to submit to the Court. Some tribes had offered their
13submission even before the foundation of the Ming. The real 
reason was probably that Emperor Hung-wu wanted to avoid 
confrontation in southwestern China, so that he could 
concentrate on the north where Mongol remnants still posed a 
considerable military threat. Moreover, the Court was 
preparing for a series of subjugation campaigns in Yunnan, 
which was still occupied by a Mongol prince and a famous tribal 
clan and had not yet come under the control of the Chinese. 
Therefore, Emperor Hung-wu had to keep the Szechuan-Kweichow 
region peaceful and continue to pacify the powerful chieftains 
as well, so that not only would the expedition troops avoid 
opposition from the tribesmen but the Court could also utilise
SL, 4:1558.
13 For example, An-ting hsüan-fu-s su , Jung-mei hsüan-f u-s s u and 
Pao-ching an-fu-s su in Hukuang, Ssu-nan and. Ssu-chou hsüan-fu- 
ssu in Kweichow were those who had submitted to Chu Yuan-chang 
(the Ming founder emperor Hung-wu) during the late Yiian dynasty. 
See MS, 26:7984, 7995; 27:8167.
the tribesmen to build roads, to dredge the rivers, to
construct bridges and to supply provisions. Finally and more
importantly, the Ming forces needed tribal troops in
collaboration with the government troops for a successful
subjugation campaign. Therefore, Emperor Kung-wu did not
permit the fixed quota of 2,500 tan of grain per annum to be
levied upon Po-chou at this early stage. But this decision did
not mean that thereafter taxes would never be levied on Po-chou.
In many of the tribal units in Yunnan taxes-in-kind were levied
two years after the Court's successful subjugation campaigns 
14in 1384. Moreover, in 1406, the Court announced that some
267,000 mou (40,454.5 acres) of the Deserted Land Tax of Po-chou,
together with that of Chengtu Prefecture and the other tribal
15units of Kweichow, Yu-yang and Yung-ning, could be exempted.
This means that before 1406 even "deserted lands" allowed to 
become uncultivated could be taxed. We may, therefore, estimate 
that the levy of a regular quota of taxes-in-kind (2,500 tan of 
grain per annum) upon Po-chou must have been undertaken after 
the mid-Hung-wu period.
According to an investigation by the Vice Minister of 
Justice Ho Ch'iao-hsin (1427-1503) in 1486, the levy of taxes- 
in-kind upon Po-chou was about 3,398 tan of grain per annum in 
1478 and 1479.^ According to these two fixed levies, we can
14 MS, 26:8002-8003.
15 SL, 4:1558; 10:763; MSK, 7:102; MS, 26:8039-8040; TIFC, 
2:893-894.
16 Ho Ch'iao-hsin, K ’an-ch'u Po-chou shih-ch'ing shu (Chang­
sha, 1938. Reprint of the 1617 Chi-lu hui-pien edition), 51:9.
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surmise that there must have been some alteration in the quota
between the last decade of the fourteenth century and the last
quarter of the fifteenth century from 2,500 tan to 3,398 tan,
about a one-third increase over the original. During the last
period, the half century or more from 1544 to 1600, the tax
17burden amounted to 5,800 tan of grain per annum. In addition,
Po-chou had to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to assist the Kweichow
18provincial government annually. Therefore, the burden of 
taxes-in-kind and taxes-in-silver were higher than before. The 
taxpayers in Po-chou inevitably suffered from the dual 
impositions from the Ming government as well as from their 
Po-chou ruling class.
Po-chou had once developed into an important trade centre.
A government-monopolised tea warehouse was built in Po-chou in
1397. Officials were appointed to supervise the grain-tea
19trade as well as the horse-tea exchange. Unfortunately, this
20tea warehouse was cancelled in 1439. The reason is not known,
but the trade between tribesmen and Han-Chinese remained 
21prosperous.
Above all, lumbering was one of the major economic 
burdens since Po-chou became an important lumbering centre in
17 PPCS, 4:328
1 q Kuo Tzu-chang, "Po p'ing shan-hou shih-i shu", HMCSWP, 
6:4551.
19
20
SL, 8:3662. 
TIFC, 2:892.
21 Ta-Ming i-t ’ ung-chih, 72:36.
G4
22Szechuan after the mid-sixteenth century. The cost of
lumbering and the transporting of timber from the Po-chou
jungle to the capital was extremely high. It ranged from about
four to five thousand silver taels for large timbers and from
2 3one to two thousand silver taels for small ones. Sometimes a 
beam timber valued at one thousand silver taels would cost ten 
times that when it arrived in the capital.^ The tribesmen 
were the ones who were forced to provide this hard labour 
corvee.
C . Military Service
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Ming Court could 
effectively utilise the tribal forces for fighting. The Po-chou 
tribal troops had done their best to serve the Ming Court in 
many military campaigns.
In 1373, a year after Chien's first court visit, several
government courier stations were built in Po-chou to improve
communications. In 1381, before the Court sent expeditionary
troops to Yunnan, Chien was ordered to accept responsibility for
the construction of courier stations, post-houses, bridges and
roads in support of the Chungking Battalion. These major
25projects took eight months to complete. In the later part of
TIFC, 1:401.
Ch'en Chi-ju, Mei-kung chien-wen-lu (n.p., n.d.), 8:3b-4. 
Lü K 'un, "Yu-wei-shu", HMCSWP, 5:4495.
25 TIFC, 2:893.
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the same year, Chien was ordered to lead an advance guard of
twenty thousand tribesmen and to supply three thousand horses
2 6for the expedition. In the first lunar month of the
27following year, Yunnan was brought fully under Ming control.
Po-chou tribal forces undoubtedly made significant contributions
to the success of the subjugation campaign.
After the military success, the Court decided, to send
retired military officers to guard Yunnan. Chien was asked to
provide fifty-five tribesmen as a guard to accompany each of
2 8these experienced veterans to their assigned destinations.
Because of its performance in these tasks, Po-chou came to be
relied upon as one of the important military bases for the
security of southwestern China. In order to control and
communicate with this strategic area more effectively and
directly, the Court decided to build three additional courier
29stations in Po-chou. Since Sha-hsi in Po-chou was walled,
it was designated a garrison city and came to be guarded by a
tribal-government united military force, composed of one
thousand government regular troops and two thousand tribal 
30troops.
Historically speaking, the military significance of the 
Po-chou tribal force was less in Ming times than it had been in
SL, 5:2186; MSK, 7:102; MS, 26:8040; Teng Ch'iu, Huang-Ming 
yung-hua lei-pien (Taipei, 1965. Reprint of the 1570 edition), 
1:199; Fang Chüeh-hui, Ming t'ai-tsu Ko-ming wu-kung-chi 
(Taipei, n.d. Reprint of the 1940 edition), 458.
27 MSK, 1:16; MS, 1:39.
28 SL, 5:2232.
29 SL, 5:2238.
30 SL, 5:2223.
Yuan times. The Po-chou troops had been enlisted in the attack
on Burma and Vietnam during the reign of Khubilai Khan (r. 1260- 
311294) . During the Ming dynasty, however, the Po-chou tribal
troops fighting in collaboration with regular troops did not go
beyond Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan. Most of the suppression
campaigns in which the Po-chou tribal force participated took
place in the Po-chou area or the Kweichow-Hukuang border region.
Of the fourteen suppression campaigns in which Po-chou tribal
troops were called upon, only six were obviously for the benefit
of the Ming Court. One, in 1381, was the subjugation campaign
in Yunnan with which the Court planned to sweep out the Mongol
remnants and establish a Provincial Administration Office. Of
the other five, one involved the Kweichow-Hukuang border region,
two were in Szechuan, and two in Kweichow; these were all
punitive moves against disloyal tribal chiefs or rebellious
tribesmen. The other campaigns were largely for strengthening
the dominance of the Yang clan in Po-chou. (See Appendix
Three: Chronicle of the Po-chou Tribal Troops' Participation
in Suppression Campaigns.) Overall, the Po-chou tribal troops
were more important than the regular troops in the suppression
campaigns, especially the two which occurred in Szechuan in
1586-1588. Even the Han-Chinese commanders borrowed severed
heads from the Po-chou tribal troops, so that they could apply
32for rewards from the Court.
31 Yuan shih, 1:240; 2:265, 375.
32 TIFC, 2:900-901.
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D. Domestic' Struggles
Power struggles within a tribe always arose out of 
contested succession to the chieftainship. The 1476-77 
suppression campaign against the Miao people in Yao-pa-kan and 
VJan-hsi, in particular, was designed to solve internal 
conflicts of the Yang clan. The twenty-fourth Po-chou ruler 
Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474) wanted to make Yu, the son 
of his beloved concubine his successor in Po-chou in place of 
Ai, the legitimate heir as eldest son of his legal wife, but 
failed. He was advised by deceitful followers to wage a 
suppression campaign on the so-called uncivilised Miao people 
and then to request to establish a new Pacification Office with 
Yu as its head. The Court believed him and sent government 
troops to help him to undertake the suppression. Po-chou had 
to supply military provisions and more than ten thousand of its 
own troops, far more than the government's, and after the 
campaign, the burden of the construction of Pacification Offices 
and garrison fortifications were largely borne by Po-chou 
itself. (See Appendix Four: A Brief Account on the 1476-1477
Suppression Campaign.)
The conflict between the two brothers, Yu and Ai, did not 
cease after the re-distribution of power and property arranged 
by their father Hui. On the contrary, the conflict reacted a 
serious level after Hui1s death in 1483. Yu and his henchman 
Chang Yiian tried to murder Ai three times between 14 85 ar.d 14 86 . 
Subsequently, the two brothers reported each other to the 
emperor. Ai exposed Yu's conspiracy and the murders comnitted 
in his name. Yu, in collaboration with Yuan, fabricated more
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than two dozen charges against Ai in order that he might replace 
Ai as ruler of Po-chou. After receiving the accusations made by 
the two camps, the Court, on 20 October 1486, decided to send 
the Vice Minister of Justice Ho Ch'iao-hsin to Po-chou to 
conduct an investigation of the case. After careful inquiry, 
he found Ai innocent except for a few minor mistakes. 
Subsequently, on 6 April 1487, the Court made its final 
judgement: Chang Yuan and his brother Shen were sentenced to
death; Ai could stay in office by paying redemption; Yu was 
dismissed from office and transferred to Pao-ning to be kept in 
custody. (See Appendix Five: A Brief Account of the 1486-1487
Investigation.)
The conflict between Ai and Yu seemed to have been settled 
but this proved to be temporary. Both for profit and revenge,
Ai levied heavy taxes upon those tribesmen previously ruled by 
Yu. Under these circumstances, these tribesmen favoured Yu 
over Ai as their ruler. With their support, Yu escaped from 
Pao-ning and returned to Po-chou and burned down Ai's lodgings 
and offices. At this moment, Ai asked for help. The Court 
promised to suppress Yu but suspended its preparations upon 
learning of Yu's death. When the Court realised that Yu still 
commanded considerable support, it decided to support Yu's son 
Hung as his father's successor. This device would keep the 
Po-chou people divided with each side keeping close watch on 
the other. Therefore, the Court appointed Hung as t'u-she, a 
tribal secretary, with responsibility to assist the registrar 
of Po-chou in pacifying tribesmen. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, members of the Registry in every Pacification Office
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were mostly Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. (See Table 
One: The Organisation of Tribal Government in Ming China.)
Thus, the Court placed Hung under the protection of a group of 
Han-Chinese officials and utilised Hung in helping to solve 
tribal problems. With the support of Hung, the Court could 
limit the expanding power of Ai, and especially of his son Pin.
Ai retired in 1501, sixteen years before his death. It 
was possibly pressure from the Court on Ai that forced him to 
seek early retirement or Ai himself might have relinquished his 
post to Pin for the sake of safety. Both explanations are 
plausible. After taking up the post, Pin demonstrated his 
brilliance by leading five thousand troops to aid the government 
in suppressing a rebellion in Kweichow. In 1507, Pin 
successfully bribed the famous and powerful eunuch Liu Chin to 
have himself promoted to the positions of Surveillance 
Commissioner of Szechuan and concurrently Pacification 
Commissioner of Po-chou. This was a unique and unprecedented 
situation. Under strong criticism by a censor, this promotion 
was cancelled the next year. Citing the provocative behaviour 
of the Miao tribesmen as a pretext, a tribal chief asked the 
Court to give Pin an imperial mandate permitting him to inspect 
the Kweichow-Hukuang border from time to time. This p-edition 
was also turned down by the Ministry of War. These actions 
indicate that Hung's new appointment as tribal secretary in the 
Registry was part of a Court policy to balance the powers or at 
least limit the power of the Po-chou ruler.
After Hung's death, the Grand Coordinator Tsou Wen-sheng 
suggested the restoration of the An-ning Pacification Office
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and recommended that either Hung's brother or son be its head.
Although there were internal disagreements within the Ministry
of War, Hung's brother Chang was eventually appointed
Pacification Commissioner of An-ning hsüan-fu-ssu in 1528. The
name of An-ning was simultaneously altered to K'ai-li, however,
and it was separated from Po-chou and re-organised under the
jurisdiction of Kweichow Province, so that the Po-chou ruler
33would be restrained in acting against Chang. In order to
increase supervision Po-chou had been separated from Szechuan
and placed under the jurisdiction of the Military Defense
Circuit of Ssu-shih of Kweichow. It was not until 1562 that
Po-chou was again returned to the authority of the Szechuan
provincial government.^ In order to strengthen its military
control, the Court ordered the setting up of Military Defense
Circuits at important bases along the coast and in the border
35regions from the sixteenth century onwards. Therefore, even
though Po-chou had been returned to the jurisdiction of
Szechuan, the Ssu-shih Military Defense Circuit retained the
3 6right to supervise Po-chou and three other tribal units.
Conflicts between brothers having different mothers 
reappeared in the reign of the twenty-seventh ruler Yang Hsiang
Chang Heng, T ’u-shu pzen (Taipei, n.d. Reprint of the late 
Ming edition), 48:26b-27; MSHC, 4:14b-15; TIFC, 2:692-693.
34 SL, 90: 8429; Hsü Hsüeh-chu, Kuo-ch'ao tien-hui (Taipei, 1965. 
Reprint of the 1634 edition. Hereafter abbreviated as KCTH), 
4:2110.
35 Li Kuo-ch'i, "Ming Ch'ing liang-tai ti-fang hsing-cheng 
chih-tu chung 'tao' ti kung-neng chi ch'i yen-pien", Chung-yang 
yen-chzu-yuan chin-tai-shih-yen-chiu-so ohi-k'an, 3.1:148-150 
(July 1972).
36 SL, 90:8429; KCTH, 4:2110.
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(r. 1518-1544). Envious of his father's favouritism toward
his half-brother, the legitimate heir Lieh, with the
encouragement of his strong-minded mother and the assistance of
a group of tribal troops, deposed his father in 1544. Shortly
afterwards, Hsiang died in the neighbouring Shui-hsi t'u-ssu
government. The tribal regent of Shui-hsi, An Wan-ch'iian (See
Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577), forced
Lieh to cede two pieces of land when Lieh asked for the body of
his father. Lieh later broke his word, and the subsequent
conflict between these two strong tribal units lasted ten years.
Finally, Supreme Commander Feng Yueh ended the dispute by
37sending a strong government force in 1555. It is not known 
why the government waited ten years before intervening; 
possibly the confrontation suddenly became more serious or the 
tax collection and labour corvee were affected by the extended 
military conflict.
In the same year, Feng Yueh sent his Regional Commander 
with seven thousand troops to suppress a Miao rebellion in 
northern Po-chou. After these two suppression campaigns, Feng 
Yueh was keen to strengthen military control over Po-chou. He 
planned to establish a military control zone on the eastern 
border of Po-chou, where the military force could be easily 
recruited from the provinces of Kweichow, Hukuang and Szechuan. 
Alongside the inner zone, fortifications were to be built at 
three important military bases: Tsou-ma-p'ing in Szechuan,
Lung-ch'uan in Kweichow and San-tu Pass within Po-chou. The
37 KCTH, 4:2109; MSK, 7:104; MS, 26:8044.
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outer zone was composed of the Garrison Guards of Chungking in
Szechuan, and of T'ung-jen and Pien-ch'iao in Hukuang. Three
commanders were assigned to these rear military bases to
command and supply troops. In order to control Po-chou more
directly, the local commander of T'ung-jen advanced to Shih-
ch'ien, and the Local Commander of Ssu-shih Military Defense
Circuit moved to Lung-ch'uan. (See Map IV. Government
Military Control on Po-chou Since 1555.) Moreover, in order to
solve the logistic problem, the Assistant Prefect of Chungking
was transferred to Lung-ch'uan to take charge of the collection
of taxes-in-kind. Feng Yueh's proposal was approved by the 
3 8Court. This military arrangement maintained the peace of 
Po-chou for about four decades until the full-scale uprising 
of Yang Ying-lung.
E. Education
Like the other tribes, the chieftains of Po-chou sent
their children to the capital to enrol in the National 
39University. This practice was encouraged by the Ming 
government to sinicise the tribal people, and differed from 
that of the Mongol Yuan government when the chieftains were 
forced to send their sons as hostages. In Ming times, non-Han 
students were treated well and eventually sent back to their 
original tribes after graduation. If a student died during
38 KCTH, 4:2109; MSEC, 5:2.
39 SL, 7:3025; TIFC, 2:894.
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this period, his corpse would be sent back to his own tribes 
for burial, as in the case of Yang Chien's son Chen.* 4^
In 1400, a Confucian School was founded in Po-chou chang- 
kuan-ssu, and six years later it was promoted to the level of
fthe hsüan-wei-ssu, so that children and youths could study 
41locally. To send children to study at the National
University could be seen as evidence that the Po-chou ruling
class sought assimilation with the Han-Chinese ruling class.
For the Ming Court to build Confucian Schools in a tribal area,
however, indicated the desire to impose Chinese culture upon
the aboriginal tribespeople. This policy of sinicisation by
education, however, was not as successful as the Ming Court had
hoped. Throughout the Ming dynasty, only one Po-chou student
obtained the chin-shih degree —  by special examination in the
reign of the first Ming emperor. Only six passed the provincial
examinations and obtained the chü-jen degree. Of these six,
one was successful in 1414 in the early Ming, four in 1630,
three decades after the abolition of the Po-chou tribal units,
4 2and the date of the other is uncertain. Moreover, the
Confucian School in Po-chou was later converted into a Taoist 
A 3monastery. " This might have happened in the mid-sixteenth
40 MSK, 7:102; MS, 26:8040.
4 1 Ta-Ming i-t ' ung-chih, 72 : 37b; TIFC, 2:894 . According to 
Charles 0. Hucker's comment on Confucius School, there was one 
such School at each Prefectural seat, at each Sub-prefectural 
seat, and at each County seat. See Charles 0. Hucker, op.cit., 
47.
42 TIFC, 2:711.
43 Ibid. , 1:441.
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century, for it might have been the result of Emperor Chia-
44ching's (1522-1566) favouritism for Taoism. The conversion
could not have been earlier than 1522 because the bestowal of
the Collected Commentaries on the Four Books on the Po-chou
45Confucian School was recorded for this year. Confucian
teachings were even forbidden during the reigns of Yang Ying-
4 6lung (r. 1571-1595) and Yang Ch'ao-tung (r. 1595-1600). It 
was not until the Yang family was destroyed in 1600 that 
Confucian teaching at a Prefectural level was restored, and a 
Confucian School was rebuilt in 1608-1609.47
Summing up, the Po-chou people seem not to have been
interested in Confucian education. They appear to have firmly
rejected sinicisation. Their enthusiasm for Chinese cultural
assimilation was far less than that of their ancestors in Sung 
4 8times. Under these circumstances, some Chinese candidates in
Szechuan, Yunnan and Kwangsi, taking advantage of the lack of
competition for limited quotas falsely entered local
examinations as members of tribal minorities. This was
prohibited by the central government in 1576, and the local
examiners were warned to check the identity of candidates 
49carefully.
44 MSCSFM, 2:547-558.
45 MSK, 7:104; MS, 26:8044.
46 TIFC, 1:516, 526.
47 Ibid., 1:441.
4 8 See Section C of Chapter Two; TIFC, 1:441; 2:710.
49 TMHT, 3:1240.
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F. Immigration of the Han People
The historical development of Po-chou lasted seven end a
quarter centuries. Its existence was undoubtedly a result of
Han-Chinese expansion although the motive for its establishment
was to fight against the aggressive tribal state of Nanchao and
later a group of Han-Chinese had settled there because of the
fall of the T'ang dynasty. In addition to the three local
dominant families, Yü, Chiang and Huang, possibly three clans
of early Han-Chinese migrants, another nine Han-Chinese clans,
Yang, Ling-hu, Ch'eng, Chao, Yu, Lou, Liang, Wei and Hsieh,
were led by Yang Tuan into the Po-chou area in the last quarter
50of the ninth century. Subsequently, other Han immigrants
joined this group, especially during the Southern Sung period
(1127-1279). As a result of social mobility within Po-chou,
another seven important Han-Chinese families, T'ien, Chang,
51Yuan, Lu, T 'an, Lo and Wu, arose in Ming times. Other less
important families were Wang, Ho, Sung, Cheng, Lo, Mao, Han and 
52Tan. The more than two dozen Han-Chinese clans comprised a 
sizeable population, including their Han-Miao mixed descendants. 
During the mid-fifteenth century, the customs and observances 
of the Po-chou inhabitants were described in the Ta-Ming i- 
tung-chih (Geographical Histories of Ming China). Members of 
the households of the officials and scholars were said tc have
50 YSCC, 10:31b; TIFC, 1:71.
MSCSPM, 2:691; Ch'a Chi-tso, Tsui-wei-lu (Shanghai, 1936 . 
Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an edition, series 3. Reprint of the early 
Ch'ing edition), 34:31.
52 TIFC, 2:702-705.
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the same customs and practices as Han-Chinese. Tribesmen
retained their own styles of hair and dress, their own customs
of marriage and diet, as well as their indigenous practices of
hunting and cultivation. Chieftains, however, usually wore
Han-Chinese dress; on formal occasions, the tribesmen would
5 3also wear Han-Chinese garments. At the end of the sixteenth
century, a large group of Han-Chinese migrants and temporary
residents, including merchants, scholars, workmen, labourers,
escaped criminals as well as the slaves captured by the local
tribesmen, was advised by Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung
(1554-1612) to reject the rebellious chieftain Yang Ying-lung
and turn to support the government in the suppression 
54campaign. ' Although there is no source to indicate the 
population of Po-chou during the Ming period, we can estimate 
that the ratio of the Han-Chinese and the non-Han tribesmen had 
changed as a result of long term trends in immigration.
53 Ta-Ming i-t ' ung-chih, 72:36.
54 PPCS, 5:482.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Po-chou Uprising and the 
Response of the Government
A . Underlying Causes of the Po-chou Uprising
In discussing the relations between Imperial Courts and
the ethnic minorities, some scholars have tended to emphasise
economic exploitation and demands for military service.* 234 5
Although the existence of heavy taxation and labour corvee
cannot be ignored, they do not seem to amount to sufficient
cause in the case of the Po-chou uprising.
Undoubtedly, the taxes-in-kind levied upon Po-chou were
gradually increased. During the Hung-wu reign, the rate was
2about 2,500 tan of grain per annum. In 1478 and 1479, the tax
burden was increased to about 3,398 tan of grain per annum.4
During the last period, the half century or more from 1544 to
1600, it amounted to 5,800 tan of grain per annum/ In
addition, Po-chou had to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to assist
5Kweichow annually. These heavy taxes-in-kind and taxes-in- 
cash, however, were not the direct causes behind the Po-chou 
ruler Yang Ying-lung's decision to revolt, since Ying-lung 
could use his authority to shift the tax burden on his people;
See [T'ang] Chia-hung, op.cit., 66-68; Chiang Ying-liang, 
op.cit., 17-25; Hu Ch'ing-chun, "Ming-tai Shui-hsi I-tsu ti 
nu-li chih-tu", Li-shih yen-chiu, 5-6:150 (December 1964).
d 'fe^ i'T vO  A |  ( M lo d l jO  j  A I  t . v ’v M x ilw . o /L fc 'rv v  Ö '’VO ‘’vv f isi\ ~ fo  A ö  £j C L fts - t  ^  /^* 1 4 7  / )2 1 
See Chapter Three, note 15.
3 Ho Ch'iao-hsin, op.cit., 51:9.
4 PPCS, 4:328.
5 Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit., 6:4551.
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he was not obliged to pay the taxes himself. Not only was he 
unlikely to suffer however high the tax rate was, but he could 
exploit the tax collection for his own advantage at the 
taxpayers' expense. He reportedly adopted a new taxation 
method called "equal tribute" (teng-tsung) by which every mou 
(1/6.6 acre) of cultivated land was assessed at an average 
levy of several ch 'ien of silver. (Ten ch 'ien of silver 
equalled one tael of silver.)^ The obvious result was that he 
could obtain more money from this new taxation method and his 
people would suffer from a higher rate of levy than before. In 
addition, the ruler of Po-chou did not pay in full the taxes 
levied by the local government. For example, the Po-chou hsilan- 
wei-ssu was supposed to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to the Kweichow 
Provincial Government annually. From 1590 to 1599, the total 
tax remittance should have been 31,647 silver taels. In fact,
7it only paid 1,817 silver taels, about 5.75% of the total.
This unsatisfactory revenue situation, however, was not an 
important factor in the Court's decision to conduct a 
suppression campaign. The tax-in-cash levied upon Po-chou was 
a relatively small sum. Because of Kweichow's poverty and low 
revenue-raising capacity, Szechuan and Hukuang were obligated 
to support this neighbouring province. As one of the tribal 
units under the jurisdiction of Szechuan, Po-chou was involved 
in this transfer practice. A delay in tax payment was the
6 PPCS, 4:328.
7 Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit.
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general situation in Ming China even in the wealthy places in 
Central and Southern China. Consequently Po-chou was not alone 
in delaying payment of tax-in-cash; the other tribal units of 
Szechuan also owed over 50 per cent of their annual tax quota. 
The following table presents quantitative data on the annual 
aid to Kweichow by several tribal units of Szechuan.
On the other hand, the annual aid from Hukuang to Kweichow 
was 30,720 silver taels. The delayed payment of Hukuang was 
much higher than that of Szechuan. Before 1483, its debts of 
annual aid to Kweichow accumulated to 81,000(+) silver taels 
which was later cancelled by the Court. From 1484 to 1486, it 
had owed 65,000(+) silver taels, about 70 per cent of thegtotal. Therefore, I can here conclude that the heavy levy 
upon Po-chou and its delay of payment were neither the main 
reason to stir up the Po-chou uprising nor the pretext for the 
Ming Court to wage the suppression campaign.
Corvee, including labour corvee and military corvee, was 
another form of economic exploitation. Besides the ordinary 
labour corvee for the construction of bridges and roads, the 
building of fortifications and tribal offices, the services at 
postal houses and offices, the protection of officials and the 
guard of garrison towns, the most difficult and hard labour 
corvee was the lumbering and the transportation of timber.
After Emperor Yung-lo moved the capital from Nanking to 
Peking in the early fifteenth century, many palaces were built
8 SL, 104:3533.
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periodically. Many high-ranking officials were sent to
Hukuang, Szechuan and Kweichow where there were reserved
natural jungles to supervise the lumbering activities and the
9transportation of big timbers. These timbers could not be cut
into pieces because they were to be used as beams to support
the roofs of the buildings. Long, thick and strong timbers
were required for construction of the high great palaces during
the pre-modern era. Owing to the poor and backward
transportation facilities, the percentage of corvee labourers
employed in this work who died or were injured was very high.
A popular saying was: "As one thousand workers entered into
the jungle, only five hundred returned alive".^ Disregarding
the cost of the dead and the wounded, the expense of
transporting the timbers from the jungle to the capital was
extremely high. The cost ranged from about four to five
thousand silver taels for the biggest ones and from one to two
thousand silver taels for smaller ones.^ Sometimes a timber
valued at one thousand silver taels would cost ten times when
12it arrived in the capital. Since palaces were to be rebuilt 
because of destruction by fire in 1583 and 1584 respectively, 
the Court ordered that big timbers from Hukuang, Szechuan and
9 MSK, 1:33; 2:298; MS, 1:83; 7:1995.
Lu K'un, op.ait., 5:4495 .
Ch'en Chi-ju, op.oit., 8:3b-4.
12 LÜ K'un, op.oit. The tribal chief of Yu-yang hsuan-fu-ssu 
was ready to contribute twenty pieces of timber to the capital 
in 1589. The Regional Inspector of Szechuan reported to the 
Court that they totally cost more than three thousand silver 
taels (see SL, 105:4092). That means each timber cost about 150 
or more silver taels. This might be the official price which 
greatly differed from the real cost. Or, perhaps those timbers 
were extremely small.
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13Kweichow be gathered for this purpose. From the mid-sixteenth
century onwards, Po-chou, Yung-ning, Chien-ch'ang, Ma-hu and
several other places became important lumbering centres in 
1 ASzechuan. “ In response to obligations, the Po-chou ruler Yang
Ying-lung contributed seventy pieces of timber to the capital
in 1586, for which the Court bestowed on him an official garment
15embroidered with a flying fish and some colourful silk clothes. 
Rather than the heavy timber corvee making Ying-lung angry, he 
could utilise the manpower of his people to transport timbers 
to the capital in exchange for commendations and bestowal from 
the Court. The Court would not wage a suppression campaign upon 
Po-chou by a pretext that its tribal chief had not fulfilled 
his obligations satisfactorily. Even if the Po-chou tribal 
ruler had not met his timber transport obligation fully, it is 
unlikely that such an excuse would be used for a suppression 
campaign. For example, the tribal chief of Shui-hsi cheated 
the Court into bestowing a garment embroidered with a flying 
fish by lying that he had contributed timbers, but the Court 
only took back the garment and let him complete the transporting 
of timbers as redemption.4^
On the other hand, Ying-lung was dissatisfied with the 
garment. He asked to have a garment embroidered with a dragon
T'an Ch'ien, Kuo oh’ueh (Peking, 1958. Hereafter abbreviated 
as KC) , 5:4463 , 4466; MSK, 2 : 298; MS, 7:1996.
14 TIFC, 1:401.
15 MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8045.
16 SL, 104:3320-3321, 3339, 3567-3568; 105:3759, 3767.
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rather than a flying fish,which was what his grandfather Pin 
had obtained. The Court refused because Pin had performed 
meritorious military service by suppressing the disloyal Miao
tribesmen. It was a special bestowal which was not to be quoted
) 6 clas a precedent. But, in order to pacify Ying-lung, however, the
Court did not dismiss his request for recognition fully, but
promoted him to Regional Military Commissioner in the summer of 
171587. The Court conferred such a military title upon him 
because he had fulfilled the military obligation in aiding 
government troops in suppressing the rioting tribesmen in 
Szechuan the previous summer and because the Court was preparing 
to wage another suppression campaign upon other groups of 
disloyal tribesmen in Szechuan at the end of 1587. Several 
months later, Ying-lung commanded his tribal troops in a half 
year suppression campaign upon disloyal tribesmen of Yiieh-chin 
and Ch'iung-pu in Szechuan from 22 December 1587 to 13 June 1588 
in conjunction with government forces. He and his troops were 
described as having been brave in f i g h t i n g . I t  is possible 
that Ying-lung desired to show off his brilliant fighting 
capacity in order to earn a higher title of honour as well as 
a precious high-ranking garment since his grandfather had 
received both bestowals from the Court for his meritorious 
military service.
From this account, Ying-lung would not have been unhappy 
with such military corvee. On the contrary, he would have tried
Ui<^ u. -rxLU y ^ L (X tfW- Ä  4  W <w ^  ^  4 ft
1 „  f tfO-^ayy. 'nri-i, - -p'*■>*. , &L- uA. I ■ 3 8 ,
±/ SL, 104:3459-3460. ^  ~
18 SL, 105: 3763-3766; KC, 5 :4532-4533, 4545; TIFC, 2:900-901.
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to do his best in the suppression campaign in order to achieve
his personal aim of honorific recognition by the Court.
Finally, this was his last participation in government's
19suppression campaigns. He had not fought for the government 
for six years prior to revolting against the Court in 1594. 
Therefore, neither the heavy tax levy nor the difficult labour 
and military corvee directly stimulated the Po-chou uprising.
Before describing the main causes of the Po-chou uprising, 
certain aspects of the uprising should be explained. First of 
all, the Po-chou uprising and the government suppression was 
not a confrontation between the Ming Court and all the tribal 
units of Po-chou. The conflict was between the twenty-ninth 
ruler Yang Ying-lung of the Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu and the 
Court, which had five of the subordinate tribal units of Po-chou 
on its side. Originally the Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu had ruled 
over two an-fu-ssu (Huang-p'ing and Ts'ao-t'ang) and six ohang- 
kuan-ssu (Chen-chou, Po-chou, Yung-shan, Chung-an, Pai-li and 
Yu-ch'ing) since the early Ming. According to Ming law, all 
civil problems concerning households, marriages, lands and 
cultivated lands of subordinate tribal offices were to be 
reported to its immediately superior tribal office, whose
Although Yang Ying-lung had promised to join the government 
force at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598), he 
was eventually not allowed to go to the battlefield in Korea. 
See SL, 107:4744 ; KC, 5 :4690; VILSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:692; MSK, 
7:105; MS, 26:8046; Fan Ching-wen, Chao-tai wu kung-pien (1638, 
n.p. Microfilm made by the Library of Congress. Hereafter 
abbreviated as CTWKP) , 10:22b.
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authority was to be obeyed. According to regulations, the
memorandum concerning the hereditary succession and Court
tribute by the subordinate tribal offices should be stamped with
20the seal of their superior Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu. Therefore,
Yang Ying-lung could take advantage of these supervising rights
to exploit his subordinate tribal chief. Of these latter, the
chiefs of the Huang-p'ing an-fu-ssu, the Ts'ao-t'ang an-fu-ssu,
the Pai-li ehang-kuan-ssu, the Yu-ch'ing ahang-kuan-ssu and the
21Chung-an ohang-kuan-ssu were the principal victims. Ying-
lung was also at odds with seven prominent local families —
T'ien, Chang, Yiian, Lu, T'an, Lo and Wu —  because he felt that
22they did not sufficiently support him. These seven families
asked protection from the above five tribal offices after Ying-
2 3lung had tortured and killed some of their clansmen. The
most important victims of these attacks were Ying-lung's legal
wife nee Chang and her mother. They were both killed by Ying-
lung himself in 1587 after he had come to favour a concubine
24and suspected his wife of infidelity. Chang Shih-chao, the 
uncle of nee Chang, joined two local tribal officials —  Ho En 
of Po-chou chang-kuan-ssu and Sung Shih-ch'en of Ts'ao-t'ang 
an-fu-ssu — in presenting to the provincial authorities a
ZU — — , —
MSHC, 7:3; Okano Masako, "Minmatsu Banshu ni okeru Yoinryu
no ran ni tsuite", in Tohogaku, 41:65(March 1971).
21 SL, 108:5363; PPCS, 5:498.
22 MSCSPM, 2:691; TIFC, 1:71.
22 WLSTCK, 68; MSEC, 7:1b; Shen Shih-hsincr, "Po ch'iu", HMCSWP, 
5:4173.
24 WLSTCK, 68.
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2 5report which charged Ying-lung with rebellion in 1589. There are
two possible reasons why they did not press their claims in the
year that nee Chang and her mother were slain. Firstly, Ying-
lung left Po-chou shortly afterwards. From 22 December 1587 to
13 June 1588, he was fighting against the rebellious tribesmen
in northern Szechuan with his tribal troops in collaboration
2 6with the government troops. Secondly, they could not accuse 
Ying-lung of rebellion because he had only killed some persons 
in his local area. This was not even a serious crime in the 
tribal world. For example, the half brother of the twenty- 
fifth Po-chou ruler, who had murdered several people in league 
with his henchmen, was not sentenced to death. (See Appendix 
Five: A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation.) In
addition, after killing his granduncle's son and later 
defeating government troops, An Kuo-heng, the tribal chief of 
Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu, was only sentenced to paying redemption 
and withdrawal from office. (See Appendix Six: The Case of
An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) Therefore, neither the murder of his
wife and mother-in-law nor the accusation of such a crime would 
be likely to drive Ying-lung to insurrection.
After splitting with the seven prominent local families 
and his five subordinate tribal chiefs, Ying-lung found himself 
increasingly isolated. He joined forces with the "uncivilised" 
Miao aborigines and allocated to them lands confiscated from 
wealthy local families, including the seven prominent ones
25 Ibid., 69; TIFC, 2:702, 705.
26 SL, 105:3763-3766.
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2 7mentioned above. Under these circumstances, Chang Shih-chao,
a member of one of the seven prominent local families, united
with two tribal officials, IIo En and Sung Shih-ch'en,
antagonistic to Ying-lung and accused him of rebellion. Ying-
lung did not actually rise in revolt against the imperial Ming
Court at this moment, but he did desire to annihilate the
influence of the seven families and to establish his own.
Because of the situation, these charges evoked two
responses from the provincial governments of Kweichow and
Szechuan for the solution of such problems. One was to suppress
Ying-lung through the use of the government military force and
2 8the other was to negotiate with him by political means. The
argument over the use of military force or political means
lasted for three years from 1589 to 1592. This would indicate
that Ying-lung had not yet risen up in revolt. Finally, as an
official in the central government concluded, it was decided
that the crime committed by Ying-lung was not revolt against
29the Court but the murder of some tribesmen. Above all, Ying-
lung' s case was at the time less important than the rebellion
in northern Szechuan. Therefore, ignoring the proposal for
suppression, the Court ordered the governors of Szechuan and
Kweichow to investigate Ying-lung's case jointly and refused to
send a high-ranking official from the central government to
30take charge of the case.
2 7 Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit., 6:4550.
3 8 WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:692; MSHC, 7:1b; MSK, 7:105; MS, 
26:8045.
29 SL, 107:4604.
30 SL, 106:4303-4304; KC, 5:4645.
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The officials dispatched by the provincial governments,
however, took advantage of the investigation to make
difficulties for Ying-lung. For example, the officials
arranged a date and place with Ying-lung for a face-to-face
investigation. When Ying-lung arrived, the officials purposely
delayed without any reason. When Ying-lung left, they suddenly
arrived. They later charged him with being recalcitrant and
disobedient. They continued to oppress Ying-lung in this
31fashion until he bribed them. Learning that the Szechuan
authorities advocate to negotiate with him by political means,
Ying-lung consented to go to Chungking personally to submit
32himself to judicial proceedings in 1592. After his arrival,
he was kept in prison, and the gaolers insulted and extorted
33him, causing him to become very angry. At the conclusion of
the Chungking trial, he was sentenced to death. Undoubtedly,
this was very unexpected because there seemed to have been a
34compromise that he would not be sentenced to death. He 
appealed and the sentence was referred to Peking, and he 
promised to pay twenty thousand taels of silver to redeem his 
life. While his petition was being considered, the Japanese
Shen Shih-hsing, op.ait.
32 WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:692.
33 Shen Shih-hsing, op.oit.
3  ^ There was no direct source to illustrate this compromise.
But the Court obviously agreed with Wang Te-wan, a supervising 
secretary, that Ying-lung should not be sentenced to death 
because he did not revolt against the Court (see SL, 107:4604). 
Ying-lung must have been informed of the result of the tribunal, 
otherwise he would not take the risk to submit himself to 
judicial proceedings.
invasion of Korea occurred and an imperial edict was circulated 
throughout the country calling for recruits. Seizing upon this 
opportunity, Ying-lung also promised to supply five thousand 
tribal troops in exchange for his release. Eventually his 
offer was accepted and he was allowed to resume his position in 
Po-chou. 33
At first, Ying-lung still kept his word on sending troops
to Korea. But Yu Shen-hsing, the Minister of Rites, suggested
not to use the Po-chou tribal troops because they might be out
3 6of control while marching through central China. On the 
other hand, the Ministry of War also proposed that there would 
be no need to use the Po-chou troops since all provincial troops 
had already been mobilised. For these reasons, even though 
Ying-lung's troops had already departed from Po-chou, the Court 
decided to stop them from marching to Korea immediately on 
17 January 1593.37
About half a year later, on 14 August 1593, the Ministry
of War received a report of an impeachment upon Ying-lung from
38Wang Hsiang-meng, the Regional Inspector of Szechuan. The 
content of the accusation was unknown. According to James B. 
Parson's studies, Ying-lung killed several officials dispatched
35 WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2: 692; MSHC, 7:1b-2; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26: 
8046; James B. Parsons, "Yang Ying-lung", DMB, 2:1554; Shen Te- 
fu, Wan-li yeh-huo-pien (Taipei, 1976. Reprint of the 1619 
edition) , 5': 24 65-24 66 .
36 KC, 5:4680; MS, 11:3478-3479; 19:5738-5739.
37 SL, 107:4744; KC, 5:4690.
38 SL, 107:4860.
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to remind him of his obligation and sought to evade
responsibility for the slayings by blaming them on the
39"uncivilised” Miao, but I am unable to check his source for
this. Subsequently, on 6 September, the provincial governors
and regional inspectors of Szechuan and Kweichow were ordered
4 0to jointly undertake a retrial of Ying-lung. Ying-lung,
however, refused to present himself before the tribunal again.
He defended himself by stating that he had previously presented
meritorious military and labour services to the Court, and he
had the power of life and death over the seven families because
they were his subjects. At this moment, nee Chang's uncle
again went to the capital to indict him before the Court.
Wang Chi-kuang, due to the refusal of Ying-lung, insisted
on waging a suppression campaign upon him. The Court agreed to
such a proposal and, on 8 December 1593, assented to suppress
Ying-lung through military force. In the spring of 1594, the
expedition forces were dispatched to Po-chou from the south,
the north, and the northeast. Under these circumstances, Ying-
41lung decided to resist the government's authority. It was 
the first time for the Yang family —  the ruling class of the 
Po-chou tribal units —  to fight against the Ming government 
troops since its submission in 1372.
James B. Parsons, op.cit.
KC, 5:4707.
See note 35; SL, 108:4945-4946; KC, 5:4714.
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It was clear that the causes of Ying-lung's uprising were 
neither the heavy tax levy nor the military burden but the 
unreasonable serious political oppression by Han-Chinese 
officials under the guise of judicial proceedings. The 
extortion of bribery by the officials and gaolers might not 
have cost Ying-lung too much but it inevitably roused Ying- 
lung's hatred. The most important thing which made Ying-lung 
refuse to submit to another trial was the fact that the previous 
judgement had been death. Since he had earlier been sentenced 
to death, he did not know whether or not he would still be able 
to redeem his life by paying twenty thousand taels of silver.
He had been fortuitously released because of the occurrence of 
the Sino-Japanese War in Korea. If he submitted himself again 
and the result was again being sentenced to death and if there 
was no redemption for his life as seemed to be a plausible 
scenario, it is understandable that he would not allow himself 
to be executed without any resistance. It was a matter of life 
or death with no choice but to revolt or face arrest and almost 
certain death. If the revolt were successful, he could save 
his life and found a state of his own like the Nanchao state in 
T’ang times. If he could defeat the government troops, he 
might still be able to negotiate with the Court. He might 
avoid being beheaded and suffer removal from office at the 
worst as in the case of An Kuo-heng, the tribal ruler of 
Shui-hsi hsiian-wei-s s u , two decades earlier. (See Appendix Six: 
The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) Furthermore, he knew that
it would not be too difficult for him to defeat the Szechuan 
regular troops. He had had the opportunity to fight against the
93
disloyal tribesmen in collaboration with them a few years 
previously and learned that the government troops were very 
weak. The commanders on the other hand were so keen to apply 
for the rewards calculated in proportion to the number of 
beheaded that they had borrowed the beheaded from him.^ 
Understanding this situation, Ying-lung decided to fight 
against the government troops. The results proved that he 
was right.
B. The Development of the Po-chou Uprising
Historians writing about the Po-chou uprising have
selected differing dates for the start of the insurrection.
The Ming scholar Mao Jui-cheng and the Ch'ing scholar Ku Ying-
t'ai use 1589, the year of the charges being made against Yang
Ying-lung by his enemies; the Japanese historian Okano Masako
starts his history of the rebellion with 1591 with the proposal
by the Kweichow governor Yeh Meng-hsiung, an adamant advocate
4 3of a war policy. A Ti-ch'ao (official newsletter) in Ming
times uses the mid-1599 appointment of Li Hua-lung as Supreme
Commander for mobilising a military force to suppress the
4 4uprising as the beginning of the revolt. I have shown that 
Yang Ying-lung actually took up arms against government troops 
in the spring of 1594, but even at this point there was still 
not the full-scale resistance to government authority. There
MSCSPM, 2:692; MSHC, 7:1b; Ch'a Chi-tso, op.ait., 34:32b.
4 3 , ,WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:691; Okano Masako, op.oit., U.
44 Wan-li ti-ch’ao (Taipei, 1969. Photolithographic edition 
of the late Ming edition), 1163.
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was a second round of negotiations between Ying-lung and the 
provincial government in mid-1595. When Ying-lung was refused 
permission to recover the corpse of his second son who had been 
held hostage in Chungking, however, full-scale warfare broke 
out in the autumn of 1596. It was not until the end of the 
Sino-Japanese War in Korea that the Chinese government appointed 
a Supreme Commander to organise a massive government-tribal 
joint force in 1599 and conduct the decisive suppression in 
1600. Therefore, development of the Po-chou uprising can best 
be understood by distinguishing two periods: (i) 1594-1595 and
(ii) 1596-1599.
(i) The first phase: 1594-1595
Governor Yeh Meng-hsiung of Kweichow, one of the strong
advocates of the war group was transferred to Shensi in 1590- 
451591, but Governor VJang Chi-kuang of Szechuan replaced him as
the chief spokesman of a policy of military pacification. After
Ying-lung's refusal to submit to a retrial, a Court decision to
wage a suppression campaign against Ying-lung was passed on
8 December 1593, with Wang Chi-kuang in charge of the 
46campaign.
In February-March of 1594 , VJang Chi-kuang arrived in 
Chungking and immediately organised an expeditionary force with
The order of the transfer of Yeh Meng-hsiung was issued on 
31 October 1590 (see SL, 106 :4224 ; KC, 5:4636). But, on 
13 March 1591, the Court still got the memorial from Yeh who 
asked for a supervising secretary to be sent from the central 
government to undertake an investigation (see SL, 106:4303- 
4304; KC, 5:4645).
46 SL, 108:4945-4946; KC, 5:4714.
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Regional Commander Liu Ch'eng-ssu to crush Ying-lung. The
troops were divided into three contingents and dispatched to
Po-chou from the south, the north and the northeast. (See
Map V. The 1594 Expedition upon Po-chou.) They were ordered
to attack and occupy the strategic passes situated on the Ta-
lou-shan mountain range. The first contingent led by Wang
Chih-han from the south was to advance via Huang-p'ing and
Mei-t'an to Ta-lou-shan; the second contingent led by Ts'ao
Hsi-pin from the northwest was to proceed via Yung-ning and
Chi-ma; the third contingent led by Kuo Ch'eng from the north
was to advance via An-wen and Sung-k'an. When they reached
Pai-shih-k'ou, Ying-lung pretended to negotiate with them and
sent his representatives to the government camp. Suddenly,
Ying-lung ordered his Miao troops to launch an attack by
shooting arrows and then striking into the ranks; the entire
contingent under Wang Chih-han was routed and the majority of
4 7troops in the other two contingents were killed or wounded.
4 8Total casualties reached between two and three thousand. The 
government troops withdrew and left a large quantity of baggage 
and military supplies. The relief troops from Kweichow were 
also defeated at Wu-chiang, and Wang Chi-kuang was dismissed 
from office immediately. The new Governor of Szechuan T'an 
Hsi-ssu was immediately appointed and ordered to discuss with
KC, 5:4726-4727; WLSTCK, 69-70; CTWKP, 10:23; MSCSPM, 
2:692; MSHC, 7:2; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8046.
48 PPCS, 5:478.
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Liu Ch'eng-ssu and Governor Lin Ch'iao-hsiang of Kweichow a
resumption of the suppression campaign.^
When Ying-lung learned that the Court had decided to renew
the suppression campaign, he petitioned the Court for pardon
and in return promised to render further meritorious services 
50in the future. The Court deferred immediate acceptance of
his offer and on 14 October 1594 appointed Using Chieh, the
Vice Minister of War, as head of an investigation to determine
whether to accept a negotiated settlement or to continue the 
51suppression.
In the spring of 1595, Hsing Chieh arrived in Szechuan
and informed Ying-lung by letter that he would not be sentenced
to death if he surrendered but warned that if he refused to
submit himself to judicial proceedings the Court would offer a
reward of ten thousand taels of silver in exchange for his head.
Hsing Chieh also laid stress on the success of the suppression
against Pübei (Po Pai) in Ningsia in 1592 to overawe him with 
52this example. By this time, the seven prominent local 
families did not want the Court to accept Ying-lung's terms 
but preferred to see Ying-lung and his rule eliminated. They 
feared that Ying-lung would take the opportunity for revenge if
See note 47 and SL, 108:5032.
50 SL, 108:5112; KC, 5:4734.
51 Ibid. ; KC, 5:4735.
Pübei (Po Pai), a Mongol, was appointed Deputy Regional 
Commander after contributing a lot of meritorious military 
service. He revolted with his sons and was eventually 
suppressed in 1592. It was one of the three famous military 
campaigns between 1592 and 1600 during the Wan-li reign (1573- 
1620). The other two were the defeat of Japanese in Korea 
and of Yang Ying-lung in Po-chou. (See WLSTCK; MSCSPM, 2:670- 
698. )
the Court allowed him to continue in power after negotiation.
On the other side, Ying-lung's associates realised that his
surrender would bring about their own destruction since in the
previous negotiations in 1592 a supervising secretary had
suggested the pardon of Ying-lung but the execution of his 
5 3advisors. They had no alternative to rebellion but certain
death and therefore put pressure on Ying-lung to continue armed
resistance. In addition, they waylaid the negotiation letters
54from the government.
As a demonstration of official goodwill and of the 
government's sincere desire to reach accommodation, Hsing 
Chieh ordered the Szechuan troops withdrawn from Ch'i-chiang 
and the Kweichow troops from Wu-chiang. By this time, the 
tribal chief of Shui-hsi hsiian-wei-s su, An Chiang-ch' en, sought 
posthumous honours from the Court for his father An Kuo-heng, 
who had defeated the government troops during his chieftainship. 
The Minister of War made an offer to An Chiang-ch'en that his 
father would get the honours if he could persuade Ying-lung to 
submit himself for trial. While An Chiang-ch'en was proceeding 
in person toward Po-chou to persuade Ying-lung, Hsing Chieh 
also sent Wang Shih-ch'i, the Prefect of Chungking, to conduct 
the negotiations. Ying-lung was asked to go to An-wen in Ch'i- 
chiang county for trial. He sent his brother Chao-lung there 
to request a change of venue to Sung-k'an. Wang Shih-ch'i
SL, 107:4604.
54 MSCSPM, 2:693; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8046.
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agreed to this change and went himself to Sung-k'an on 15 June 
1595. Ying-lung walked on his knees and knocked his head onto 
the ground and requested that he be treated in the manner of 
An Kuo-heng, who also had defeated government troops but was not 
sentenced to death but only to being deprived of office. (See 
Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) After
Wang Shih-ch'i had obtained this promise from Hsing Chieh, a 
trial was arranged at An-wen on 29 August.
At the conclusion of this new trial, Ying-lung was again
sentenced to death but his death penalty was not executed.
Instead, twelve of his associates were sentenced to death and
were later beheaded at Chungking. According to the tribal laws,
by which crimes could be pardoned on payment of redemption,
Ying-lung was required to pay forty thousand taels of silver to
assist the local authorities in lumbering activities, was
deprived of his office, which was handed over to his eldest son
Ch'ao-tung, and had his second son K'o-tung detained at
Chungking as a hostage until the forty thousand silver taels
had been paid in full. This judgement was eventually approved
55by the Court on 19 November 1959.
The tribal offices of Huang-p'ing, Ts'ao-t'ang, Pai-li, 
Yu-ch'ing and Chung-an, previously under the control of Po-chou 
hsiian-wei-ssu, were now transferred to the jurisdiction of an 
Assistant Prefect of Huang-p'ing and, early in 1596, Li P'ei- 
ken, the Assistant Prefect of Chungking, was appointed to carry
SL, 109:5377-5378; VZLSTCK, 71-73; CTWKP, 10:24-26; MSCSPM, 
2:692-693; MSHC, 7:2b-3; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8046-8047.
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56out the administration of this new post. Further changes
included the promotion of Wang Shih-ch'i to Deputy Commissioner
of the Military Circuit of Eastern Szechuan with supervision
over the tribal officials and the establishment of a new
pacification office at Sung-k'an with charge of tribal 
57affairs. P'u Lin, Magistrate of Ch'i-chiang was appointed
5 8head of this new office, and thereafter a large portion of 
power formerly exercised hereditarily by the Yang family was 
shifted to the civil officials of the bureaucracy.
(ii) The second phase: 1596-1599
Though technically forced to abdicate his position in
favour of his eldest son, with his power limited and kept in
isolation from his subordinates, Ying-lung regained authority
by uniting with other Miao tribesmen. At first, he still
regarded the five subordinate tribal units and the seven
prominent local families as his primary enemies. Because of
them, he had lost his position, favour, reputation, and almost
59his life, so he vowed to kill all of them.
Still complying with the judgement, Ying-lung continued 
to meet his obligations by paying redemption in silver cash and 
obviously in regular instalments by contributing big timbers. 
Regarding the latter, it was recorded on 10 October 1596 that
SL, 108:5363-5364; 109:5453; KC, 5:4760-4761.
57 WLSTCK, 73; CTWKP, 10:26b; MSCSPM, 2:693; MSK, 7:105; MS, 
26:8047.
5 8
TIFC, 2:631-632.
WLSTCK, 73; CTWKP, 10:26b.59
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twenty big timbers in his own name and twenty others in the
6 0name of his successor arrived in the capital. It was only 
with the death of his second son who had been detained at 
Chungking as hostage in early or mid-1596 that Ying-lung turned 
his rage against the Ming local authorities who refused to 
return his son's body until the redemption payments had been 
met. Burial was an important custom in the tribal world; even 
Ying-lung's father Lieh, though not on good terms with his 
father Hsiang, had paid heavily to secure the return of the 
body from Shui-hsi.^ Exasperated, Ying-lung exclaimed, "My 
ransom would [only] be sent if my son were alive". Afterwards, 
he assigned over one thousand monks to perform a funeral 
ceremony at the border accompanied by his own large military 
forces. At the same time, he occupied some strategic passes 
and bases and trained his Miao fighters as an advanced guard 
called "the strong hand" {ying-shou). For the provisioning of 
his Miao tribesmen, he confiscated the property of the wealthy 
local families after charging them with trivial crimes. With 
this financial support, the Miao people willingly agreed to 
give him their full support in battle. Perhaps they might have 
been promised to obtain much more reward after victory.
After consolidating his position and reorganising his 
military force, Ying-lung advanced toward outright rebellion in 
August of 1596. During the second half of the year, he
SL, 109:5650; KC, 5:4780.
See Section D of Chapter Three.
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plundered Ta-ch'ien and Tu-pa, razed the tribal offices of
Ts'ao-t'ang and Yu-ch'ing, and attacked Hsing-lung, Tu-yiin and
other garrison towns. He dispatched his brother Chao-1 ung in
command of a troop contingent to surround Huang-p'ing and
slaughter the family of Chang Hsi, the tribal head of Chung-an.
By April of 1597, his pillaging had extended as far as
Chiang-chin and Nan-ch'uan counties in southern Szechuan. In
late 1597, having laid siege to the city of Ho-chiang, he
demanded that his enemy Yuan Tzu-sheng be surrendered to him
and cut Yuan into pieces while Yuan was hanging down from the
city wall. At the end of this year, he gained the collaboration
of his son-in-law Ma Ch'ien-ssu, brother of the tribal chief of
Shih-chu hsüan-fu-ssu, who coveted his brother's position.
In 1598, Ying-lung's troops moved to plunder Kweichow and
Hukuang and broke the communications between postal stations
in the area. Learning that his enemies were hiding in the
garrison town of Pien-ch'iao Guard of Hukuang, he attacked the
6 2town and wiped them out.
During 1596, 1597 and 1598 Ying-lung and his troops made 
raids over a wide area mainly in northern Kweichow and southern 
Szechuan where he and his Miao troops were reportedly committing 
murder, rape, looting, and the desecration of tombs. No 
effective measures against him were taken, however, because the
6 3attention of the central government was still focused on Korea.
62 WLSTCK, 73-74; CTWKP, 10:27-28; MSCSPM, 2:693-694; MSEC, 7:
3b-4; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8047; TIFC, 2:902-903.
r o
Ibid.', PPCS, 5:478; James B. Parsons, op.cit., 1555.
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It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in
Korea in the winter of 1598 that a proposal for sending troops
to the five tribal units and other bases in Po-chou was approved
64on 28 December of this year. Early in 1599, Governor Chiang
Tung-chih of Kweichow dispatched an army of three thousand men
to attack Ying-lung; after an initial success, however, the
force was completely annihilated at Fei-lien-pao near P'ing-
yueh in Kweichow. Chiang Tung-chih was summarily dismissed
from office and Kuo Tzu-chang was appointed new governor of
65Kweichow on 2 April 1599. The defeat undoubtedly drew the 
attention of the central government and forced the officials to 
realise that the case of Ying-lung was not as simple as that of 
Pübei (Po Pai) in Ningsia in 1592. On 14 April 1599, the Court 
accepted the proposal of Grand Secretary Shen I-kuan to appoint 
Li Hua-lung (1554-1612),the former Vice Minister of War and 
concurrent Assistant Censor-in-Chief, as Supreme Commander with 
personal charge of military affairs in Szechuan, Hukuang and 
Kweichow and concurrent Superintendent of Military Rations and 
Governor of Szechuan.^
Li Hua-lung received his formal appointment from the 
Ministry of Personnel on 22 April 1599, but, owing to the long 
distance, he did not arrive in Szechuan until 19 July. After 
the transfer of duties from the former Governor T'an Hsi-ssu,
64 SL, 110:6081-6082.
6 5 SL, 110:6144, 6164-6165; KC, 5:4831; WLSTCK, 75; CTWKP, 
10:28b; MSCSPM, 2:694; MSHC, 7:4b; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8047;
TIFC, 2:903.
66 SL, 110:6131, 6150; KC, 5:4832.
he started to interview his subordinates at the provincial
capital of Szechuan in order to understand the situation and
6 7mobilise the troops. Relying upon the knowledge that the
government troops had not yet assembled, Ying-lung led eighty
thousand Miao troops northward into southern Szechuan. From
16 July 1599 onward, while his son Ch'ao-tung was leading
twenty thousand troops to Sha-hsi against the Yung-ning tribal
troops, his associates were leading an additional twenty
thousand troops against Nan-ch'uan and Chiang-chin. Ying-lung
himself commanded over thirty thousand troops in an attack on
Ch'i-chiang which was guarded by only three thousand new
Rrecruits. On 11 August, the city of Ch'i-chiang fell. At 
this moment, Ying-lung's military adviser Sun Shih-t'ai, a Han 
Chinese of Chekiang province, persuaded him to make a bold 
strike against Chungking and Chengtu in order to seize the
69Prince of Shu, Chu Ch'uan (enf. 1578, d. 1615), as a hostage.
He rejected this plan, however, and continued to loot, demanding
the return of his second son's body and handing over of his
enemies. In view of the precarious situation when it seemed
that Ying-lung could reach Chungking within half a day, the
70Prefect complied with his requests. By this time, even 
Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung recognised the possible fall of
67 PPCS, 1:1-3.
68 PPCS, 1:13, 27-28; 4:381, 444; SL, 111:6236; WLSTCK, 75-76; 
CTWKP, 10:29; MSCSP.M, 2: 694-695.
69 WLSTCK, 87; TIFC, 2:904; PPCS, 2:207; James B. Parsons, 
op.oit., 1555.
70 SL, 111:6236; PPCS, 1:28, 30; 4:386.
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Chungking and even Chengtu. In his letter to the Grand
Secretaries of the Court and the Minister of War, he frankly
said that he had taken advantage of negotiations to delay Ying-
lung's advance to Chungking. He informed Ying-lung in writing
that negotiations were still possible and also concocted bogus
letters (one to the Deputy Commissioner of the Military Circuit
of Eastern Szechuan and one to the Prefect of Chungking) sure
to fall into Ying-lung's hand indicating the same message in
71order to lure Ying-lung into a trap. Ying-lung, in contrast,
adopted a strategy of maximum strength before the opening of
negotiations and tried to expand the land under his occupation;
he built stone tablets and renamed the new lands Hsiian-wei-
kuan-ohuang (Official Lands of Pacification Commissioner [of
the Yang family]). In addition, he claimed that Lung-ch'iian,
72Ho-chiang and Chiang-chin were originally part of Po-chou.
He thought he could take advantage of negotiations to enlarge 
the boundaries of Po-chou.
When Ying-lung found that the negotiations were a ruse, he
plundered the area, killing thousands of inhabitants by throwing
them into the river. By this time, Ying-lung could not attack
Chungking directly because the defense of the city had been
considerably strengthened and his sixteen spies had been
discovered and killed. Shortly afterwards, the defense of
73other cities were also strengthened by the relief troops.
PPCS, 6:639, 671-673.
PPCS, 4:387; WLSTCK, 76; CTWKP, 10:30; TIFC, 2:904.
73 PPCS, 6:667-668.
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Therefore, Ying-lung turned southward and launched a major
military campaign in Kweichow by burning the towns of Tung-p'o
and Lan-ch'iao. With this victory, he gained control over more
"uncivilised" Miao fighters from the mountainous area and could
threaten the communications of the provincial governments of
Kweichow and Hukuang. After strengthening his force, Ying-lung
again turned northwards to attack Lung-ch'üan at the beginning
74of the following year.
C. The Response of the Government
In response to the initial accusations lodged against 
Ying-lung in 1589, the provincial authorities of Szechuan 
adopted an attitude totally different from that of Kweichow.
The Kweichow officials sided with Ying-lung's enemies — i.e., 
the five tribal chiefs and the seven prominent local families. 
Governor Yeh Meng-hsiung of Kweichow sent a report to the 
central government concerning the evil deeds committed by Ying- 
lung. Ch'en Hsiao, Regional Inspector of Kweichow, charged 
Ying-lung with twenty-four criminal violations. Due to the 
urgent need to pacify disloyal tribesmen in northern Szechuan, 
the provincial authorities of Szechuan in contrast sought 
postponement of Ying-lung's case. Governor Li Shang-ssu of 
Szechuan suggested that Ying-lung's tribal troops be recruited 
to take part in the suppression campaign rather than to force 
Ying-lung to submit to judicial proceedings. Regional Inspector 
Li Hua-lung, later the Supreme Commander in the 1600 suppression
74 PPCS, 6 : 680; WLSTCK, 77; CTWKP, 10:31; MSCSPM, 2: 695 ; TIFC, 
2:904.
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campaign against Po-chou, also requested that Ying-lung not be
arrested for trial at the present time. The case should be
dealt with after the suppression of the rebellious tribesmen in
northern Szechuan. Subsequently both provincial authorities
again presented memorials to the Court concerning Ying-lung's
case. While the war group of Kweichow remained committed to a
suppression campaign against Ying-lung, the peace group of
Szechuan pointed out that there was no crime upon which to
75justify a suppression campaign.
In 1591, Yeh Meng-hsiung presented a proposal for
political reform of the tribal chieftain system. He insisted
on a change of the five tribal offices into regular government
offices under the jurisdiction of Chungking Prefecture in
Szechuan because the five tribal chiefs, having come out into
open conflict with Ying-lung, preferred seeking the protection
of the provincial government to remaining under the control of 
7 6Ying-lung. The Szechuan provincial authorities, however,
still placed emphasis on the urgency and importance of the
suppression campaign in northern Szechuan. Owing to these
divergent opinions of the two provinces, Li Shang-ssu and Li
Hua-lung sought permission to resign, but their applications
were rejected by the Court. Because of the northern Szechuan
emergency, they were ordered to remain in their posts to
77conduct the suppression campaign. During the controversy,
75
SL, 106:4267; K C , 5:4640; MSK, 5:105; MS, 26:8045
76
SL, 106:4303-4304 , 4358; K C , 5:4 645 , 4648 .
77 SL , 106:4358; K C , 5:4648.
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the Court decided to transfer Yeh Meng-hsiung to the northern
province of Shensi. He then had a chance to present his
prominent military capacity during the suppression of the Pubei
(Po Pai) Rebellion in 1592 .^
The discussion of Ying-lung's case within the central
government continued unresolved. In the opinion of the
supervising secretary Viang Te-wan, Ying-lung was guilty of
slaughter but not of rebellion. He should not be sentenced to
death but only to dismissal from office; only his associates
who planned the murders should be executed. The trial of Ying-
lung ought to be conducted jointly by the provincial authorities
of Szechuan and Kweichow. These suggestions were supported by
the Ministry of War and eventually approved by the Court on 
7926 May 1592. The Court understood that the provincial 
governments could not afford to wage two suppression campaigns 
simultaneously. Most of the troops had already been sent to 
northern Szechuan to suppress the rebellious tribesmen. If the 
Court approved the proposal of the Kweichow war group, it would 
rouse Ying-lung to revolt against the provincial governments, 
and the provincial troops would be confronted with uprisings on 
two fronts —  one in northern Szechuan and one on the Szechuan- 
Kweichow border. Moreover, the Ningsia suppression campaign 
against Pubei (Po Pai) was being carried out in North China
SL, 106:4224; KC, 5:4636; MSCSPM, 2:683-691.
79 SL, 107:4604.
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8 0from March of 1592 onwards. Under these circumstances, the 
handling of Ying-lung's case was deferred and left to judicial 
investigation.
Since he was aware of the attitude of the Kweichow 
authorities, Ying-lung preferred to submit to a trial in 
Szechuan rather than in Kweichow. The arrest of Ying-lung and 
the subsequent trial at Chungking took place at the end of 1592 
and the beginning of 1593, but the Japanese invasion of Korea 
intervened in mid-1592. In the discussion of recruits for this 
military mobilisation, a proposal to utilise Ying-lung's troops 
was discussed at Court. The original death sentence against 
Ying-lung was, therefore, not consistent with the Court's 
intent. Realising that crimes could be redeemed in the tribal 
world, the local authorities had sentenced Ying-lung to death, 
only so that they could extract more ransom by negotiation.
Once the suppression campaign in northern Szechuan was
over, the new provincial authorities of Szechuan turned their
attention to Ying-lung. Regional Inspector Wang Hsiang-meng
8 2of Szechuan impeached Ying-lung on 14 August 1593. Still of 
the opinion that Ying-lung was not in rebellion, however, the 
Court refused to appoint officials from the central government 
to administer Po-chou but ordered the provincial authorities to 
assume charge of an investigation of Ying-lung locally. Since 
Ying-lung refused to submit himself for another trial, Governor
MSCSPM; ibid.
81 MSCSPM, 2:671.
82 SL, 107:4860 . „0Jd W  U,v /l Ufa
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Wang Chih-kuang of Szechuan had greater justification to insist
on the suppression of Ying-lung. On 8 December, the Court
agreed with Chih-kuang's proposal to crush Ying-lung, but at
the same time, the Court warned him not to take the opportunity
8 3to slaughter tribesmen for military reward. Two days later,
Wu Ying-ming, a supervising secretary of the scrutiny office in 
the of War submitted the advice that it was necessary
to distinguish between the cases of Ying-lung and Pübei. He 
insisted that Ying-lung's refusal to submit himself to a trial 
was not rebellion. He criticised the unjustifiable behaviour 
of the provincial authorities who released Ying-lung one day 
and arrested him the following day. This made the tribal chiefs 
feel that the provincial authorities were untrustworthy, so he 
argued against crushing Ying-lung immediately but rather moving 
the government troops to the borders in anticipation of Ying- 
lung 's surrender for trial. The military force could take 
action only if negotiations were unsuccessful.84 The central 
authorities, however, insisted that provocation of a new 
military campaign should be avoided.
Unfortunately, Ying-lung outmanoeuvred this tactic to his 
favour. He pretended to surrender and launched a surprise 
attack on them. After the defeat of government troops in early 
1594, Governor Lin Ch'iao-hsiang of Kweichow asked the Court to 
condemn the provincial authorities of Szechuan, and he insisted
SL, 108:4945-4946.
84 SL, 107:4947-4948.
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on the suppression of Ying-lung. The Ministry of War, however, 
still suggested giving Ying-lung a chance to surrender himself 
voluntarily to the provincial authorities because the Sino- 
Japanese War which lasted nearly seven years from the summer of 
1592 to the winter of 1598 was still being undertaken in Korea. 
The central government was unwilling to assume the burden of a 
simultaneous suppression campaign. The Court, therefore, 
decided to order the provincial authorities of Szechuan and
8 5Kweichow to be locally accountable for the suppression campaign.
Both provinces now regarded the suppression of Ying-lung 
as unavoidable, but the Kweichow authorities intended to shift 
the responsibility onto the Szechuan authorities. Lin Ch'iao- 
hsiang stressed the poverty of Kweichow to show that Kweichow 
could not afford to finance the campaign itself. Regional 
Inspector Hsieh Chi-mou of Kweichow suggested that the Szechuan 
provincial government should take total responsibility for the 
campaign, but he offered to supply a tribal force to assist in 
the defense of certain strategic bases. T'an Hsi-ssu, the new 
Governor of Szechuan, however, pointed out that although Po-chou 
was under the jurisdiction of Szechuan, both tax-in-kind and 
tax-in-cash of five of the subordinate tribal offices of Po-chou 
had been transferred to Kweichow, so the Kweichow provincial 
government could not shirk in providing support for the 
suppression. At this moment, Yang Tung-ming, supervising 
secretary of the scrutiny office in the Ministry of Rites, after 
condemning the inconsistent policy followed by the provincial
85 SL, 108:5044-5045.
112
authorities which was calculated to arouse Ying-lung's
suspicions, suggested the dispatch of a high-ranking
commissioner from the central government to investigate Ying-
lung's case. If Ying-lung could be pardoned, the Court should
not sentence him to death. If he maintained his resistance and
refused to be investigated, the commissioner could then recruit
troops from Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Hukuang to crush 
8 6him. Yang Tung-ming's proposal was accepted, and on 20
November 1594 Hsing Chieh was appointed Supreme Commander with
personal charge of military affairs in Szechuan and Kweichow to
head an investigation for either a second trial or a suppression
8 7against Ying-lung.
In order to avoid having to finance the entire campaign by
themselves, the provincial authorities of Szechuan backed away
from an insistence on suppression. On 19 December 1594, both
Governor T 'an Hsi-ssu and Regional Inspector Wu Li-chia
presented a proposal to deprive Ying-lung of his title and to
appoint his eldest son Ch'ao-tung as tribal secretary to take
charge of tax collection. Ch'ao-tung could later be
recommended to regain Ying-lung's original post and title in
five years if he had not violated any laws. The Szechuan-
Kweichow joint force would be sent to suppress Ying-lung if he
8 8persisted in his opposition to appearing before any tribunal.
86 SL, 108:5137-5139.
87 KC, 5:4738.
88 SL, 108:5159-5160; KC, 5:4741.
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Yang Ching-shun, a Kuo-tzu-ohien po-shih (Erudite of the
National University), regarded it unworthy to waste a lot of
troops and money in waging a suppression campaign which might
last a long time. The best way, he suggested, was to send an
imperial edict listing Ying-lung's crimes but forgiving him and
only forcing him to abdicate in favour of his son and narrowing
89the extent of his domain. T'an, Wu and two Yangs all 
disagreed with the death sentence for Ying-lung and urged that 
the case be settled peacefully.
Hsing Chieh arrived in Szechuan early in 1595. He behaved 
in accordance with the settled policy that peaceful negotiation 
be adopted first and suppression be used only as a last resort. 
Wang Shih-ch'i, in particular, patiently tried to accommodate 
Ying-lung in reaching a negotiated settlement. After several 
months of negotiations with Ying-lung, a second trial was 
eventually held on 29 August 1595 at An-wen in Ch'i-chiang, 
Szechuan. The death sentence for Ying-lung was replaced by the 
decision to behead his twelve associates. His post was to be 
handed over to his son Ch'ao-tung, and he was ordered to pay a 
fine of forty thousand taels of silver, double the fine at the 
first trial. In addition, his second son was to be detained 
at Chungking as hostage.
After the trial, Hsing Chieh also proposed the 
reorganisation of the administration of Po-chou. According to 
his proposed reform, a considerable portion of the power
89 SL, 108:5254-5255.
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exercised hereditarily by the Yang family would be transferred
to civil officials appointed by the provincial governments.
These peaceful negotiations were considered successful because
no military moves were undertaken. The results of the second
trial were also satisfactory because the provincial treasury
would be supplemented by such a heavy fine. Owing to these
successful negotiations and the satisfactory conclusion of the
trial as well as the reasonable reorganisation of the
administration and military control of Po-chou, Hsing Chieh
was promoted to Censor-in-chief of the Censorate and Wang Shih-
ch'i, Deputy Commissioner of the Military Circuit of Eastern
Szechuan. The Governors of Szechuan and Kweichow were also
90awarded silver and gifts.
Owing to the high military expenditures on the Korean
front as well as the destruction by fire of several palaces,
the Court began to dispatch eunuchs as mining comptrollers
and tax collectors to the province from 1596 onwards in order
to increase Court revenue. In the winter of the same year,
when negotiations with Japan broke down, the Sino-Japanese War
91again entered a serious stage. The full attention of the 
central government was again focused on Korea. Even Wang Shih- 
ch'i, the most important and able official during the 
successful 1595 negotiations, was transferred to the Korean 
battlefield. Ying-lung rapidly resumed his power and enlarged 
his force by recruiting more Miao tribesmen. During 1596, 1597
90 SL, 109:5403.
91 MSK, 1:98-99 ; MS, 2:278 ; MSCSPM, 2:676-677; WLSTCK, 49-55.
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and 1598, Ying-lung rose in full scale revolt. Because of the 
Sino-Japanese war, there were no effective military moves taken 
against him. It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War 
in late 1598 that the central government could turn its 
attention to Ying-lung's insurrection. After three thousand 
provincial troops of Kweichow were almost annihilated by Ying- 
lung in early 1599, the Court decided to appoint Li Hua-lung as 
Supreme Commander to organise a suppression campaign.
In sum, the responses to the Po-chou uprising differed 
with the central and local governments and especially with the 
provincial governments of Szechuan and Kweichow. At the 
beginning, the Kweichow provincial authorities insisted upon the 
suppression of Ying-lung through the use of military force, but 
their Szechuanese counterparts advocated negotiation through 
political means, mainly to be able to utilise Ying-lung's 
tribal troops in the emergency in northern Szechuan. The 
Kweichow provincial authorities proposed the reorganisation of 
frontier administration as a means of separating the five 
subordinate tribal units from the supervision of Po-chou and 
asked that a high-ranking official from the central government 
be appointed to investigate the possibility of such 
reorganisation. The Court ignored this proposal, and neither 
was an official sent to take charge of the reorganisation, nor 
were instructions issued from the central government. Instead, 
the matter of Ying-lung's uprising and that of the 
reorganisation of the five tribal units were left to be jointly 
discussed by the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Kweichow. 
Because of the emergency in northern Szechuan and the threat of
]. 16
resignation by the Szechuan Governor and the Regional Inspector, 
Ying-lung's case was settled by trial rather than by 
suppression.
During the first trial of Ying-lung in 1592-1593, the case 
of the reorganisation of the tribal units was not mentioned. 
Again, owing to the emergency of the Japanese invasion of 
Korea, Ying-lung was released on his promise of commanding five 
thousand tribal troops in defence of Korea. Ying-lung did not 
take part in the campaigns in northern Szechuan or in Korea.
The public statements of reliance upon Ying-lung's military 
assistance were, therefore, mainly to raise his pride and 
dignity but also to undermine the pressure against him.
Less than a year after the first trial, Ying-lung was 
ordered to surrender for a retrial. Although the Court 
realised that Ying-lung was not technically a rebel, it approved 
the request that Ying-lung be retried. When Ying-lung refused 
to submit to these new judicial proceedings, military moves 
against him were immediately undertaken. It seems there was a 
kind of chauvinist spirit in the minds of Han-Chinese government 
authorities.
After the defeat of the Szechuan troops by Ying-lung, the 
Court realised that the provincial military force could not 
solve the problem. Owing to the heavy military burden in 
Korea, a large scale centrally directed suppression campaign was 
not possible. After a series of negotiations with Ying-lung 
conducted by a Supreme Commander appointed by the central 
government, a second trial was held. The results seemed to be
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satisfactory to the government, but the dismissal of Ying-lung 
from office failed to bring him under control. A civil official 
would never have risen up if dismissed from office, but a 
former tribal leader could resume his power easily once he was 
back in his semi-independent kingdom. The twenty-fourth and 
twenty-fifth rulers of Po-chou were good examples of this.
They had power and were still regarded with esteem after their 
forced retirements. Unless the trial decided to detain Ying- 
lung himself instead of his second son, the Chinese government 
could not really control him. Another important mistake made 
by the provincial authorities was the refusal to return the 
corpse of Ying-lung's second son. This was a serious insult 
to Ying-lung and contrary to traditional tribal customs. In 
the early Ming even the corpse of the son of the twenty-first 
Po-chou ruler was allowed to be transported from banking despite 
the long distance. About half a century earlier, the twenty- 
seventh Po-chou ruler Lieh promised to concede two districts 
to the Shui-hsi tribal chief in return for his father's corpse. 
The provincial authorities had previously invoked tribal law to 
allow Ying-lung to pay ransom in redeeming his life, and they 
should also have respected the tribal customs by returning the 
corpse. It was not worth stirring up Ying-lung's uprising 
during the Sino-Japanese war. This demonstrates that the 
provincial authorities at the time were more foolish than 
those during the emergency in northern Szechuan. In order to 
concentrate all forces for the conduct of the suppression 
campaign, the former provincial authorities were careful to
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avoid driving Ying-lung to insurrection. The situation was 
particularly inconvenient for the government side. Both 
provincial governments as well as the central government 
refrained from doing anything until the end of war in aid of 
Korea against Japanese invasion.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Decisive Suppression in 1600
Before their insurrection, Ying-lung's troops had been
regarded as a strong military force, superior to the regular
government troops of Szechuan in the suppression campaigns
against disloyal tribesmen. Ying-lung himself was always the
first to break through enemy ranks with his troops. The
government troops followed them, and the Han-Chinese commanders
always borrowed severed heads from him.'*' In addition, he
recruited a large number of "uncivilised" Miao to enlarge and
strengthen his force. Since he had defeated the government
troops in both the spring of 1594 and the spring of 1599 at
Pai-shih-k'ou and Fei-lien-pao respectively, the Court found
that the provincial force could not challenge him successfully
without a mass military mobilisation. Understanding this
situation, on 14 April 1599, the Court decided to appoint the
former Vice Minister of War, Li Hua-lung, as Supreme 
2Commander. In order to expand his authority, the Court 
ordered him to take personal charge of military affairs and 
logistic support in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. In 
addition, he was ordered to replace T'an Hsi-ssu as Governor 
of Szechuan. He was further bestowed an imperial sword (Shang- 
fang-chien) on 27 October of the same year, so that he had the
WLSTCK, 68; CTWKP, 10:21a; MSCSPM, 2:691-692; MSEC, 7:1;
TIFC, 2:900-901.
2 The Court made up its decision on 14 April 1599, but Li Hua- 
lung received the formal appointment from the Ministry of 
Personnel on the 22nd of the same month. See SL, 110:6150; 
PPCS, 1:1.
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right to put to death anyone up to the rank of Regional Vice-
Commander who was not obedient to him or not brave enough in
3fighting without the approval of the Court.
In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the strategy 
of the suppression campaign, the war preparation, the military 
mobilisation and the decisive battle of 1600.
A. Strategy for Suppression
In order to conduct the suppression campaign against Ying- 
lung effectively, the Court reviewed the appointments to some 
of the important regional posts. First of all, on 2 April 
1599, Governor Chiang Tung-chih of Kweichow was replaced by 
Vice Censor-in-chief Kuo Tzu-chang (1543-1618), who had served 
in several of the southern and southwestern provinces, such as 
Kwangtung (1582-1585), Szechuan (1586-1589), Chekiang (1589—
1592), Shansi (1592-1593), Hukuang (1593-1595) and Fukien 
(1595-1598).3 4 In the same month, Li Hua-lung was appointed
Supreme Commander of Military Affairs in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow and 
Concurrently Controlling Military Rations and Grand Coordinator of the Szechuan 
Area. Li had gained commanding experience on the suppression of the rebellious 
tribesmen in northern Szechuan while serving as a Regional Inspector of Szechuan 
between 1590 and 1591. (See pp.106-107) During the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) 
he was appointed Governor of Liaotung and then promoted to Vice Minister of War 
and Concurrent Governor of Liaotung. [ For details see Appendix Seven: Official 
Career of Li Hua-lung (11 April 1554-17 January 1612) ] In order to strengthen
the commanding group, several of the leading military commanders were withdrawn 
from Korea, namely Liu T ’ing (1552-1619), Ch'en Lin (d.1607) and Wu Kuang (d. 1601) .
Liu T'ing was born in a military family. His father Liu 
Hsien gained fame for leading an army of one hundred forty
3 SL, 111:6292.
4 Chaoying Fang and L. Carrington Goodrich, "Kuo Tzu-chang", 
DMB, 1:775.
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thousand men in a successful campaign against a rebellion of 
tribal people in I-pin in Szechuan in 1573. Liu T'ing, through 
his hereditary status, had taken part in that campaign but 
became well-known after the successful defeat of the Burmese 
invasion of Yunnan in 1582. Afterwards he was asked by the 
governor of Kwangsi to assist in putting down a rebellion. He 
had been serving in Korea at the beginning and end of the Sino- 
Japanese War (1592-1598). During this period, he was appointed 
Regional Commander of Szechuan for the purpose of the suppression 
of Ying-lung. When negotiations were made in 1594, he was 
transferred to Kansu province to defeat outlaws there. In 1587, 
when hostilities resumed in Korea, he was ordered to proceed
5there with Chinese and tribal forces under his command.
against banditry in the mountainous region of Kwangtung over a 
long period (c. 1562 to the 1580s). He had had experience in 
command of a squadron of warships and gained merit for taking 
part in suppressing coastal bandits and pirates. Before he was 
appointed to organise and command the naval forces in aid of 
Korea to resist the Japanese invasion, he was asked to help the 
provincial authorities in the suppression of a rebellion of the 
Yao tribesmen in Kwangsi in 1596.^
Wu Kuang, also a -Ganto-nese, diad been serving as Assistant 
Commander of southern Fukien before he was assigned to command
MS, 21:6389-6393; Lo Jung-pang, "Liu T'ing", DMB, 1:964-966. 
Lo Jung-pang, "Ch'en Lin", DMB, 1:167-174.
Ch'en Lin (d. 160 7) , a -GAntibnesse, was famous in the fight
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a naval detachment to cooperate with Liu T'ing's land force
7in the Korean War.
Besides those withdrawn from Korea, other military 
commanders experienced in fighting tribesmen were appointed to 
take part in the suppression campaign against Ying-lung. They 
were T'ung Yüan-chen, Li Ying-hsiang and Ma K'ung-ying.
T'ung Yuan-chen, a Han Chinese from Kweilin of Kwangsi 
province, had been serving for many years as a Regional 
Commander in Kwangsi and later Kwangtung. Because of his 
experience in suppressing tribesmen, in 1595 T'ung Yuan-chen 
was ordered by Supreme Commander Ch'en Ta-k'o to return to 
Kwangsi to assist in the suppression of Yao tribesmen. Both 
Ch'en Lin and Wu Kuang, who had both been removed from office 
and were residing at home, were also asked to take part in the 
campaign. Afterwards, T'ung Yuan-chen was transferred to 
Kweichow.^
Li Ying-hsiang from Hukuang had been promoted to be Local 
Commander of Ssu-en in Kwangsi at a young age. In 1579, he was 
appointed Regional Vice-Commander of Sung-p'an in northern 
Szechuan; subsequently, in 1585, he returned to Szechuan as 
Regional Commander having demonstrated his military abilities 
in a variety of posts during the intervening years. Thereafter 
he was one of the chief commanders in the campaigns against the 
tribal rebellions in northern Szechuan and along the Szechuan- 
Tibet border, in which Po-chou troops had collaborated with the
7 Ibid.
8 MS, 21:6401-6402.
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government forces. After these campaigns ended in 1588, he 
was deposed from office because of a bribery scandal. It was 
not until the beginning of 1600 that he was recommended by 
Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung to resume his post of Regional 
Commander in the suppression of Ying-lung. The Regional Vice- 
Commander Ts'ao Hsi-pin in the 1600 suppression campaign had 
also served as a Local Commander under Li Ying-hsiang during 
the 1585-1588 campaign against disloyal tribesmen in northern 
Szechuan.^
Ma K'ung-ying, Regional Commander of Shensi, had taken 
part in the suppression of a rebellion of Pubei in 1592 and two 
invasions of Tartar cavalry in 1596 and 1599. Learning that 
Ying-lung and his Miao troops were frightened of the Shensi 
troops, Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung strongly urged their 
participation in the suppression campaign in Po-chou. Ma K'ung- 
ying was appointed Regional Commander of the Shensi troops.1 *^
Besides the appointments of military commanders, a dozen 
high-ranking civil officials were transferred or appointed to 
fill the vacancies in the posts of Provincial Intendent and in 
the Provincial Surveillance Circuit, the Provincial 
Administration Circuit and the Military Defense Circuit. In 
order to save time, Li Hua-lung suggested appointing them from 
Szechuan and the neighbouring provinces. The primary 
justification was that they could easily administer affairs
MS, 21:6396-6401.
10 MS, 21:6412; PPCS, 4:382-383; 6:636-637.
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because of their experience in southwestern China.11 To
expedite the handling of problems, the provincial authorities
were granted the right to appoint or transfer Prefects and
12Magistrates locally.
On the other hand, Li Hua-lung carried out a nationwide 
recruitment of troops since the local government troops could 
not challenge the Po-chou troops. Other tribal troops 
neighbouring Po-chou were not really reliable and might remain 
neutral in the military conflict between the provincial 
government and Po-chou. If a massive government-tribal force 
from other provinces could be formed, there would be no choice 
for the local tribal opportunists. The troops from Shantung, 
Chekiang, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan in particular had no 
connections with Po-chou. They would fight against Ying-lung 
with total commitment under the command of the government. The 
Shensi troops, who were fierce fighters known for their 
cruelty and had defeated the Tartar cavalry, would be a strong 
army to threaten Ying-lung, and the Wolf troops of Kwangsi 
were similarly famous at fighting. Veterans of the Korean War 
were regarded as the most battle-hardened troops in China. 
Bearing in mind these facts, Li Hua-lung broadcast that the 
tribal-government troops were to be recruited from all over 
China, including the provinces of Shantung, Honan, Chekiang, 
Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hukuang, Shensi, Szechuan, Kweichow 
and Yunnan, in order to be formidable and make Ying-lung
11 PPCS, 1:57-62.
12 PPCS, 1:42, 63, 70.
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1 3confused. Even some Japanese who had surrendered or been
captured and assigned to the garrison in Tientsin were
recruited. Most of the troops were in small contingents as it
was assumed that just the appearance of these troops from so
many areas would dampen the spirit of Ying-lung's troops and
14cause some of them to surrender.
Before the government-tribal troops gathered together on
17 September 1599, the Court agreed with a proposal of the
Ministry of War to offer a reward of land and honorific titles
to anyone regardless of ethnic origin who could arrest or kill
15Ying-lung; this reward was to be advertised throughout China.
In order to encourage the tribal chiefs and the Miao tribesmen 
to fight enthusiastically against Ying-lung, Censor T'u Tsung- 
chiin suggested dropping mention of the policy of "kai-t’u kuei- 
liu": he did not want to discourage those tribal chiefs who 
might refrain from fighting for the government if they learned 
that they would not get substantive political rewards after the 
extermination of the Yang family state in Po-chou. He suggested 
that the Court publish a proclamation which demonstrated that 
the government would not claim even a square foot of land and 
that the Po-chou territories would be rewarded to those who 
could arrest Ying-lung. On 21 October 1599, the Court announced 
that one could replace Ying-lung's hereditary position if he
13 PPCS, 1:42, 63, 70.
1 4 Chaoying Fang, "Li Hua-lung", DMB, 1:824; MSCSPM, 2:696;
T 'ien Wen, Ch'ien shu (Taipei, Chung-hua wen-shih ts’ung-shu
edition, series 3, n.d. Reprint of the Ch'ing edition), 
21-22:324.
15 SL, 111:6254-6255.
kept Ying-lung in prison, or the Po-chou territories would be 
separated to reward those who got Ying-lung successfully by 
cooperation.^ The Investigating Censor Wang Fan-ch'en of 
Nanking also presented the same opinions on not publicising the 
intended confiscation of the land of Po-chou by the 
government.^  7
Li Hua-lung also listed the twelve items in the regulations
on rewards. Not only were the military commanders and tribal
chiefs promised silver cash (ten thousand taels of silver for
Ying-lung's head), a piece of land from Po-chou, honorific
titles, beautiful imperial garments and precious gifts, Ying-
lung' s advisers, associates, followers, wife and sons were also
promised rewards if they could imprison or kill him. Moreover,
the military commanders and tribal chiefs would be punished if
they did not march on time to the destination or fight bravely 
18enough. In the same year, an imperial edict written in
colloquial style was issued to attempt to persuade Ying-lung to
either commit suicide or to come to surrender and to also
attempt to arouse Ying-lung's wife and sons, brothers, brothers-
in-law, advisers, Miao troops, native inhabitants, and the
temporary Han-Chinese residents and merchants of Po-chou to
murder Ying-lung with the promise not only not to punish them
19but also to give them all Ying-lung had.
16 SL, 111:6277-6278.
17 SL, 111:6297-6298.
18 PPCS, 1:52-54.
19 PPCS, 5:478-482.
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both the central and local authorities considered itA
necessary not to proclaim their intention of using "kai-t'u 
kuei-liu" to exterminate Ying-lung's tribal state in Po-chou 
because it might arouse other tribal chiefs not to fight 
actively against Ying-lung. It was even feared that such a 
public stance might cause them to join Ying-lung in revolt 
against the government out of fear lest they might also be 
replaced by Han-Chinese civil servants in the future.
Therefore, the Court, rather tha,n divulging its policy to 
replace chieftains with regular officials, announced that the 
government was not interested in the lands of Po-chou but was 
willing to offer part of the land as reward to those who could 
murder or arrest Ying-lung. Motivated by a desire for the 
rewards of silver cash, lands, titles and gifts, the tribal 
chiefs would be willing to fight against Ying-lung for their 
own benefits. Moreover, Li Hua-lung recruited troops from 
about ten provinces in order to threaten Ying-lung and his Miao 
troops and to impress the allied tribal troops that the Court 
was not solely dependent upon them for the suppression of Ying- 
lung. On the suggestion of the central and local authorities, 
the Court ordered the Ministry of War to broadcast the rewards 
for the murder or arrest of Ying-lung in order to encourage 
the military commanders and tribal chiefs in fighting against 
Ying-lung and to stir up internal discontent within Ying-lung's 
camp.
B. War Preparation and Military Mobilisation
The important thing for war preparation is military 
rations. Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung assumed this
3 2 8
responsibility as he was concurrently Superintendent of
Military Rations. He had difficulty obtaining sufficient
silver cash because of the financial weakness of the state.
The central government had spent over 1,878,000 taels of silver
during the Pübei suppression campaign in Ningsia in 1592 and
over 7,822,000 taels of silver during the Sino-Japanese War in
20Korea from mid-1592 to the end of 1598. Therefore for
military aids Li Hua-lung relied upon local authorities and
donations from individuals. The results were only partially
satisfactory. Details are illustrated in Table Four.
Because of the heavy burden of military expenditures in
the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, the Court had previously levied
a silver surtax in the Northern Metropolitan Area. On
27 November 1599, the Court approved such a taxation method in
Szechuan and Hukuang for the purpose of financing the 1600 
21campaign. Every tan of grain would be levied an additional
0.12 taels of silver. By this means Szechuan could raise an
extra revenue of 123,425 taels of silver and Hukuang, 260,223
22taels of silver— a total of 383,648 taels of silver.
Including military assistance and donations, the local 
authorities contributed a total of 1,616,722.3 taels of silver 
for the suppression campaign against Ying-lung.
Ch' iian Han-sheng and Li Lung-wah, "Ming-tai chung-yeh-hou 
t'ai-ts'ang sui-ch'u-yin-liang ti yen-chiu", Hsiang-kang-Chung- 
wen-ta-hsüeh Chung-kuo-wen-hua-y en-ohiu-so hsiieh-pao , 6.1:202 
(December 1973).
21 SL, 111:6311.
22 PPCS, 4:421.
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TABLE FOUR: Local Military Aids in
the 1600 Suppression Campaign
Names of local Silver Cash Grain Saltpetre
authorities and persons (tael) {tan) (catty)
Nanking 100,000
Province
Honan 90,000
Kiangsi 3,300 (+)
Fukien 100,000
Kwangtung 84,134
Kwangsi 300,000
Hukuang 96,147.1
Shensi 100,435.2
Szechuan 171,482.1
Yunnan 70,775.9
Prefecture
Feng-yang 100,000
Ying-t'ien 1,900 (+)
Yun-yang 10,000
Prince of Shu in Szechuan 2,000 5,000
Duke of Ch'ien in Yunnan 2,000
Tribal chief Li Ssu-ming 10,000
Tribal chief An Ta-shun 100
Ch'en Shang-hsiang 100
Nee Chang 100
9 National University Students 900
Total 1,233,074.3(+) 5,300 10,000
j_______________________I_____________ L
Sources: Li Hua-lung, P'tng Po ah'üan-shu 
2:191; 4:338-340.
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On the other hand, the amount of the financial support
from the central government had not yet been decided. The
Ministry of War attempted to gain exemption from this financial
burden. On 19 December 1599, its spokesman suggested cancelling
the recruits from the Southern Metropolitan Area in order to
decrease the military expenditure. He also pointed out that
the Ministry of War had contributed substantially in the Sino-
Japanese War and argued that rather than the proposed level of
support of 70 per cent from the Ministry of Revenue and 30 per
cent from the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Revenue should
23pay the entire cost. The Court ordered the Censorate to join
with the two ministries in discussing the military budget. It
was not until 8 January 1600 that the amount was settled. The
total expenditure paid from the central government was to be
1,100,000 taels of silver; the Ministry of Revenue was
responsible for 770,000 taels of silver and the Ministry of
24War for 330,000 taels of silver.
The problem of financial support was always troublesome.
Owing to the long distance, silver cash from the central
government in Peking was always accounted against the payment
25of other taxes from nearby provinces or prefectures. Some of 
the local authorities continued to argue over the amount of 
financial support demanded of them or simply delayed payment.
23 SL, 111:6323-6324.
24 PPCS, 4:420; SL, 115:8270; Li Lung-wah, "Ming-tai ti k'ai- 
chung-fa" , Hsiang-kang-Chung-wen-ta-hsiieh Chung-kuo-wen-hua- 
yen-chiu-so hsüeh-pao, 4.2:486 (December 1971).
25 SL, 111:6377-6378; PPCS, 4:374, 420-421; 6:640-641.
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The Court therefore dispatched an imperial edict that Supreme
Commander Li Hua-lung had the right to set totals of silver
cash and collect these amounts from the provincial authorities
2 6without the permission of the Court.
While the problem of finances was being handled, the
military provisions, grain, firearms, weapons, armours, bows
and arrows, explosives, gunpowder and cannons were being
purchased or made in Szechuan, Hukuang and neighbouring
provinces. Part of the military supplies, such as armours and
firearms, however, were brought with the relief troops from
2 7other provinces.
Because the troops were gathering from different places,
it was considered likely that conflicts between these troops
and the local soldiers or the tribesmen would arise. Therefore,
while preparing for war, Li Hua-lung did not neglect these
internal problems. From time to time he issued regulations to
2 8restrain the troops with strict discipline. Because the
tribal troops outnumbered the government troops, Li Hua-lung
regularly gave feasts in their honour or granted rewards to
encourage them to fight against Ying-lung during the suppression 
29campaign.
Owing to the heavy rain during the summers, Li Hua-lung 
urged all the troops to gather as soon as possible. He insisted
26 S L , 111:6383.
27 P P C S, 4:338-339.
7 Q
P P C S, 4:445, 467-468; 5:508; 6:603.
29 P P C S, 5:492, 501, 533-534, 563, 580-581; 6:586-587.
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that the mass mobilisation be completed no later than March
of 1600. After that the heavy rain might cause flooding which
would hamper the advance of the troops, especially when
30climbing over mountains. Therefore, Li Hua-lung harangued 
the troops in Szechuan on 28 February and Governor Kuo Tzu-
31chang of Kweichow repeated this with his troops on 17 March.
The mass mobilisation of the three provinces, including
Hukuang, was completed on 26 March. The total force was
divided into eight columns and claimed to number two hundred
forty thousand troops, of whom approximately 30 per cent were
Han-Chinese and 70 per cent were tribesmen. They converged on
Po-chou from nine directions, and Li Hua-lung directed the
general operations from his headquarters at Chungking. Li
retained direct command over troops proceeding separately along
four routes from Szechuan; from Kweiyang, Kuo Tzu-chang issued
instructions to the troops attacking Po-chou along three routes
from the west and the south. To facilitate his command over
his Hukuang troops, Governor Chih K'o-ta moved his office from
the central part of the province to Yuan-chou on the Hukuang-
Kweichow border. A temporary Grand Coordinator Chiang To was
32appointed to Pien-ch'iao to the east of Po-chou. Generals 
Liu T'ing, Ma K'ung Ying, Wu Kuang and Ts'ao Hsi-pin under Li 
Hua-lung, Generals T'ung Yuan-chen, Chu Ho-ling and Li Ying- 
hsiang under Kuo Tze-chang, and Generals Ch' en Lin and Ch1en
PPCS, 6:688, 690, 691, 694 , 695.
31 SL, 111:6417-6418.
32 WLSTCK, 78-81; CTWKP, 10:33-35; MSCSPM, 2:696; TIFC, 2:904- 
905 .
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Liang-p'in under Chih K'o-ta, each commanded a column of 
approximately thirty thousand government-tribal troops.
Assisted by subordinate commanders and tribal chiefs, they 
marched towards Ying-lung's headquarters in a coordinated 
operation. The following table shows the relationships between 
the administrative jurisdictions and the troops.
From Table Five (Government-Tribal United Force in the
1600 Suppression Campaign) and Map VI (Routes of the 1600
Decisive General Assault upon Po-chou), we can see that half
of the government-tribal united troops gathered in Szechuan.
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 would march toward Po-chou from the north
and the northwest; columns 5 and 6 from the west. Most of them
obviously focused on the northwestern border of Po-chou where
Ying-lung's headquarters and strongholds were gradually built
among the mountain range of Ta-lou-shan. This table illustrates
that the tribal troops were directly commanded by their current
tribal leader but under the supervision of Han-Chinese
commanders. According to Charles 0. Hucker, when military
campaigns were undertaken, censors were commissioned to keep
watch over all operations and to submit independent reports of
33successes or failures to the throne. This table also shows 
that almost every column of the government-tribal united force 
was supervised by a Censorial Commissioner who was appointed by 
the Court for the same purpose during the 1600 suppression 
campaign upon Po-chou.
33 Charles 0. Hucker, op.oit., 52.
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C . Three Stages of the Decisive Battle
In addition to the three victories at Pai-chih-k'ou, 
Fei-lien-pao and Ch'i-chiang in the spring of 1594, in the 
spring and in the autumn of 1599 respectively, Ying-lung gained 
a fourth victory at Lung-ch'iian at the beginning of 1600 before 
the mass mobilisation of the government-tribal suppression 
force. At the end of 1599, Ying-lung razed the towns of Tung- 
p'o and Lan-ch'iao and blockaded the communications between 
Kweichow and Hukuang; with this region isolated and under his 
sway, Ying-lung was able to recruit the local "uncivilised"
Miao tribesmen thus strenthening his military force. From 
2 February 1600, he directed his Miao troops in a northward 
advance against the Lung-ch'iian tribal unit to the northeast of 
Po-chou. Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung learned of this 
manoeuvre but too late to offer assistance. On 18 February, 
Ying-lung captured the town of Lung-ch'uan which was guarded by 
the Han-Chinese Defender Yang Wei-chung and the tribal chief 
An Min-chih. Yang Wei-chung had already left before the fall 
of Lung-ch'uan; An Min-chih fought against Ying-lung with only 
five hundred tribal troops and was totally annihilated.
Owing to Ying-lung's strength and the delay in obtaining 
relief troops, Li Hua-lung ordered two tribal chiefs to launch 
separate but coordinated attacks against Po-chou to hamper 
Ying-lung's invasion. As a result, Ma Ch'ien-ch'eng of Shih- 
chu hsuan-fu-ssu captured seven stockades of Po-chou four days 
before the fall of Lung-ch'uan, and CTan Yu-lung of Yu-yang 
hsuan-fu-s su killed three hundred Po-chou troops at their camp 
in Kuan-pa a few days later. On learning that Po-chou itself
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was under attack by government-recruited tribal forces, Ying-
lung withdrew from Lung-ch'uan and returned to Po-chou the 
34following day. In a brilliant strategic move, Li Hua-lung 
had calmly and cleverly rescued Lung-ch'uan indirectly by an 
attack on Po-chou rather than directly by the dispatch of 
relief troops. Lung-ch'uan was later recovered and used as an 
important base for the Hukuang troops during the decisive 
battle.
After 26 March 1600, the eight columns of government- 
tribal united troops began converging on the troubled area and 
strategic passes from nine directions: four from Szechuan from
the north and the northwest of Po-chou; three from Kweichow from 
the west and the south of Po-chou; the column separated into 
two from Hukuang from the east of Po-chou. (See Map VI:
Routes of the 1600 Decisive General Assault upon Po-chou.)
Li Hua-lung issued an instruction that outside the passes the 
rebels should be pacified and allowed to surrender because 
they were too numerous but inside the passes surrender was 
ruled out because Ying-lung might cunningly seize an opportunity 
to attack the government-tribal united troops. The battle of 
Pai-shih-k'ou in 1594 was an example of this.
During the first stage of the campaign from about 29 March 
to 13 May, the government-tribal united troops gained several 
victories but suffered one defeat. Liu T'ing starting from 
Ch'i-chiang with the first column of the united force marched
34 PPCS, 2:99-104; MSCSPM, 2:695-696.
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towards Po-chou and occupied three strategic bases defended by
Ying-lung's associate Mu Chao, who had been an important
figure during the Po-chou victory in Pai-shih-k'ou in 1594. In
April, Ying-lung sent his son Ch'ao-tung to organise a large
number of Miao troops in an attack against Liu T'ing from three
directions. Ch'ao-tung was instructed to defeat the Ch'i-chiang
column and then turn to attack the second column of the
government-tribal united force at Nan-ch'uan to destroy all the
major stores of grain and military supplies. If Ch'ao-tung
were successful, the government-tribal united force could not
advance further without additional supplies. Ch'ao-tung's
Miao troops were unexpectedly annihilated after a ten-hour
desperate fight from 3 a.m. to 1 p.m. on 13 April. However,
35Ch'ao-tung was lucky to escape with his life.
On the government side, the tribal troops of Yu-yang and
Shih-chu (both from Szechuan) in the Nan-ch'uan column, occupied
Sang-mu Pass on 20 April after an important victory. The
tribal troops of Ssu-ch'eng (from Kwangsi) and Yung-shun (from
Hukuang) in the fifth and seventh columns of the government-
tribal united force together with the regular troops of Pa-yang
occupied Wu-chiang Pass on 23 April and Ho-tu Pass on 24 April.
In a separate action, Regional Commander Ch'en Lin led his
eighth column (Section A) from P'ien-ch'iao to defeat four
groups of Po-chou rebels and occupied several strongholds
3 6within a few days' time.
PPCS, 2:113-115; MSCSPM, 2:696-697; TIFC, 2:905-906. 
PPCS, 2:120-129; MSCSPM, 2:697.
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After the Po-chou rebels had suffered several consecutive 
defeats, Ying-lung's adviser Sun Shih-t'ai suggested attacking 
a weak column of the government-tribal united force before all 
the columns converged. Learning that the fifth column led by 
T'ung Yuan-chen was proceeding from Wu-chiang alone, on 
27 April, Ying-lung ordered a contingent of several tens of 
thousands of troops, including cavalry, to strike at the Shui- 
hsi tribal troops of the fifth column. The Shui-hsi troops 
used elephants in a counter-attack but the elephants turned 
back and stampeded through the camp after the elephant riders 
were shot. Their firearms misfired and exploded on the advanced 
detachments of the fifth column, and the tribal and regular 
troops fled in haste. Thousands of them were killed by the 
Po-chou troops when a bridge on the escape route was destroyed. 
Although the headquarters of the fifth column was about sixty 
li (about twenty English miles) distant from the battlefield, 
the commanders did not know what happened and sent three hundred 
tribal troops of Yung-shun on routine guard duty. The Yung-shun 
troops did not suspect the Po-chou troops they met because the 
Po-chou troops were dressed like the Shui-hsi troops and 
deceived them into forming a joint sentry patrol. Inevitably 
the Yung-shun troops were mostly killed. The Po-chou troops 
then put their clothes on and marched to the headquarters of 
the fifth column on 29 April. The government-tribal troops 
were similarly unaware of this strategem because they dressed 
like the tribal troops of Shui-hsi and Yung-shun. The 
headquarters was attacked, and the troops escaped and attempted 
to cross the river. Most of them were slaughtered because the
] 41
Po-chou rebels had cut the bridge. Several Han-Chinese
subordinate commanders died in this battle. This was the fifth
major victory for the Po-chou forces since 1594. Because of
this defeat, Regional Commander T'ung Yüan-chen was degraded
from office, and his subordinate commander Hsieh Ch'ung-chiieh
37was beheaded with an imperial sword. Regional Commander of 
the seventh column of the government-tribal united force was 
ordered to replace T'ung Yuan-chen and assume charge of the 
remaining troops.
The first column led by Liu T'ing meanwhile continued to
march forward, and on 11 May occupied Lou-shan Pass, the main
entrance into Po-chou. Two days later, the Yai-men Pass also
3 8came under government control.
During the second stage of the campaign from about 13 May 
to 20 June, the government-tribal united force enjoyed victory 
on the battlefield except for the minor defeat suffered by Liu 
T'ing's subordinate commander Wang Fen at the beginning. 
Exploiting the advantage gained with the victory at Wu-chiang 
where the fifth column of the government-tribal united force 
had almost been annihilated, Ying-lung organised another attack 
against an independent contingent of the first column under 
Wang Fen. On 13 May, Ying-lung personally commanded Miao 
troops, stationing himself at Pai-shih-k'ou, the scene of his 
first victory over the government regular troops in 1594. Two 
days later, on 15 May, he launched an attack and annihilated
37 PPCS, 2:136-141; MSCSPM, 2:697; TIFC, 2:908.
38 PPCS, 2:156-159.
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the whole contingent. Wang Fen, tribal chief Yang Yü of T'ien- 
ch'uan from northern Szechuan, as well as several military 
officers, and a total of two thousand soldiers died in this 
battle. This was the sixth and final victory enjoyed by 
Ying-lung.
Ying-lung desired to restore his control over the Lou-shan
Pass which was occupied by Wang Fen's superior commander Liu
T'ing after 11 May. When he heard of the loss of one of his
contingents, Liu T'ing launched a counter-attack from three
directions. Ying-lung was defeated and almost captured during
the fighting. With the assistance of the second (from Nan-
ch'uan), third (from Ho-chiang) and fourth (from Yung-ning)
columns of the government-tribal united force led by Ma K'ung-
ying, Wu Kuang and T s 'ao Hsi-pin, respectively, Liu T'ing
occupied the strongholds of Lung-chao-t'un and Hai-yun-t'un on
30 May, reaching Hai-lung-t'un, the headquarters and the
39strongest base of Po-chou. Separately, Regional Commander 
Ch'en Lin of the eighth column of the government-tribal united 
force had occupied three strongholds— Ch'ang-k'an-t'un, Ma-nao- 
t 'un and C h 'ing-she-t'u n — on 25 May. The tribal chief An 
Chiang-ch'en of Shui-hsi, from the sixth column via Sha-hsi, 
had broken through the Lo-meng Pass and occupied Ta-shui-t'ien
o o aa 4 0on 28 May.
From the beginning of June, Ying-lung was severely limited 
in his ability to defend Hai-lung-t'un. He sent messages to
39 PPCS, 2:143-146, 176; MSCSPM, 2:697; TIFC, 2:906.
40 MSCSPM, 2:697.
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every column of the government-tribal united force for
negotiations, but Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung warned all
Regional Commanders not to trust him; he ordered that the
representatives petitioning for surrender be beheaded and that
41the surrender letters be burned. On 13 June, Regional
Commander Wu Kuang of the second column from Ho-chiang arrived
in Yai-men Pass and cleared Shui-niu-t'ang of the rebels in
three days. On 16 June, the Po-chou headquarters leaked a
false report of Ying-lung's death by suicide and had some women
perform a funeral in order to delay the attack of Wu Kuang.
When Wu Kuang discovered the ruse on 20 June, he burned two
passes and occupied three strategic mountain strongholds in
order to blockade the roads which the rebels used to transport
4 2fuel (wood) and water. Thereafter the government-tribal 
united troops adopted an encirclement and suppression policy.
The third stage from 28 June to 15 July was the final 
stage in the annihilation of Ying-lung. All government-tribal 
united troops started to encircle and assault the Po-chou 
headquarters at Hai-lung-t'un on 28 June. Hai-lung-t'un was 
situated in a mountainous area and could only be attacked from 
the front and back. At first, most of the government-tribal 
united troops assembled at the front, but subsequently the 
tribal troops of Shui-hsi and Chen-hsiung, the main forces of 
the fifth and sixth columns, camped separately to the rear of 
Hai-lung-t'un. Learning that part of the Shui-hsi troops sold
PPCS, 6:601-602; MSCSPM, 2:697.
PPCS, 2:187; 6:604-607; MSCSPM, 2:697.
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firearms and explosives to Ying-lung, Ch'en Lin ordered them
to retreat from the rear of Hai-lung-t'un and replaced them
with his own troops. As a result, Supreme Commander Li Hua-
lung ordered the reassignment of the troops in preparation for
an attack on Hai-lung-t1un. The first and seventh columns led
by Liu T'ing and Li Ying-hsiang united in an attack on one day,
and the third and eighth columns led by Wu Kuang and Ch'en Lin
combined to launch an assault on the following day. Both
attacked Hai-lung-t'un from the rear. Regional Commander Ma
K 'ung-ying commanded the rest in an attack from the front.
Because of the heavy rain, they found it difficult to gain this
stronghold before the rain stopped on 13 July. The following
morning from about 3 a.m. to 9 a.m., Liu T'ing and Li Ying-
hsiang overcame several walled bases with cannon fire; and on
15 July, Wu Kuang and Ch'en Lin pressed the attack from 3 a.m.
gaining the Po-chou headquarters at dawn. At the same time,
Ma K'ung-ying's troops entered the headquarters from the front.
Ying-lung hanged his two beloved concubines and himself and
4 3set fire to the room in which they locked themselves. The 
final and decisive battle lasted only for one hundred and 
twelve days from 26 March to 15 July. It reportedly had slain 
more than twenty thousand rebels and captured one hundred forty 
important figures alive, including Ying-lung's wife (nee T'ien), 
brothers, sons and grandsons, who were sent to the Court the
43 PPCS, 2:188-190; 6:600, 604; MSCSPM, 2:698; TIFC, 2:909-910.
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following year, together with the corpses of Ying-lung and six 
44other members. The rule of the Yang family was finally ended
The one hundred forty prisoners were judged to be executed or
4 5exiled on 29 January 1601.
In conclusion, during the first stage (29 March - 13 May), 
since Ch'ao-tung could not succeed in crushing Liu T'ing and 
destroying the biggest store of supplies at Nan-ch'uan, the 
Po-chou troops remained under repeated attack. The victory at 
Wu-chiang could only defeat one-eighth or less of the total 
government-tribal united troops. After attempting in vain to 
recover the Lou-shan Pass and sweep the government-tribal 
united troops out of the traditional Po-chou border areas in 
the second stage (13 May - 20 June), Ying-lung was confined to 
his headquarters and could not go outside to fight the regular 
army. Once eight columns of the united force had gradually 
converged for the third stage (28 May - 15 July), Ying-lung's 
hopes were lost and even his request for surrender was rejected
A semi-independent kingdom which had endured for seven and a 
quarter centuries came to an end.
44 PPCS, 2:194-210; MSCSPM, 2:698; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8049;
Ming shu, 29:3247. All sources show the decisive battle lasted 
114 days. Probably the authors of the later periods mis- 
followed the prefaces written by Chang T'i in 1600 and by Chang 
Wen-yao in 1601 in P ' ing Po ch'üan-shu respectively. I 
accurately work it out according to Ch'en Yuan, Erh-shih-shih 
shuo-jun-piao (Peking, 1962), Hsieh Chung-san and Ou-yang I, 
co-ed., Liang-oh ' ien-nien Chung-hsi-li tui-chao-piao (Taipei, 
1970. Reprint of the 1936 edition), and Cheng Ho-sheng, Chin- 
shih Chung-hsi shih-jih tui-chao-piao (Taipei, 1972, 3rd 
edition).
45 SL, 112:6630-6633.
CHAPTER SIX
Policy Formulation and Implementation 
after the Suppression Campaign
The t'u-ssu chieftainship system and the t ’u-kuan 
prefectural institution were instruments for controlling tribal 
administration in Ming times. When these proved to be 
inadequate, the Ming authorities were forced to look for 
alternatives. After the abolition of a t'u-ssu, the Court had 
to consider whether the use of a fragmentation strategy or the 
application of kai-t'u kuei-liu was more advantageous. In the 
late Ming, after the reign of the Yang family ended in the 
decisive suppression campaign of 1600, the central and local 
authorities agreed to adopt a policy of kai-t’u kuei-liu; the 
Po-chou tribal unit was absorbed into the regular administration 
and the native chieftains were replaced by civil officials. In 
order to exert more direct military control over this newly- 
conquered area, a strong military settlement was established.
To eliminate the domination of the prominent wealthy families 
and tribal heads and to regularise the tax revenue for the new 
prefectural governments, a large-scale land survey was carried 
out and their large landholdings were redistributed. Under 
these reforms, the landlords of Po-chou were replaced with 
small landowning cultivators, including a large number of 
Chinese migrants from Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. Chinese 
culture was promoted as a means of exerting greater Chinese 
political influence. For this purpose and to train native 
collaborators to serve in the local government, Confucian 
Schools were rebuilt, and the civil examination system
] 17
re-introduced with the object of greater sinicisation. These 
are the important aspects which will be discussed in this 
chapter.
A. Comments on the Ming Frontier Policy
Although the t 'u-ssu and t ru-kuan institutions seemed very 
stable under the strict supervision exercised by the Ming 
central and local governments —  by the military establishments 
from above and by the registrars and subordinates from below, 
tribal uprisings especially of t’u-ssu occurred frequently 
after the mid-fifteenth century. The internal causes were the 
struggle for succession or for power within the ruling class, 
economic exploitation by cruel chieftains, blood feuds among 
tribesmen, and Han-tribal tensions. The external causes were 
the increased difficulties and consequent loosening of political 
supervision. The removal of the capital from Nanking to Peking 
made the Court feel remote from tribal affairs and weakened its 
ability to exercise control over them. Most of the chieftains 
were granted permission not to proceed to the capital 
personally because of the long distance but were allowed to be 
installed locally by presenting testimonials to their superior 
local government and to transmit their tribute to the throne 
through the local authorities; this became standard practice 
after the mid-fifteenth century. Moreover, the major threats 
to the Ming were posed by the Mongol cavalry and the Wo-k'ou 
pirates, and they diverted the attention of the Court to the 
steppe and to the coast. The tribal affairs in the southwest 
were not seen as of major significance.
14 8
In handling tribal problems, the Ming Court had no fixed
policy between seeking pacification through political
negotiations or carrying out suppression by military force.
Attitudes differed among.the central authorities and among the
local authorities. Such inconsistency not only delayed the
success of a campaign but also led to the spread of uprising
because the rebellious chief might have sufficient time to
restore his power and strengthen his military force. Even
after the suppression of a t'u-ssu, the Court did not invariably
adopt the practice of kai-t'u kuei-liu. The rebel leader might
be allowed to stay in office after the suppression assisted by
government-appointed native police officers.'*" Alternatively,
the t'u-ssu authority might be transformed into a t ’u-kuan
prefecture. On occasion, after the application of kai-t'u
kuei-liu, a rebel leader might be rehabilitated or new native
chieftains might be selected if the Court found itself unable
2to rule over the tribe through regular civil officials. The 
Po-chou case was a successful example of kai-t'u kuei-liu. In 
the case of the suppression of the Yung-ning - Shui-hsi 
rebellion (1621-1629), however, a fragmentation strategy was 
employed in which the tribal feudal organisations were preserved 
but the vast tribal area was divided into many small domains 
respectively ruled by newly-elected native chiefs and Han
Wang Shou-jen (1472-1529) was a strong advocate of such a 
policy. He did not agree to adopt kai-t'u kuei-liu because of 
the considerable military expense needed to guard the newly- 
conquered area. See Wang Shou-jen, Wang Yang-ming eh'uan-ahi 
(Shanghai, 1935), 14:5b-ll; 18:8.
2 MSK, 7:88, 179, 185; MS, 26:8007-8009; 27:8211-8212, 8226.
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military officers. Therefore, the kai-t'u kuei-liu policy was 
not a course adopted out of necessity. The resolution of 
tribal problems ultimately depended upon what was most 
advantageous for the Ming Court. The Po-chou case was resolved 
only after the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) in 
Korea when the Court could expend sufficient time, money and 
manpower to implement the kai-tru kuei-liu policy since kai-t'u 
kuei-liu required considerable investment to be successful. The 
Yung-ning - Shui-hsi case, on the other hand, arose during the 
Sino-Manchu War (1618-1644) in the northeast and in the long 
period of nationwide popular uprisings. The Court could not 
afford the creation of new prefectural governments and therefore 
adopted the fragmentation policy of establishing many small,
4weak territories ruled by new tribal chieftains and Han rulers.
In comparison with the Ming policy for tribal administration, 
the Ch'ing Court (1644-1911) exercised much closer supervision 
and enforced harsher regulations over the t'u-ssu. In order to 
prevent possible collusion against Manchu rule in China, the 
policy of joint administration by tribal chiefs and Han civil 
servants was abandoned during the Yung-cheng reign (1723-1735). 
Thereafter the Manchu t'u-ssu policy was three-fold:
(1) fragmentation of hereditary feudatories, (2) change of t'u- 
ssu ranks to "t'u-t'un" ("military colonisers") and (3) kai- 
t 'u-kuei-liu. The last one which became the ultimate goal was 
frequently adopted and repeatedly put into effect especially in
3
MSCSPM, 2:772-784; MSK, 5:236-239; 7:109-110; MS, 21:6439- 
6444; 26:8055-8056; 27:8173-8176.
4 MSCSPM, 2:782-783; MSK, 5:239; MS, 21:6446-6447; T'ien Wen, 
op.cit., 424-425.
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China’s southern and southwestern provinces. Only those t ’ u- 
ssu in the border regions of China were reserved throughout 
the Ch’ing and the Republic (1912-1949).^
B . Application of kai-t'u kuei-liu
Before the decisive suppression campaign of 1600, the 
Court administrators and the local authorities all expressed 
publicly that the outcome of the suppression campaign would be 
the redistribution of Po-chou territory as military rewards 
rather than the transforming of this tribal unit into a 
regular administrative unit or the replacement of tribal chiefs 
by regular officials.
Immediately after most of the strongholds of Po-chou were 
occupied by the government-tribal united force and Ying-lung 
was forced to retreat into his headquarters at Hai-lung-t'un on 
28 May, however, Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung started 
re-interpreting the exact meaning of the stated policy. In 
his letter to the Grand Secretaries (Chao Chih-kao and Shen I- 
kuan) and the Minister of War (T'ien Yüeh), Li Hua-lung pointed 
out that although an imperial edict had already been announced 
against absorbing the tribal units within the regular 
government, this had only been done to encourage the tribal 
chiefs to fight against Ying-lung. He argued that the sentence 
that a tribal chief could succeed to Ying-lung's honours and 
titles and become the ruler of Po-chou if he killed or 
imprisoned Ying-lung should be explained as meaning only before
Herold J. Wiens, op.oit., 229, 232-233, 240; She I-tse, 
op.cit., 163-171.
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the general mobilisation or the national recruitment of the
government-tribal united force. After the troops had already-
been mobilised and Ying-lung had been defeated and confined to
his headquarters, even if a tribal chief took Ying-lung's head
in the final fighting, he would only be awarded titles and
gifts. Li said that it was not necessary to follow the former
imperial edict in every detail.^
On 6 August, twenty-two days after the end of the
suppression campaign, the Ministry of War received news of the
victory from Grand Coordinator Chiang To of P'ien-ch'iao -
7Yuan-chou in Hukuang. On 11 August, the Ministry of War listed 
ten measures for the disposition of Po-chou. The final items 
concerned the policy of kai-t'u kuez-liu. This explanation was 
more convincing than Li Hua-lung's. It pointed out that in the 
initial decision the policy of kai-t'u kuei-liu was to be used 
after the extermination of Yang Ying-lung, except if a tribal 
chief gained the right to succeed to Ying-lung's title and to 
annex his land by killing or arresting Ying-lung. The strongest 
tribal troops of Shui-hsi [of Kweichow] and Ssu-ch'eng [of 
Kwangsi] had withdrawn from the battlefield on 8 July, however, 
a week before the fall of Ying-lung; Ying-lung had not been 
killed by a tribal chief but had committed suicide, and his 
body was found in the fire by Regional Commander Wu Kuang. The 
chiefs of these two tribal groups were therefore to receive 
awards only according to their contribution to the fighting
6 PPCS, 2:186; 7:800-801.
7 SL, 111:6511.
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during the campaign along with the other troops. Under such 
circumstances, the local authorities were free to reorganise 
the administrative districts in the Po-chou area and to 
integrate them into the structure of the regular local 
government.8
Subsequently, Li Hua-lung and Kuo Tzu-chang, in presenting
memorials to the Court, both listed twelve proposals for the
reconstruction of Po-chou and both insisted on a change of the
Po-chou tribal unit into regular government and the replacement
9of the tribal chiefs with regular officials. The revenue would 
obviously increase after the application of kai-t 'u kuei-liu 
because the taxpayers would pay both taxes-in-kind and taxes- 
in-cash directly to the local government and would be exempt 
from exploitation by the tribal heads and chieftains. After the 
landlord class had been broken, the small land owners would be 
less able to escape the tax levy. Because of the small size 
and poverty of Kweichow province, both Li and Kuo suggested 
dividing up the territories of Po-chou into two prefectures, 
each comprising several counties; one of them would be under 
the jurisdiction of Kweichow, and the other, Szechuan. Despite 
these initial proposals for the creation of prefectures and 
counties which differed only slightly from one another, the 
final decision in 1601 was that Tsun-i prefecture (fu) with one 
sub-prefecture {ahou), four counties (hsien) and one garrison 
town (wei) be created and placed under the jurisdiction of
8 SL, 111:6519-6521; PPCS, 4:344; MSCSPM, 2:698.
 ^PPCS, 4:321-333, 344-351; Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit., 4547-4554.
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Szechuan and that P 1ing-yueh prefecture with one sub-prefecture, 
three counties, two small sized tribal units [chang-kuan-ssu) 
and two garrison towns be part of Kweichow. (See Map VII.
Change from Tribal to Regular Government.) The following table 
illustrates this integration.
TABLE SIX: The Integration of Po-chou into
the Structure of Regular Government
Provincial
Government Prefecture Sub-prefecture County Tribal Unit Garrison Town
Szechuan Tsun-i Chen-an
Tsun-i 
T 'ung-tzu 
Sui-yang 
Jen-huai
Wei-yuan
Kweichow P 1ing-yueh Huang-p'ing
Yü-ch'ing
Wen-an
Mei-t'an
K' ai-li 
Yang-i
Ch1ing-p1ing 
Hsing-lung
Sources: MS, 4:1034, 1205-1207; TIFC, 1:80.
After the creation of the prefectural governments, the 
newly-created administrative posts were filled by Han-Chinese 
officials from neighbouring local governments or by those who 
had participated in the suppression campaign. About two dozen 
of them had been nominated by Li Hua-lung and were listed in the 
fifth item of his memorials.^  The five original tribal chiefs 
of Po-chou, all enemies of Ying-lung, had taken part in the 
suppression campaign as guides but were not reinstated. They 
were appointed as lower ranked tribal assistants in the regular 
government offices. They were blamed by both Li (in his eleventh
10 PPCS, 4:326-328.
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item) and Kuo (in his third item) for fomenting the Ying-lung
uprising with their accusations.^ Because of the numerous
tribal inhabitants and in view of their efforts in the
suppression campaign, they were appointed to assist the Han-
Chinese officials in governing the newly-conquered area.
Several tribal heads who had participated in the campaign were
12also appointed to posts in the new governments.
Because of the length of time the uprising had lasted,
thirteen postal stations in Po-chou had been closed or ruined.
These were all rebuilt so that communications between these
newly-creatbd government offices and the neighbouring provinces
13would be restored and maintained. The semi-independent 
autonomous domain was thenceforth under Chinese cultural 
influence and politically became part of China.
C. Establishment of Military Settlements
In order to firmly control this newly-conquered area, a 
strong military settlement was set up. The garrison town of
PPCS, 4:331-332; Kuo Tzu-chang, op.ait., 4549-4550.
12 TIFC, 2:702-706. Such as Po-chou hsüan-wei t'ung-chih Lo 
Ch'i-pin was appointed chih-hui-shih t'ung-chih (Vice Commander) 
of Wei-yüan wei (Guard); Chen-chou chang-kuan Cheng K'uei, tru 
t ’ ung-chih (Vice Magistrate) of Chen-an chou (Sub-prefecture) ; 
Chen-chou fu chang-kuan Lo Lin, t'u t'ung-p'an (Assistant 
Magistrate) of Chen-an chou; Yü-ch'ing chang-kuan Mr Mao, hsien- 
ch ’ eng (Vice Magistrate) of Yu-ch'ing hsien (county); Pai-ni 
chang-kuan Mr Yang, chu-pu (Assistant Magistrate) of Yu-ch'ing 
hsien; both Ts'ao-t'ang an-fu-shih Sung Yiieh and Weng-shui chang- 
kuan Yu Ho, Vice Magistrates of Weng-an hsien.
13 PPCS, 4:330.
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Wei-yüan wei was built at Pai-t'ien-pa where the headquarters
of the Tsun-i prefectural government was located. Li Hua-lung
suggested assigning five battalions to this garrison town, each
comprising one thousand households and each with one thousand
soldiers. Each soldier would be allotted thirty mou (4.55
acres) of land, so that they could provision themselves ."*"4 This
was the system of military colonies which was adopted generally 
15in Ming times. It was proposed that the total number of 
troops in Tsun-i prefecture be ten thousand. In P 'ing-yüeh 
prefecture, the Huang-p' ing sub-prefecture was said to have three 
thousand garrison troops.^ In addition, the garrison towns of 
Ch'ing-p'ing and Hsing-lung of Kweichow province, now under the 
jurisdiction of P 'ing-yüeh prefecture, undoubtedly comprised at 
least several thousand soldiers. A Regional Commander was also 
proposed for Tsun-i prefecture to be in charge of the garrison 
troops. Li Hua-lung suggested setting up a combined Circuit of 
General Surveillance and Military Defense to be in charge of 
all military affairs in the new prefectures and the neighbouring 
garrison towns and tribal units, as well as being responsible 
for the construction of city walls and fortifications, the 
defense of border regions, the storage of military rations, the 
communications of postal stations, and the suppression of local 
bullies. "*"^
14 PPCS, 4:324.
15 Wang Yu-ch'uan, Ming-tai ti chun-tun (Peking, 1965), 92-94.
16 PPCS, 4:325-326.
17 PPCS, 4:324-325.
157
Since the important cities and counties of the coastal
provinces had high walls to protect against the Wo-k'ou pirates,
Kuo Tzu-chang suggested building an outer city wall at 
18Kweiyang. Li Hua-lung suggested the construction of city
walls in all the newly-established prefectures and counties.
He advised the use of rock or brick instead of wood for the
19construction of these walls. Although control over this area 
was sufficient, defense against neighbouring "uncivilised" 
tribesmen was still important. The strong tribal unit of Shui- 
hsi had not yet been changed into the regular government and 
might pose a particularly intimidating threat, as proved true 
two decades later.
D. Land Survey and Re-distribution
After Ying-lung confiscated the lands of the wealthy and 
locally prominent families to provision and train the Miao 
troops, the proof of land title was destroyed. The agrarian 
situation deteriorated as Po-chou was subjected to revolt and 
suppression. Much of the land remained uncultivated, and many 
landowners died or disappeared during the war. After the 
elimination of all tribal units in Po-chou and the creation of 
new prefectures and counties, the land was surveyed and 
divided into classifications according to productivity. The 
survey revealed that there was a total of 396,305.3 mou (60,046.3 
acres) of paddy (t’ien) and 885,142.1 mou (134,112.4 acres) of 
land {ti) in Tsun-i prefecture. The total of the taxes-in-kind
1 o
HMCSWP, 6:4554.
19 PPCS, 4:331.
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was 17,478.336 tan of grain, and the total of the taxes-in-cash
20was 30,190.992 taels of silver. There is no available data as
to tax revenue from the part of Po-chou which became P1ing-yueh
prefecture. In Ying-lung’s time (r. 1571-1595), however, the
taxes-in-kind for the whole of Po-chou (an area smaller than the
total area of Tsun-i and P 'ing-yüeh prefectures) was 5,800 tan
21of grain and the taxes-in-cash, 3,164.7 taels of silver. It 
is difficult to estimate how this rate compares to that prior 
to the redistribution since the taxpayers previously had to pay 
taxes both to the local government and to their tribal chiefs. 
Moreover, previously Po-chou had been responsible for the cutting 
and transport of beam timbers.
In dealing with the redistribution problem, the government 
confronted false claims of up to one or two thousand mou from 
Po-chou residents as well as claims from non-residents claiming 
to be Po-chou inhabitants. Only applicants with genuine local 
accents were to be given land, and they were to each receive 
thirty mou (4.55 acres) regardless of their previous wealth or 
poverty. The remaining land was to be cultivated by recruited 
labourers on whom a tax-in-kind and labour corvee was levied.
The land belonging to the Yang family or to Ying-lung's relatives 
who had died in the battlefield or been executed by the 
government was confiscated and sold to Han-Chinese from Szechuan, 
Kweichow and Hukuang according to the market price. The limit 
of land purchase was fixed at fifty mou (7.58 acres) for common
20 TIFC, 1:282.
2 ~^ PPCS, 4:328; Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit., 4551.
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people and one hundred mou (15.16 acres) for military officers.
The revenue from the land sale was to be used for the
construction of the projected government offices, postal
22stations and city walls, etc.
Under these circumstances, the old landlord class of Po- 
chou was destroyed and a new class of self-cultivating, taxpaying 
small landowners established under the new prefectural 
governments. Many of these were Han-Chinese migrants from the 
neighbouring provinces. Thus the old ruling agents were replaced 
by regular civil officials and the social leadership shifted from 
the few old established families to the new migrant middle class. 
Thereafter the Szechuan-Kweichow border region passed under the 
direct control of Chinese local government officially and under 
the influence of Han-Chinese migrants socially.
E. Sinicisation by Education
The imperial Court had tried to sinicise Po-chou for a 
long time, most successfully during the Southern Sung, partly 
because the Court moved southward and partly because a lot of 
highly-educated Han-Chinese visited or even migrated to Po-chou. 
In the early Ming, a Confucian School was set up in Po-chou.
The twenty-first Po-chou ruler Yang Chien and other tribal chiefs 
also sent their sons to the National University in Nanking. The 
twenty-second ruler Yang Sheng (1378-1440) sought permission to 
set up schools and employed scholars to teach the Po-chou 
people. The twenty-sixth ruler Yang Pin (b. 1487; r. 1501-1508)
22 PPCS, 4:328-329.
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asked the Court to let his son Hsiang (r. 1518-1544; d. 1544)
enrol in the National University in Peking. In 1522, the Court
bestowed the Collective Commentary on the Four Books upon the
2 3Confucian School at the request of Hsiang. Apparently, the 
Court did not give up its education policy although it was not 
fully developed.
Ying-lung was said to have ignored Confucian teachings,
and the Confucian School in Po-chou was rebuilt as a Taoist 
24temple. Undoubtedly, the education in Po-chou must have been 
interrupted for a long time, at least for the duration of the 
uprising. Confucian teachings were restored only after the 
suppression campaign. An Instructor of Prefectural School was 
appointed in each of the prefectural seats, and two Assistant 
Instructors were also appointed to teach students. The old 
schools in Tsun-i prefecture and Chen-an sub-prefecture were 
rebuilt. Thirty students were enrolled in the Tsun-i 
prefectural school, and twenty students at the Chen-an sub- 
prefectural school. A Confucian School in the Huang-p'ing sub­
prefecture of P 'ing-yueh prefecture was also rebuilt. A total 
of 99.616 mou (15.09 acres) of cultivated land was set aside for 
the support of these Confucian Schools. Depending on the 
prosperity of the new counties, schools were to be built in each 
of them. The outstanding students would be selected to serve in 
the new local governments. In 1608-1609, the Confucius Temple
TIFC, 2:689-693.
TIFC, 1:441, 516; PPCS, 4:329.
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25was also rebuilt. The symbol of Chinese culture again appeared 
in the Szechuan-Kweichow border region. Thereafter Chinese 
cultural assimilation was fully developed especially during the 
Ch'ing period in this previously tribal area.
25 PPCS, 4:329-330; TIFC, 1:441, 490-491.
CONCLUSION
Recognising the diminishing returns involved in efforts to 
bring all of the ethnic minorities directly under imperial 
authority, the Ming rulers did not set out to conquer the tribes 
in the Southwest or to abolish the chieftainship system.
Because of the practical limitations of its military and economic 
resources, such a course would have been infeasible. On the 
other hand, the Chinese authorities could not ignore these 
tribal societies nor could they permit them to develop 
independently or even exist under loose rein in the frontier 
regions. Mindful of the threats posed by strong tribal states 
and powerful tribal coalitions in the T'ang and Sung periods, 
the Ming Court realised the need to maintain supervision over 
the peoples in the border areas. Utilising aspects of the 
frontier policies and techniques for regulating tribal affairs 
which evolved during previous dynasties, the Ming Court codified 
and systematised the t 'u-ssu chieftainship institution as an 
instrument for controlling tribal administration.
In the early Ming t 'u-ssu system, chieftains who offered 
their submission to the throne were reinstated in their pre­
existing rule and were conferred special t 'u-ssu titles and 
ranks depending upon their size and merit. Once such a feudal 
relationship was established between the tribal unit and the 
imperial Court, the emperor could require the chieftain to fulfil 
various obligations, including Court tribute, tax collection, 
military and labour corvee. Collaterally, with formal 
confirmation of his position, a chieftain became a legitimatised
16 3
feudal lord with recognised authority over his tribal subjects.
As a consequence, he could request assistance from the Court if 
his tribesmen rose in revolt against him.
To exercise supervision over chieftains, the Ming Court 
maintained military control over the t 'u-ssu tribal governments 
through a tight military structure under the jurisdiction of 
both the Ministry of War in the central government and the 
Regional Military Commission or Guards at the provincial level.
In addition, a Registry was set up in each of the first two 
classes of t'u-ssu government; i.e., hsüan-wei-ssu (ranked 3b) 
and hsüan-fu-ssu (ranked 4b). All registrars (ranked 7b in 
hsüan-wei-ssu and 8b in hsüan-fu-ssu) and most of the secretaries 
and clerks were Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. Thus, 
each t ru-ssu government was supervised by Han-Chinese 
authorities —  from above by the Ministry of War and the Regional 
Military Commission or Guard and from below by the Registry.
A considerable number of sinicised tribes were transformed 
into t ' u-kuan prefectural governments after the early Ming.
Their official status and administration were the same as those 
of the regular prefectural governments. Generally, the headship 
of these t ru-kuan governments was conferred upon chieftains, but 
most of the deputies and subordinates were Han-Chinese civilian 
officials. On occasion, two magistrates, a tribal chief and a 
Han-Chinese were appointed simultaneously to the same office to 
form a dual leadership with different duties. For the same 
purpose, these t'u-kuan prefectural governments were also 
codified under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel in
] 64
the central government and directly governed by the Provincial 
Administration Office in the provincial government.
This practice in the Ming tribal administration was called 
"liu-t'u kung-chih" (joint rule by Han-Chinese regular civil 
officials and tribal chieftains) or "I-Hon ts ’ an-yung"
(employment of both tribesmen and Han-Chinese). The intent of 
such practice was to have a dual political administration as a 
kind of transition to full Han-Chinese civil administration.
Although the t ’u-ssu system as an instrument of regulating 
minority peoples was employed throughout the course of the Ming 
dynasty, the policies in the pursuit of which it was used 
changed over time. The succeeding stage in dealing with tribal 
affairs was "kai-t’u kuei-liu"; i.e., the replacement of tribal 
chiefs with Han-Chinese regular civil officials or to the change 
from tribal to regular government. Although this became the 
objective of the Ming Court in its frontier policy and tribal 
administration, the Ming rulers did not undertake to change all 
tribal governments into regular ones in a planned way. The 
practice of kai-t’u kuei-liu had been in use since the early 
Ming but it was not consistently and regularly carried out. It was 
employed only occasionally and only under specific circumstances, 
such as the annihilation or dismissal of a tribal chief, the 
lack of a legitimate heir, incessant struggle among claimants 
to succession, the incapacity or disobedience of a tribal chief, 
or at the request of local tribesmen who preferred a regular 
government to a tribal one. On occasion, a chieftainship might 
be re-established after the application of kai-t’u kuei-liu if 
the Court found itself unable to rule over the tribe through
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regular civil officials. Aside from kai-t'u kuei-liu, the Ming 
policy also included measures designed to fragment the big 
tribes politically. The advocates of this divide-and-rule 
policy regarded that a lot of money and a considerable military 
force would be saved by separating a big tribal area into many 
independent small and weak tribal units ruled by many new and 
old chieftains. Until the late Ming this policy was still 
adopted as it was after the suppression campaign against the 
Yung-ning - Shui-hsi rebellion (1621-1629) because it arose 
during the Sino-Manchu War (1618-1644) in the northwest and in 
the long period of nationwide popular uprisings and the Court 
could not afford the creation of new regular prefectural 
governments.
The Ming Court achieved its two greatest successes in the 
establishment of Kweichow province after the suppression of the 
Ssu-chou and Ssu-nan hsuan-wei-s su in 1413 in the early Ming 
and in the creation of the two prefectures of Tsun-i and P'ing- 
yueh by the abolition of Po-chou hsuan-wei-ssu in 1600 in the 
late Ming. In order to achieve the goal of kai-t'u kuei-liu, 
both political means and military force were used. The 
suppression campaign against Po-chou which cost over two million 
taels of silver was the most expensive instance in which 
military force was used.
Under the rule of the Yang family, Po-chou had existed as 
a semi-autonomous kingdom for seven and a quarter centuries 
since 876 A .D. from the late T'ang, through the Five Dynasties, 
the two Sung periods, the Yuan, to the Ming. That its territories 
remained undisturbed by war until 1600 A.D. might be attributed
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to its geographical isolation. But that the rule of the Yang 
family was maintained for such a long period can be regarded as 
the result of its opportunistic policy of serving the imperial 
houses by means of a feudal relationship. Except for periods of 
imperial weakness during the late T'ang and the Five Dynasties, 
Po-chou rulers submitted to new imperial Courts of the Sung, the 
Yuan and the Ming without reluctance even though they had been 
faithful and obedient to the previous newly-defeated imperial 
house. They never refused taxation, labour corvee, military 
service and other feudal obligations levied upon Po-chou.
Rather they met their obligations regularly and presented 
tribute to the Court frequently. The emperors of the Sung, the 
Yuan and the Ming dynasties appear satisfied with the services 
rendered. The rulers of Po-chou consistently endeavoured to 
gain merit in order to be awarded honours from the imperial 
houses. Even the 29th Po-chou ruler Yang Ying-lung eagerly 
sought an imperial noble garment and an honorific title through 
his military service and lumbering activities. The elimination 
of the Yang family's rule and the abolition of the Po-chou 
tribal government were made possible by internal strife and 
accomplished by government military moves.
Yang Ying-lung was described as vigorous but envious. He 
became antagonistic towards his five sub-tribal chiefs as well 
as towards the seven locally prominent families because they . 
failed to remain subservient to him. When he found himself 
isolated, he united with Miao tribesmen; in defence, the five 
tribal chiefs and seven prominent families sought protection from 
the provincial and central authorities. In this situation, the
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Ming Court remained flexible in its response, assessing its 
priorities and the possible benefits it could expect at what 
cost to itself. Initially, for example, the accusation by the 
five tribal chiefs and seven prominent families was ignored when 
the Court found Ying-lung's military contribution was vital in 
the emergency in northern Szechuan, even though he had killed 
his wife and mother-in-law and was reported to plot against the 
Court. The Court also decided that it would not be worthwhile 
to wage an additional military campaign while the massive 
military assistance to Korea against the Japanese invasion was 
being undertaken although the lands and properties of the five 
tribal chiefs and seven prominent families had been confiscated 
by Ying-lung.
In the handling of the case of Ying-lung, it seems that 
the central authorities were more correct or reasonable than the 
provincial authorities. In response to the accusations lodged 
against Ying-lung, the provincial authorities of Szechuan and 
Kweichow assumed divergent positions. When this occurred, the 
Court immediately transferred the strong advocate of war Yeh 
Meng-hsiung from Kweichow to Shensi where it could utilise his 
military capabilities in the suppression of the Piibei rebellion. 
Belatedly, the Court refused to permit the resignations of Li 
Shang-ssu and Li Hua-lung and agreed with them on the need to 
put Ying-lung's case aside because of the suppression campaign 
in northern Szechuan. Otherwise, the provincial troops would be 
faced with uprisings on two fronts.
During the period of the military campaigns against 
rebellious Mongol officials in Ningsia (1592) and the Japanese
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invaders in Korea (1592-1598), the Court had had to focus on 
these military threats and attempt to handle Ying-lung's case 
through political means. The provincial officials must be held 
responsible for the considerable mishandling of the problem 
posed by Ying-lung. This poor administration resulted in Ying- 
lung's being forced to stand trial twice, Po-chou's being 
antagonised twice in seven years, and in the development of a 
large-scale uprising. In the first place, the provincial 
authorities did not take the opportunity to execute or imprison 
Ying-lung when he allowed himself to stand trial at Chungking. 
They should have removed him and then should have changed Po- 
chou from a tribal state into a regular administrative unit 
after the five subordinate chiefs and seven prominent families 
sought their protection against Ying-lung in 1592-1593.
Secondly, the Szechuan provincial authorities erred in ordering 
Ying-lung to stand trial a second time in half a year without 
additional evidence. This roused Ying-lung to oppose the 
government forces and he won his first victory in early 1594. 
Finally, the Szechuan provincial authorities miscalculated in 
refusing to return the corpse of Ying-lung's son previously held 
as hostage in Chungking. Such a decision seriously contravened 
tribal custom and provoked Ying-lung to revolt against the 
provincial government a second time while the Sino-Japanese War 
in Korea was still being undertaken. In sum, the provincial 
advocates of war never took the whole situation into 
consideration. They should have attempted to avoid driving 
Ying-lung to insurrection. Instigating revolt amounted to 
disrupting the whole national strategic plan and forcing the
159
Court to confront two military campaigns on two distant fronts 
simultaneously— one on the northeastern border of China and the 
other in the southwest. As a matter of fact, the heavy military 
burden in Korea prevented the Court from supporting a new 
military campaign. It was not until the end of 1598 when the 
war with the Japanese was over that the Court could turn its 
attention to the southwest and reorganise the suppression 
campaign against Ying-lung.
The Court did not handle Ying-lung's case through political 
negotiations at this moment because Ying-lung's uprising had 
spread over a wide area in northern Kweichow and southern 
Szechuan where his Miao troops were accused of murder, rape, 
looting, the desecration of tombs, attacks on garrison towns and 
the destruction of government offices. The local military force 
was ineffective in suppressing this insurrection. The 
confiscation of the lands and property of the five tribal chiefs 
and seven wealthy local families by Ying-lung seriously disrupted 
the social order and upset its economic basis. Ying-lung refused 
to pay the tax-in-kind and tax-in-cash, utilising this extra 
financial revenue to strengthen his own military forces. If the 
Court could not immediately suppress Ying-lung, the rebellion 
might escalate to the point that a strong tribal state might 
reappear in the southwest of China as happened in the T'ang and 
Sung periods. Therefore a military campaign against Ying-lung 
conducted by high-ranking military officials was inevitable.
The institution of t’u-ssu was a policy of i-i chih-i 
(using barbarians to govern barbarians). When conducting a 
suppression campaign against a rebellious chieftain, the Court
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would adopt a policy of i-i kung-i or i-i fa-i (using barbarians 
to attack barbarians). In the 1600 suppression campaign in Po- 
chou, about one hundred sixty-eight thousand tribal troops were 
recruited to crush the rebellious tribesmen in Po-chou, 
approximately 70 per cent of the total government-tribal united 
force. Most of the strong tribal chiefs from Szechuan, Hukuang, 
Kwangsi and Yunnan personally commanded their tribal troops on 
the battlefield, including several of the Po-chou subordinate 
tribal chiefs who had rejected Ying-lung. Due to Supreme 
Commander Li Hua-lung's brilliant military strategy, the 
decisive battle lasted only one hundred and twelve days. The 
rule by the Yang family over Po-chou eventually ended in this 
suppression campaign.
Ying-lung's failure to maintain his rule over Po-chou can 
be imputed to subjective and objective reasons. Consistent with 
his envious and cruel character, he murdered his wife and mother- 
in-law, and these acts aroused the enmity and hostility of the 
Chang family. His five subordinate chiefs were annoyed at what 
they considered his exploitation of them. After the confiscation 
of their land and property, he suffered a decline in strength 
when his five subordinate chiefs and seven prominent local 
families were forced to seek protection from the local government 
authorities. With this increased financial support, he could 
gain the support of a large quantity of Miao troops and 
successfully defeated the government troops. He did not 
consolidate his military force to found a new state nor did he 
heed Sun Shih-t'ai's advice to advance directly to Chungking,
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occupy Chengtu and keep Prince of Shu as hostage. The more 
places he could occupy, the more he could obtain through 
negotiations or the longer he could support his fight against 
the government troops. Foolishly, all he did was enlarge the 
boundaries of his own domain, hoping to gain government 
acquiescence after negotiations. Li Hua-lung could safely 
remain in Chungking and have sufficient time to mobilise his 
massive government-tribal united force. Utilising internal 
conflicts among tribal leaders and promising awards including 
land, silver cash, titles and ranks, the government troops gained 
the support of other strong tribes to build a strong government- 
tribal joint force. Ying-lung could not gain the support of 
even one strong tribe but could only employ Miao tribesmen to 
fight for him. Therefore his troops were considerably 
outnumbered and defeated by the 240,000 government-tribal troops.
After the abolition of the rule of the Yang family in 
Po-chou, the central and local authorities broke their promise 
to bestow lands on the tribal chiefs who had rendered 
distinguished military service but agreed unanimously to change 
Po-chou from tribal to regular government and to replace all 
chieftains with civil officials. Consequently, the territory 
of Po-chou was divided into two new administrative units: Tsun-i
prefecture in. Szechuan (in Kweichow after 1727) and P ' ing-yueh 
prefecture in Kweichow. After the implementation of "kai-t'u 
kuei-liu" in Po-chou, about two dozen important civil officials 
were nominated to fill the posts in the new prefectural 
governments. A few tribal heads who had helped the Court and 
rendered meritorious military service were reappointed as low-
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ranking subordinates. In addition, a strong military settlement 
was established to directly control this newly-conquered area 
and keep watch on the adjacent tribal units. A large-scale land 
survey and re-distribution was carried out by which the Po-chou 
landlords including locally prominent families and tribal heads 
were replaced with small land holders including a large number 
of Han-Chinese migrants from Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. 
Confucian Schools were rebuilt and the civil examination 
re-introduced with the object of greater sinicisation and the 
training of native collaborators to serve in the new local 
government.
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APPENDIX ONE
The Military Hierarchy in Ming China
Abbreviations
CMC Chief Military Commission or Tu-tu fu
RMC Regional Military Commission Tu ohih-hui-shih-ssu
or Tu-ssu
BRMC The Branch of RMC Hsing tu-ssu
G Guard wei
B Battalion so
HWSS ( Ilsuan-wei-shih-ssu
HFS
AFS ^Tribal Government
Hsuan-fu-ssu
An-fu-ssu
CTS
CKS
( ° r^Pacification Office Chao-t 'ao-ssu Chang-kuan-ssu
MICKS ( Man-i Chang-kuan-ssu
I. Left CMC
The capital: Peking —  G(6) 
RMC Chekiang —  G(16)
RMC Liaotung —  G(25)
RMC Shantung —  G(18)
& B (35) 
& B (18) 
& B (17)
II. Right CMC
The capital: Peking —  
Metropolitan areas —
RMC Shensi --
BRMC Shensi --
RMC Szechuan
BRMC Szechuan 
RMC Kwangsi
G (3)
G (1)
G ( 30) & B (17)
G (12) & B ( 3)
CTS T'ien-ch'üan Liu-fan (1) 
G Mou-chou -- CKS(3)
G Chungking“!" H F S (1)HFS -- CKS (2)
G Sung- CKS (17)
p 'an L A F S (4)
B Tieh-hsi -- CKS (2)
G (9) & B (10)
G Chien-ch'ang —  C K S (3)
G Yen-ching —  CKS(l)
G Yüeh-chin —  CKS(l)
G (2) & B (8)
G (10) & B (22)
, , r AFS ( 3)G Yung-ch ang i
RMC Yunnan
RMC Kweichow
- G(19) & B (20)
- A F S (1)
- C K S (2)
- G Hsin-t’ien —  CKS (5)
- G P'ing-yueh —  CKS(l)
- G Lung-1i —  CKS(l)
- G (15) & B (12)
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III. Central CMC
The capital: Peking —  G(4) & B(2) 
Metropolitan areas —  G(26) & B(16) 
Defense command —  G(8) & B(l)
RMC Honan —  G(12) & B(7)
IV. Front CMC
- The capital: Peking —  G(3)
- Metropolitan areas —  G(l)
r HWSS Yung-shun —  
- HWSS Pao-ching —
- RMC Hukuang-
r HFS 
Shih- 
nan
G Shih--HFS 
chou mao
San-I
- HFS
C K S (6)
C K S (2)
AFS -fC K S (3)L M I C K S (2)
A F S (1)
AFS -- CKS (1)
AFS -- MICKS(1)
A F S (1)
AFS -- MICKS(2)
AFS (1)
Chung- - 
chien 
- HFS
AFS -- CKS (1)
Yung- > --  CKS (4)
mei
L C K S (2)
- G Chiu-hsi —  AFS(l) 
j- G Chen-yüan —  CKS(l) 
L G (25) & B (31)
- BRMC Hukuang -- G(8) & B(9)
- Defense Command —  G(3) & B(l)
- RMC Fukien -- G(ll) & B(16)
- BRMC Fukien —  G(5) & B(5)
- RMC Kiangsi   G(3) & B(ll)
- RMC Kwangtung —  G(15) & B(52)
V. Back CMC
The capital: 
Metropolitan 
RMC Ta-ning 
RMC Wan-ch'uan 
RMC Shansi 
BRMC Shansi
—  G (40) & B (12)
—  G (11) & B (1)
-- G (15) & B (7)
-- G (9) & B (9)
-- G (14) & B (3)
Peking —  G(21) 
areas
Source: Ming shih (Peking, 1974), 8:2205-2220.
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APPENDIX THREE
Chronicle of the Po-chou Tribal Troops' 
Participation in Suppression Campaigns
No . Year Place Objects to be Suppressed
Po-chou Troops 
Participated
1 1381 Yunnan Mongol remnants and 
unpacified tribes
20,000
2 1409 Po-chou area Tribesmen of Ts'ao-t'ang, 
Huang-p'ing and Chung-an
uncertain
3 1416-
1417
Southeastern Kweichow Tribesmen of Ch'ing-shui- 
chiang
uncertain
4 1432 Po-chou area Tribal heads and over 
2,000 tribesmen of 41 
stockades of Ts'ao-t'ang
uncertain
5 1452 Kweichow-Hukuang 
border regions
Tribesmen of Chin-pou, 
Wu-ch'a and Ts'ao-t'ang
uncertain
6 1456 Kweichow-Hukuang 
border regions
Tribesmen of T'ung-ku and 
Wu-kai
uncertain
7 1474 Po-chou area Robber Chi-kuo of Po-chou 
and his followers
uncertain
8 1476-
1477
Po-chou area Miao tribesmen of Wan- 
hsi and Yao-pa-kan
10,000(+)
9 1478 Po-chou area Tribesmen of Lan-t'u uncertain
10 1494 (Uncertain) Miao tribesmen uncertain
11 1501 Kweichow Female chieftain Mi-lu 
of P'u-an
5,000
12 1518 Po-chou area Tribal heads of K'ai-li 
and Chung-an
uncertain
13 1586 Szechuan Tribesmen of Sung-p'an 7,000
14 1587-
1588
Szechuan Tribesmen of Yüeh-chin 
and Ch'iung-pu
uncertain
Sources: SL, 105:3763-3766; MSK, 7:102-106, 169; MS, 26:8039-8049; 27:8187;
TIFC, 2:892-901; Chang Tsan, Tung-cheng chi-hsing-lu {Ts 'ung-shu 
chz-ch'eng edition. Shanghai, 1937), 7; Kuei-chou-sheng po-wu- 
kuan, "Tsun-i kao-p'ing 'Po-chou t'u-ssu' Yang Wen teng ssu-tso mu- 
tsang fa-chueh chi", Wen-wu, 1:65, 68-69 (1974).
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APPENDIX FOUR
A Brief Account on the 1476-1477 Suppression Campaign
Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474), the twenty-fourth 
ruler of the Po-chou tribal unit, took a concubine because his 
wife had not provided him with an heir. Subsequently, both 
became pregnant and the concubine was the first to give birth, 
delivering a son Yu on 19 August 1464. Two months and twenty 
days later, his wife also presented him with a son named Ai 
(8 November 1464-1517; r. 1474-1501). Hui favoured Yu over Ai, 
and in 1474 attempted to abdicate his title with Yu as successor. 
Such a decision was totally rejected by the other tribal chiefs 
who insisted that only the son of a legal wife could be a 
legitimate heir. This rule was not only the law of inheritance 
adopted by the Yang clan but also the traditional standard of 
inheritance practised both by the dynastic families and the Han- 
Chinese families in China. Under such circumstances, Hui had no 
alternative but to pass his position to Ai. Hui still sought 
an opportunity to advance Yu's interests. Under these 
circumstances, a group of deceitful supporters proposed that Hui 
wage a suppression campaign against the "uncivilised" Miao 
tribesmen in Yao-pa-kan, Wan-hsi and the border regions of Yung- 
shan and Chung-an, and then seek the establishment of a new 
pacification office there with Yu as its head under the pretence 
of his superior military merits. Hui consented to this plan and 
forced the tribal chiefs of Yung-shan and Chung-an to countersign 
an application to the Court proposing suppression of the Miao 
tribesmen, falsely claiming that they refused to pay taxes or
] 82
render corvee. Since tax collection and corvee obligation were 
shared by both the Court and the tribal leaders, the Court in
1476 appointed Chang Tsan, the Vice Censor-in-chief of the Chief 
Surveillance Office and concurrently Grand Coordinator of 
Szechuan, to be the commander-in-chief of this suppression 
campaign.
Tsan has written a book entitled Tung-cheng chi-hsing-lu 
(Diary on the Eastern Expedition) based on the diaries he kept 
during the 103-day suppression campaign (7 October 1476- 
17 January 1477). The actual pacification and suppression 
campaigns lasted only about two months from 13 November 1476 to 
10 January 1477. Those who refused to be pacified were 
militarily suppressed by the joint forces of the government and 
tribal troops. The largest mobilisation occurred on 7 December
1477 comprising 22,821 soldiers from the tribal-government joint
force. About one-fourth of this army were Han-Chinese (5,710) 
and the rest, tribesmen (17,111), including those from Po-chou 
and from Szechuan's southeastern t’u-ssu: Shih-chu, Yu-yang,
P'ing-ch'a and I-mei. Hui himself led 9,000 tribal troops to 
participate in this suppression campaign on the following day.
A month later, the whole campaign ended with the result 
that sixteen stockades were captured, 496 killed and 9,800 
tribesmen and tribeswomen pacified. Hui bribed Tsan to petition 
the Court to establish the An-ning an-fu-ssu and two new chang- 
kuan-ssu and to report falsely that Yu had been brave in the 
battlefield, had killed seven enemies at one time, and therefore 
should be appointed the head of An-ning Pacification Office.
Due to Yu's youth, Hui also bribed Tsan to falsify Yu's age as
13 3
eighteen instead of thirteen so that Yu could be regarded as 
mature enough to be a tribal commissioner. Hui's followers, 
advisers and deceitful relatives were appointed to the new posts 
of these new pacification offices. These facts were only 
exposed ten years later when the Vice Minister of Justice Ho 
Ch'iao-hsin conducted an investigation of Po-chou in 1486.
When Tsan's suggestion was approved by the Court, Hui was 
obligated to undertake construction of the three new pacification 
offices and two new fortifications for the purpose of dominating 
the conquered or pacified tribesmen. The Provincial 
Administration Office of Szechuan only gave three hundred silver 
taels to help to solve the workers' food problem. Hui ordered 
five thousand people to commence this work, and, at the same 
time, he asked the Court to permit him to settle 1,500 tribal 
troops from Po-chou with their families in the newly captured 
districts to guard the offices and forts. Eight hundred of 
these troops were sent to An-ning where Yu had become the head 
of the Pacification Office.
Sources: Ho Ch'iao-hsin, K'an-ch’u Po-chou shih-ch’ing shu
(Ch'ang-sha, 1938. Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng edition. 
Reprint of the 1617 Chi-lu hui-pien edition), 51:4b-9; 
Chang Tsan, Tung-cheng chi-hsing-lu {Ts’ung-shu chi- 
ch’eng edition. Reprint of the 1477 edition), 1-31; 
Ming shih-lu (Taipei, 1962), 45:2758-2759; Chang Huang, 
T ’u-shu pien (Taipei. Reprint of 1613 edition), 48: 
24b-27; T'ien Ju-ch'eng, Yen-chiao chi-wen (Ch'ang-sha, 
1938. Reprint of the 1617 Chi-lu hui-pien edition), 
59:8b-10b; C h 'a Chi-tso, Tsui-wei-lu (Shanghai, 1936. 
Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an edition. Reprint of the early 
Ch 'ing edition), 34:31-37; Mao Ch'i-ling, Man-ssu ho- 
chih (1745 edition), 4:llb-12; Ming-shih kao (Taipei, 
1963), 3:404; 7:103; Ming-shih (Peking, 1974), 15:4597; 
26:8041; Tsun-i fu-chih '(Taipei, 1968), 2:689-692 .
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APPENDIX FIVE
A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation
The investigation of Po-chou affairs in 1486-1487 by the 
Ming Court which lasted nearly half a year was a continuation of 
internal difficulties which had been evolving within the Yang 
Clan for more than a decade.
In order to allocate power and position to two of his sons, 
Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474) had passed his own title to 
his legitimate heir Ai in 1474 but also waged a suppression 
campaign against the Miao tribesmen and established a new 
pacification office for his favourite son Yu in 1477.
Furthermore, the following autumn, Hui distributed the property 
of the Yang family among his four eldest sons (Yu, Ai, Tzu and 
Min), including 145 units of cultivated land, 26 units of tea 
gardens, 28 units of wax mines, 11 units of hunting districts,
13 units of fish ponds as well as a quantity of gold or silver 
utensils and decorative fittings. Moreover, not forgetting his 
other two sons, he urged Ai and Yu to distribute some of the 
cultivated land to these brothers not previously provided for.
He had thought that there would be no conflicts among his sons, 
especially between Yu and Ai, since he had attempted to 
distribute his status, authority and wealth among his descendants.
Unfortunately, the conflicts between Yu and Ai were 
aggravated as they were growing up. Between the eighth lunar 
month of 1485 and the fourth lunar month of 1486, Yu, encouraged 
by his follower Chang Yuan, made three attempts on Ai's life.
Only with the birth of Ai's son on 9 August 1486 did Yu and Yuan
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decide to abandon efforts to murder Ai since even if Ai were 
eliminated, Yu would still not succeed to the rulership of Po- 
chou because of Ai's legitimate heir. Moreover, the tribesmen 
would be unwilling to forgive the murder of an infant expected 
to become their future chieftain.
Chang Yuan, the planner of the abortive assassination 
attempts ordered the summary execution of the three hired 
assassins to conceal his crime. One of them escaped, however, 
and informed Ai. Frightened of being exposed, Yuan sought 
refuge under Yu's protection. In order to evade blame, they 
decided to act first by falsely accusing Ai of many serious 
crimes. They were unaware that with the assistance of the 
informer Ai had discovered the two corpses concealed by Yuan and 
had informed the Ministry of War which referred the report to 
the Censorate.
The crimes for which Yu and Yuan indicated Ai are:
1. Trying to murder Yu.
2. Wounding, killing or imprisoning tribal 
officials.
3. Falsely reporting that the city walls of 
An-ning were completely built up.
4. Conspiring with Miao barbarians.
5. Bribing the inspecting officials from the 
provincial government.
6. Placing the imperial letters in discourteous 
places.
7. Using golden saddles and reviewing insignia.
8. Making firearms, flags and golden imperial 
staffs.
9. Organising imperial bodyguards.
10. Castrating male tribesmen for use as eunuchs.
11. Building a golden dragon gate at the entrance 
to his house.
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12. Making golden seals.
13. Raping his father's concubines and killing 
the infant offspring of one of them.
14. Opening 24 iron mines in order to smelt iron 
for making weapons.
15. Establishing silk factory to make imperial 
garments without imperial authority.
16. Setting up a Merchant Tax Office at Pai- 
t'ien-pa without Court approval.
17. Commanding three thousand troops to carry 
out military exercises on the pretext of 
attending a funeral at Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu.
18. Setting up an Office of Music without imperial 
authority.
19. Wearing imperial dragon garment at festivals, 
calling himself 'Master of Heaven' and his 
wife 'Mistress of Earth'.
20. Establishing Bureaus of Foodstuffs, of Horses, 
and of Cattle.
21. Levying tribesmen tax-in-cash for his personal 
use.
22. Doubling the fines on criminals.
23. Placing a golden dragon post in his bedroom.
24. Personally appropriating all the properties 
of the Yang Clan.
25. Communicating secretly with the Prince T'ang.
26. Studying military tactics and astronomy.
These were grave offences against the Ming Court. In addition 
to the violation of criminal and civil laws, items 14, 15, 16,
20, 21 and 22 deprived the Court of its rightful profits and 
revenues; items 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19 and 23 overstepped the 
imperial rights and usurped the prerogatives in imperial honours; 
and items 4, 17, 25 and 26, the most important ones, amounted to 
treasonous conspiracy to revolt. If verified, the Court would 
be forced to despatch an army to deprive Ai of Po-chou.
These charges were all concrete and specific, so it would 
not be difficult for the Court to ascertain if they were true or
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false. Yuan suggested that they fabricated rumours and poems 
showing that Ai really wanted to revolt. They believed that 
this kind of gossip could be easily impressed upon the public 
and form a popular image of Ai. In such a case, the Court would 
have to take the action of sentencing Ai to death. To further 
enhance their case, Yu instigated Yuan's brother Shen and a 
tribal chief Ho Ch'ing to accuse Ai as well. If the effort were 
successful, the crimes of Yu and Yuan would be effectively 
concealed. Moreover, Yu would have an opportunity to replace Ai 
as chieftain of Po-chou. Ai, however, did not remain silent 
while Yu was conspiring against him. He engaged Yu's enemies 
from various tribal pacification offices to press charges against 
Yu.
After receiving contradictory reports from the two opposing 
camps in Po-chou, the Court deemed it necessary to initiate an 
official investigation of the Po-chou situation and, on 
20 October 1486, Ho Ch'iao-hsin (1427-1503), the Vice Minister 
of Justice, was ordered to proceed to Po-chou to carry out this 
inquiry. Other members of the commission were Liu Kang 
(Commander of Embroidered-uniform Guard), Liu Ya (Grand Defender 
of Szechuan), Liu Chang (Grand Coordinator of Szechuan) and Ho 
Chun (Regional Inspector of Szechuan). Ho Ch'iao-hsin and Liu 
Kang were from the Metropolitan Government, and the others were 
from the Provincial Government.
Ordinarily, under Ming judicial procedure, both Ai and Yu, 
as well as all of the accusers and the accused involved in the 
case would be arrested and sent to the court at Chungking, the 
closest city to Po-chou, where an official probe would take
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place. With the tradition of strong local autonomy in Po-chou, 
however, the tribal chiefs might escape from prison or refuse to 
be arrested. Therefore, Ho Ch'iao-hsin received permission to 
make an on-the-spot inquiry without arrest or transfer.
After a thorough investigation in Po-chou, Ai confessed 
that he had only failed to return an imperial letter promptly in 
violation of official procedure and asserted that he had wounded, 
imprisoned or accidentally killed persons only in the course of 
his official duties. But he convincingly defended himself 
against the false accusations made against him, most of which 
proved to be completely groundless. The remaining charges were 
seen to be based upon distortions and misrepresentations. In 
the course of the detailed investigation, Ho Ch'iao-hsin and his 
colleagues examined the corpses of Yu's murdered henchmen and of 
those who died of illness but were falsely claimed to be killed 
by Ai, the houses and furniture allegedly having imperial 
decorations, the places where it was claimed iron mines were 
opened and a merchant tax office set up, affidavits of forty 
witnesses as well as the depositions of seventy-one accused 
persons. In the final judgement, the less important criminals 
sentenced to death, heavy beating, imprisonment, punishment in 
fines and rations, or dismissal from office had their sentences 
carried out immediately. The tribal chiefs Ai, Yu, Yiian and 
Shen as well as three high-ranking Han-Chinese officials awaited 
for the final judgements from the Court. In the following year, 
on 6 April, the Court made its verdict: Yuan and Shen were
sentenced to death and had to be beheaded; Ai could remain in 
office after paying redemption; Yu was dismissed from office and
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transferred to Pao-ning to be kept in custody, but he retained 
the right to his share of property; the three high-ranking Han- 
Chinese officials could return to office after paying 
redemption. The exact amounts to be paid as redemption are not 
specified, but the Court instructed Ho Ch'iao-hsin to execute 
his decision flexibly according to the circumstances.
Sources: Ho Ch'iao-hsin, K ’an-ch'u Po-ohou shih-oh 1 ing shu,
51:la-5 3b; SL, 50:4 780-4 781 , 4868-4869; KCTH, 4:2110; 
MSK, 4:40; 7:103; MS, 16:4853; 26:8042; Man-ssu ho- 
chih (1745 edition), 4:12b-14a; Fu Wei-lin, Ming shu 
(Ts’ung-shu chi-ch'eng edition), 22:2440; Tsun-i fu- 
chih (1841 edition), 2:896-897; Lee Hwa-chou, "Ho 
Ch'iao-hsin", Dictionary of Ming Biography (New York 
& London, 1976), 1:505-507.
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APPENDIX SIX
The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577
An Kuo-heng (r. 1562-1577; d. 1595) was a native chieftain 
of Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu of Kweichow. After the death of his 
grandfather, his granduncle An Wan-ch'uan temporarily 
administered the tribal affairs during the regency of his father 
An Jen. Wan-ch'uan left office when Jen reached his maturity 
and took the chieftainship. Not long after, Jen died. Wan- 
ch'uan was again requested to manage the tribal affairs because 
An Kuo-heng was not yet mature enough to be a tribal ruler. In 
1562, when Kuo-heng succeeded as chieftain, Wan-ch'uan again 
withdrew from office.
Kuo-heng was proud and cruel. Once he killed Wan-ch'üan's 
younger son over a petty matter. Wan-ch'uan's elder son Chih 
appealed to the Kweichow provincial government. The Governor 
Wang Cheng immediately advanced with troops to suppress Kuo-heng, 
and Chih promised to supply provisions. When the troops had 
marched to the bend of a river, Chih's provisions had still not 
arrived. Therefore, Wang Cheng sent an order for the troops to 
cease their advance at once, but it was too late. The troops 
had already passed the river and been defeated by Kuo-heng. 
Afterwards, Kuo-heng, resisting total loss in the face of the 
mass mobilisation of government troops, sued for peace. The 
Censor-in-chief Juan Wen-chung made a deal with Kuo-heng that if 
he could present the persons who headed the conspiracy, concede 
a place to settle Chih and his mother, and compensate the Court 
for the military expenditures and the loss of this suppression
191
campaign, the Court would not sentence him to death. Kuo-heng 
promised to do so. Eventually, Kuo-heng had to pay 35,000 taels 
of silver to redeem his life and 6,000 taels of silver for some 
of his followers. Kuo-heng and Chih both were deposed and 
abdicated to their sons.
Sources: Kuo-ch'ao tien-hui, 4:2111-2112; Man-ssu ho-chih 
2:16; 3:5-6; Ming-shih-kao, 7:161-162; Ming-ohih
27:8171.
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APPENDIX SEVEN
Official Career of Li Hua-lung (11 April 1554-17 January 1612)
Date Age Title of Officialdom Sources
1574 20 Degree of ohin-shih MS, 20:5982
1574-1580 20-26 Magistrate of Sung hsien in 
Honan
PPCS, 1:88; 
MS, 20:5982; 
DMB, 1:823
1580-1582 26-28 Secretary of the Nanking 
Ministry of Works
PPCS, 1:88; 
DMB, 1:823
1582-1586 28-32 Bureau Director of the Nanking 
Ministry of Personnel
Ibid.
6 Aug. 1586-Jan. 1589 32-34 Assistant Director of Education 
in Honan
PPCS, 1:88; 
SL, 103:3227
Jan. 1589-Mar. 1590 34-36 Assistant Administration 
Commissioner of Honan
PPCS, 1:88; 
SL, 105:4113
Jan. 1590- 36 Deputy Director of Education 
in Shangtung
SL, 105:4113
-27 Jul. 1590- 36 Governor (?) [of Szechuan?] KC, 5:4630
-10 Jan. 1591- 37 Regional Inspector of Szechuan SL, 106:4267; 
KC, 5:4640
-24 Feb. 1591- 37 Regional Inspector of Szechuan SL, 106:4290
-16 Mar. 1591- 37 Regional Inspector of Szechuan SL, 106:4303; 
KC, 5:4645
-25 May 1591- 37 Regional Inspector of Szechuan SL, 106:4358
-28 Jul. 1591- 37 Censor Serving as Regional 
Inspector in Szechuan
SL, 106:4391
-25 Aug. 1591- 37 Censor Serving as Regional 
Inspector in Szechuan
SL, 106:4408
-4 Apr. 1592- 38 Censor [Serving as Regional 
Inspector in Szechuan]
SL, 107:4573
-16 Oct. 1592 38 Deputy Director of Education 
in Shantung
PPCS, 1:88; 
SL, 107:4693
16 Oct. 1592- 38 Administration Vice 
Commissioner of Honan
Ibid.
1 ) 3
Date Age Title of Officialdom Sources
22 Jan. 1593- 38 Vice Minister of the Court of 
the Imperial Stud
PPCS, 1:88; 
SL, 107:4746
-6 Mar. 1593 38 Censor of the Circuit of Shensi SL, 107:4777
6 Mar. 1593- 38 Assistant Administration 
Commissioner
Ibid.
1 Sept. 1593- 39 (Degraded from office) SL, 107:4882
-4 May 1594 40 Vice Minister of the Court of 
the Imperial Stud
SL, 108:5033
Jan. 1594- 40 Commissioner of the Office of 
Transmission
PPCS, 1:88; 
SL, 108:5033
10 Jul. 1594- 40 Assistant Censor-in-chief and 
Concurrent Governor of Liaotung
SL, 108:5067
29 Mar. 1595- 40 Vice Minister of War PPCS, 1:89
12 Oct. 1596- 42 Governor of Liaotung (under 
recuperation at office)
SL, 109:5651
6 Jun. 1597- 43
I
Vice Minister of War and 
Concurrent Governor of Liaotung 
(under recuperation at native 
place: Ch'ang-yuan, Pei-
Chihli)
SL, 109:5786 
DMB, 1:822
I
1 Jul. 1597- 43 (Under recuperation at native 
place: Ch'ang-yuan, Pei-
Chihli)
PPCS, 1:88
22 Apr. 1599- 45 Vice Minister of War and 
Concurrent Assistant Censor-in­
chief Serving as Supreme 
Commander of Military Affairs 
in Szechuan, Hukuang and 
Kweichow and Concurrently 
Controlling Military Rations 
and Grand Coordinator of the 
Szechuan Area
PPCS, 1:1, 
88
28 Apr. 1600 46 (Title as above but promoted 
from Assistant Censor-in-chief 
to Censor-in-chief)
SL, 111:6429
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Date Age Title of Officialdom Sources
Jun. 1603 49 Vice Minister of Works MS,  20:5986; 
D M B , 1:825
Nov. 1604 50 Minister of War and Concurrent MS,  20:5986;
Junior Guardian D M B , 1:824
1605-1608 51-54 (Retirement) D M B , 1:825
1608-1612 54-58 Minister of War i MS,  11:3485- 
3486; DMB, 
1:825!*
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Chiu-hsi b>1 H s ieh W u - c h ' i u n g 44 !
C h 'iung-pu : jl :;jl hsien-oh 'eng Hl £
Chou I-te i*,) it Ilsin-t' ien Id >1
Chou K u o-chu © © h H s ing Chieh •it|( i l j
C h o u  Ta-mu 4) k Vk H s i n g - l u n g iüi fi
Chou T u n-chi © k t Hsing tu-ssu ?j M' I)
Ch u  Ch' u a n %iL Hsu Chung-chia 11 <t a
Chu H o - l i n g Hsu Y u n - c h u e h <i L %
Chu-ko liang iS % k> hsüan-fu-shih ’s. 44 4L
Chu K u ei-fang i  n % hsuan-fu-ssu L 44 3
chu-pu i  if H s u a n - w e i  k u a n - c h u a n g i  g. L p
Chu Yuan - c h a n g i  b  g hsuan-wei-shih i  C
Chu a n g 14 c i\i.) hsuan-wei-ssu i  't3
C h u n g k i n g f  4 Hu K u e i - f a n g 15] !r |
chün-hsien sp h i Huang 4
darughachi •-L, ■%'b  7 i- Hui Mi n 1. k
E l -Buqa o i  T  S o H u n g  C h 'eng-yuan •* ;? m
fan-i wei-so 1 4 m  ffr I-Han ts 'an-yung 1 ; ! *■ (?)
fan-shuai i-i ohih-i '■ / 4 - 'I ('4') ^
F e i - l i e n - p a o 4t k  1 i-i fa-i w. V. 5 V 4
feng-chien h  4L i-i kung-i w. -1 4
Feng- y a n g lip ? i i-gen
Feng Yueh g, * i-man kung-man rh ,> >4
fu /o I-pin jl ' f
fu-shih
Ha K u a n g - h s i e n
li1.) i L
“Ir L  ' P
i-tsu
J U X  (iL_ hu.Mj
J en C h 'e n g-chueh *3 f r)
H a i - l u n g - t 1un 
H a i - y u n -t 'un
■J hi li) 
;■*1 ©
J u a n  W e n - c h u n gJ U- 1v_g —  r>\t ä.
Jurche^iT-
f . k i  4
Pt JLi
Han
-
kai-t ru kuei-liu cP ± 1} L o
Han i- faf 4 Kao Ch e - c h i h ,L h  k
Han W u - t i / i lk. f K h i t a n C 4
Ho /i'°j K h u b i l a i  Khan J 4' 4!
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Ku Ying-t'ai 1 /&. 1 Lo Lin A 4  /«.!,
Kuan-pa •r 4\. Lo-meng Pass i1 i'till)
K'ung Ch'ao-fu Lou 'tA
K'ung Chi-tsu jcM a Lou-shan Pass t   ^ 4)
Kuo Ch'eng If 4 Lu /I
Kuo Tzu-chang 4 ? t Lu Yun-lung si A 4
Kuo-tzu-chzen po-shzh iS) f SI 4  i Lung-chao-t1un ntH  ©
Kweilin M M Lung Ch'eng i t  >i
Lan-ch'iao ii Lung-li t l ’t
Lan-t'u Mil -l Ma Chen in- 4
Li Ching $ ‘‘I Ma Ch'ien-ch'eng 4 f t
Li Hua-lung t  <o IL Ma Ch'ien-ssu Si,f
li-mu t  @ Ma-hu 4 t
Li P'ei-ken A 4 kl Ma K'ung-ying b i- it
Li Shang-ssu 1  ft & Ma-nao-t'un ' ,  % [ fi
Li Ssu-ming ft 4- 4 man-z chang-kuan-ssu A 1 i t
Li Ying-hsiang A 4 4 Man-z-chuan 1' i
Liang ~ d--t- Mang-pu t  if
Liaotung i t  i Mao - b
Lin-an A Mao Jui-cheng i  4 .ii
Lin C h 'iao-hsiang 11 A 4 Mei Kuo-lou "fi (?) h
Ling-hu 4  -fiv Mi-lu 4  4
Liu Chang A) g Miao
Liu Ch'eng-chih 4) Min (tribe) f)
Liu Ch'eng-ssu vj til] Min (river) ■"ft
Liu Chin Ming Yu-chen 4 1- b
Liu Hsiao-chi-ek 4'J I t  ff Mou-chou t\'1
Liu Hsien LJ Mu Chao 4 *s
Liu I-hsiang v) "  W Mu Ts 1 an 4  4
Liu Kang ?») *6) Nan-p'ing 4  f
Liu T'ing *} a i l Nanchao 4  h
Liu Tsung-yuan lip '£ -If Ning-chou 4  M|
lzu-t ru kung-chzh fi M Ningsia 4  A
Liu Y'a 1) m Okano Masako (*) 'fj L  A
Liu Yu-hsi ?■] 4  if Pa-yang ht it.
Liu Yueh 1) 1 Pai Ming-k'uei /=? ' i  i L
Lo Vv'.*°.L Pai-shih-k'ou vt l2
Lo Pai-t'ien-pa
Lo Ch'i-pin .Mi -L -1 Pao-ning 4. i
Lo Hsing <?.m it Pei-Chihli ;|t i  Ijl
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Pei Tu '! n T ’ an ■ i 'A
P'cng Yang-cheng h  i T T'an Hsi-ssu Lg * v;v'f ')'
P ' eng Yuan-chin V)U T ' an I .a|  JL
pien 4 T'an Yu-chien 4 i ,  / i t
Pien k'ung-shih T- Tartar -f i-L
Pien Shang-chiang 4  T  h Teng Hung-lieh 7i f  A1 41
P ' i n g - c h ' a ■f£ teng-tsung ^  'A
P ' ing-yueh f  iä ti i-Tj
Po-chou ' t ' i ' 4*) T i - c h 'ao ftf fy
Pubei n Tieh-hsi 'it  7t;
P 1 u-an £ -k T ' ien 0
P 1u Lin iff)' t h t 'ien
Sang-mu Pass k  i  Ufl T 'ien Ta-feng 0
Sayin-Buqa ' f  (S g T'ien Yüeh ¥
shang-fang-chien h  t) 4?f Tientsin 4  i f
S h a o - c h ' ing .‘- s 4 Ts'ai Tsung-hsien ti- -:r *r•r. & T.
She Ch'ung-ming f  ■£ a/] Ts'ao Hsi-pin o 4
She Shih-hsu ■Y « -l i T s 'en Shao-hsün £  AS 4/>
She Shih-wei h  1 /& Tsou Wen-sheng
Shen I-kuan -  t tsu-shuai
Shih Ch'ao-cheng ■L % i Tsun-i 4L- '-tv
shih-ch 'en Tu chih-hui-shih-ssu ^  f t  n
Shih Ching-hsien Tu-pa sp 4
Sh u i - n i u - t ' ang :ik 4 V| Tu-tu «P V
Ssu-chou tu-yuan-shuai-fu r  'if-
Ssu-en O  'O' Tu-yun *p 3
Ssu-shih s  t t 'u-chih-chou i. V 'f
Sun Shih-t'ai >g 1» t 'u-chih-fu J_ V» .ft
Sung i-
+ i
t ’u-chih-hsien i  v-t i
S u n g - k 'an t 'u-kuan
S u n g - p 'an tv, t ’u-li
j _
Sung Shih-ch'en ■$ ^  a t 'u-she
Sung T'ai-tsu t ’u-ssu g]
Sung Yueh *  % T'u Tsung-chun
T a - c h ' ien A Pf t ’u t  'ung-p 'an JL t
Ta Hsia v: 1 Tuan 4'L
Ta-li <  ?I T u n g - c h 'uan i "i
Ta-lou-shan A  |  * T u n g - p 'o > A4
Ta-ning k  "f t 'ung-chih (,f) ft
T a - s h u i - t ' ien g, p ® T 'ung-ku Ah)
At
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T 'ung Yuan-chen •i *..• 'i 'k Yang Ilsien
Tz 'u-sh'Lh H  t_ Yang Kuang-tsu Vi  L  fjl
W a n - c h 'uan 5 7>-,1-1 X. Yang Min-cheng \ i  ki.
Wan-hsi n i Yang Tung-ming h i  i  °i]
Wan Min-ying %  k  i Yang Wei-chung "Hi t
Wang ± Yang Yin-ch'iu • U  'i a
Wang Cheng i  is- Yang Ying-lung U  ä  (it
Wang Chi-kuang i . A &  ß b Yang Yu i f ,  £
Wang Chih-han j~ i- Yao 4 cfi i q t )
Wang Chih-tung i. -L Yao-pa-kan k  'T
Wang Fan-ch'en % Yeh Meng-hsiung -f ,*> «t "A
Wang Fen — .4**~  ^ Yeh T a n g - c h 'un f  *  i
Wang Hsiang-meng
Wang I-kuei X  - Yen-ching §  /f
Wang Ju-yuan ;X <:« ;M - •N
Wang Meng-chi X  1  t Yi
t)
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tf
Wang Shih-ch'i ying-shou ■<_ 2
Wang Te-wan X  U Y i n g - t 'ien
Wang Ying-ch'ang T ,'A °—  e Yu
Wang Ying-lin i  1- & Yu Ho }vb A t
Wei _±4 Yu Hsi-lei tC H
Wei-po •f >? 19 yu-ssu
wei-so y f j  t f f Yu
Wei Yang-meng i ft 'T•x (i, k *)e Yu Chi-hsun J 1 ?S
Wo-k 'ou Yu Shen-hsing
Wu 7 it 1
Wu ■)': Yuan
Wu-ch ' a f 2 Yuan-chou ;\L ^
W u - c h ' e yuan-shuai-fu -o lif A
Wu-chiang (2 :T ■ 9 Yuan Tzu-sheng ± y s?\ -T T
W u - k 'ai 5- (V) Yueh-chin &
Wu Kuang * 4 Yun-yang ?*.: ft
Wu Li-chia Yung-an-chim fu-jen ^ i A
Wu-meng Y u n g - c h 'ang A  8
Wu Shih-ch'iao * ^ * Yung-cheng /I iL
Wu T 'ien-yu k k K
Wu Ts'ung-chou t-
Wu Wen-chieh
Wu Ying-ming ;)L /h. Ojj
Yai-men Pass % !’:• 6;1
Yang Ching-shun h  i 4
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